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Abstract
This dissertation is comprised of three essays intended to contribute to the
operations management discipline, specifically within supply chain management. The
first essay provides a research agenda for studying deceptive product counterfeits, which
are products that have been manufactured and/or distributed and sold by an entity in
violation of another’s intellectual property rights and intentionally misrepresented by the
seller as the genuine article. The proliferation of counterfeits into legitimate supply
chains presents quality, health and safety and cost concerns for nearly all industries. We
identify antecedents of vulnerability to deceptive counterfeits for firms and their supply
chain partners using Situational Crime Prevention Theory and Normal Accident Theory.
Vulnerability to counterfeiting has negative performance impacts for the firm, its
customers and society. We propose using the Six Ts of Supply Chain Quality
Management (Roth, Tsay, Pullman and Gray, 2008) as an approach to select effective
strategies to mitigate these impacts.
Essay Two serves as an initial effort to understand how counterfeits can enter
supply chains. In this essay, we test whether purchasing specialists can serve as effective
guardians of the supply chain using a scenario based role playing experiment. We explore
if buyers can detect signals of counterfeits in proposals and successfully avoid the
counterfeit supplier in the decision process. We additionally examine whether time
constraints and workload pressure detracts from the ability to successfully process signals
and avoid the counterfeit. We find that the buyers can successfully detect counterfeit
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signals and avoid the counterfeit in the selection decision, but don’t find support for time
constraints and workload pressure effects.
The final contribution of this dissertation is a methodological essay that explores
the effect of time pressure on decision making by using a combination of perceived time
pressure and objective measures of time spent in the decision process to determine if time
pressure affects the quality of the decision making in a supplier selection decision. We
find that time constraints and perceived time pressure are related constructs that
negatively affect decision quality in a supplier selection decision.
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Chapter 1

Introduction
Product counterfeiting is the unauthorized reproduction of goods that are
protected as the intellectual property of another entity (Cordell, Wongtada & Kieschnick,
1996; Shultz and Saporito, 1996). Practitioner literature, government reports and the
media frequently highlight serious consequences for consumers, firms, and society from
the proliferation of counterfeit goods (Phillips, 2005; Parloff, 2009; OEDC, 2009; SASC,
2012; CBP, 2012; European Commission, 2012). Infiltration of counterfeit parts and
components is a critical problem for emerging and established markets worldwide.
Supply chain managers are charged with the responsibility of ensuring a safe and secure
supply chain, and the purchasing department plays an essential role in this task through
its work in obtaining required materials for the operations of a supply chain.
One example of the potential financial impact of product counterfeiting within a
business to business context comes from the defense sector, particularly in the area of
electronic components. As highlighted in a Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC)
report in May 2012, the federal government had to spend $4.5 million to remove
counterfeit parts for one of its missile defense systems (SASC, 2012). In addition to the
costs of addressing counterfeits that firms face, an even greater concern is one of
user/consumer health and safety. Perhaps one of the most heartbreaking examples is from
China, where counterfeit infant formula caused the malnourishment, illness and
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subsequent deaths of more than 50 children in Fuyang city (McDonald, 2009). In addition
to the health and safety concerns associated with counterfeits are concerns regarding the
exploitation of vulnerable populations, including children, in unsafe work conditions to
produce counterfeit goods for minimal pay in sweatshop conditions (Boniface, 2010;
Thomas, 2009). The aforementioned examples illustrate a few of the cost, health and
safety risks, associated with counterfeit goods. There is a combined effort on the part of
governments, industry groups, and individual firms to address the counterfeit problem.
Firms are rising to this challenge by investing in ways to control and track their goods
and supplies, improving traceability of product origins by developing databases for
reporting, tracking and seizing counterfeit goods; and by educating consumers and supply
chain partners on how to identify counterfeit copies of their products (Staake and Fleisch,
2008; Berman, 2008).
As we examined the extent literature to understand the counterfeit phenomena,
five research questions emerged that this dissertation seeks to address in order to improve
the supply chain management discipline’s knowledge in this area. The specific questions
are:
1.

What are the aspects of supply chains that make them vulnerable to the
infiltration of counterfeits?

2.

What are the impacts of counterfeits in supply chains?

3.

What can be done to address the problem from a supply chain perspective?

4.

How can supply chain and purchasing specialists help firms prevent the
infiltration of counterfeits into supply chains?
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5.

What effects do time and workload pressure have on the quality of the
purchasing decision outcome?

The dissertation is structured into three essays with three intended contributions.
In Essay One, we develop a conceptual model to identify the sources of vulnerability to
counterfeits entering legitimate supply chains and the impacts of counterfeits for firms,
consumers and society, and offer a proposed agenda for research to understand and
mitigate the possible negative outcomes that are the result of deceptive counterfeits. In
developing our agenda, we include relevant theories that can be used as a lens to examine
this issue, including Signaling Theory (Spence, 1974; Mavlanova and Benbunan-Fich,
2010), Crime Prevention Theory (Speier, Whipple, Closs and Voss, 2011), Normal
Accident Theory (Perrow, 1984), High Reliability Theory (Weick, 1987) and Deception
Theory (Bowyer, 1982; Whaley, 1982; Bell and Whaley, 1991). We then use the Six Ts
of Supply Chain Quality Management (Roth et al., 2008) to offer a typology of relevant
strategies to help prevent counterfeits from entering supply chains.
The second contribution of this dissertation, and focus of Essay Two, is to use a
behavioral operations perspective to examine the role of purchasing specialists as
guardians of the security of supply chain by conducting a scenario based role playing
experiment to determine if they can detect signals of counterfeits and avoid the
counterfeit supplier in a purchasing decision. Following the logic of Crime Prevention
Theory as applied to supply chains (Speier et al., 2011), we propose that purchasing
specialists serve as guardians of the supply chain, so it is essential to understand if they
can detect signals of counterfeits in proposals and avoid selecting offerors whose
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proposals contain counterfeit signals. This essays extends research on deceptive
counterfeits into the business-to-business purchasing situation. Prior experimental
research into the phenomena was conducted in the marketing discipline to address
consumer behavior in e-commerce situations (Mavlanova and Benbunan-Fich, 2010). As
part of our experiment, we examine if time pressure and workload pressure
considerations affect the ability to detect the counterfeit signals.
The final contribution of this dissertation is primarily focused on understanding
the effects of time pressure, both actual constraints on time and perceptions of time
pressure, on the quality and accuracy of decision making. This essay uses data gathered
during the experiment that is the focus of Essay Two and employs structural equation
modeling to examine the relationship of perceptual assessments of time pressure and
measures of the observed amount of time spent in decision making to determine if these
are strongly related to one another. Additionally, we examine whether these two
approaches to assessing time pressure are valuable in terms of their relationship actual
time constraints and decision quality.
The remainder of this essay is structured as follows. Chapter 2 is our conceptual
piece, Essay One, entitled “Deceptive Counterfeits: A Supply Chain Quality Management
Research Agenda”. It is followed in Chapter 3 by our experimental contribution, Essay
Two, which is titled “Avoiding Deceptive Counterfeits: A Behavioral Experiment
Informed by Signaling and Crime Prevention Theories”. Our structural equation
modeling effort on time pressure is the focus of Essay Three, “Objective versus
Perceptual Measures of Time Pressure: An Exploratory Methodological Note”. We
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summarize our dissertation conclusions and recommendation for future research in
Chapter 5. Attached to the back of this dissertation are two appendices containing the
detailed typology findings from Essay One and the experimental scenarios and
questionnaire used in Essay Two, as well as a listing of References used throughout this
work.
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Chapter 2

Essay One: Deceptive Counterfeits: A
Supply Chain Quality Management
Research Agenda
2.1

Introduction
Product counterfeiting, or the unauthorized reproduction of goods that are

protected as the intellectual property of another entity (Cordell, Wongtada & Kieschnick,
1996; Shultz and Saporito, 1996), is a critical problem for supply chains in all industry
sectors in both emerging and established markets around the globe. The challenge for
supply chain managers is to ensure a safe and secure supply chain, end-to-end, for their
downstream customers in both business-to-business (B2B) and business-to-consumer
(B2C) relationships.
From a B2B perspective, the clearest examples of product counterfeiting can be
seen in the defense aviation sector, particularly in the area of electronic components. The
costs for remediation of the problem of counterfeits in these supply chains are staggering.
As detailed in a Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) report in May 2012, the
Missile Defense Agency and its contractors had to invest $4.5 million in reworking as a
result of counterfeiting (SASC, 2012). That is just one defense agency’s costs. Given that
the SASC identified more than 1800 cases of suspected counterfeits in the U.S.
Department of Defense’s supply chains, it is evident that the cost grows substantially. As
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a result of the SASC findings, the U.S. Congress added requirements to the National
Defense Authorization Act of 2012 that it is the responsibility of contractors (supplying
firms) to bear the costs associated with correction of counterfeit problems unless specific
criteria are met (NDAA, 2013).
In addition to the costs of addressing counterfeits that firms face, the other major
concern is one of user/consumer health and safety, which is particularly true in the area of
counterfeit pharmaceuticals. One of the more striking examples of the problem was
reported in Smithsonian Magazine, detailing how the Chinese-made anti-malarial drug,
artesunate, was being counterfeited on a major scale, with perpetrators selling blister
packs that look like the legitimate medicine but that were made solely of flour (Marshall
and Battambang, 2009). The people who need this medication are in developing countries
such as Cambodia where malaria is a highly fatal disease. While the legitimate drug is
produced in China, so too was the counterfeit packaging used to defraud innocent people
who need this drug. While some of the people involved in this incident were prosecuted
by the Chinese government, the manufacturer of the counterfeits was never identified,
and most of the 240,000 counterfeit packs were never recovered, probably making their
way into the market in Southeast Asia. This is not an isolated incident. In the early 2000s
in Nigeria, counterfeit medicines for the treatment of HIV, malaria and other diseases
were sold on the street by “hawkers” (Phillips, 2005).
As evidenced by these examples, counterfeit products present a host of cost,
health and safety risks, impacting countries around the globe, so there is a growing focus
within industry and government on eradicating this problem from infesting licit supply
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chains. Government and industry groups are trying to work with one another to improve
enforcement of criminal penalties and to make the distribution of counterfeits more
difficult, but as the problem is still present, companies need to take actions to secure their
supply chains from product counterfeit infiltration. Firms are rising to this challenge by
investing in ways to control and track their goods and supplies, such as RFID
technologies; by working with anti-counterfeiting initiatives sponsored by governments
and industry groups, such as developing databases for reporting, tracking and seizing
counterfeit goods; and by educating their customers on how to identify counterfeit copies
of their products.
To support the efforts by practitioners to address the counterfeiting problem that
consumers, businesses and governments face, there are three basic research questions that
the supply chain management discipline should seek to answer:
1.

What are the aspects of supply chains that make them vulnerable to the
infiltration of counterfeits?

2.

What are the impacts of counterfeits in supply chains?

3.

What can be done to address the problem from a supply chain perspective?

The objective of this chapter is to begin to answer these questions. To do so, we
develop a conceptual framework for the exploration of product counterfeits in supply
chains. The framework includes the definition of a construct called “vulnerability to
product counterfeits” and explores the antecedents of this vulnerability. These
antecedents are a combination of product and supply chain factors, including aspects that
are specifically related to conducting supply chain operations in emerging markets.
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Additionally, our framework offers propositions for the relationship between
vulnerability to product counterfeits and business performance outcomes, including loss
of demand and costs of remediation of counterfeits. To answer the third question, we
present a summary of proposed strategies in extant literature and use the High Reliability
Theory as the basis for propositions that the Six Ts of Supply Chain Quality Management
(Roth, Tsay, Pullman and Gray, 2008) can be used as the anchors for strategies to combat
counterfeits in supply chains.

2.2 Background
Sources and Distribution of Product Counterfeits
The U.S. Customs and Border Protection and the European Union’s border
control agents have a long history of seizing product counterfeits and pirated goods as
part of their inspections for IPR violations. From 2001 to 2011, there were a total of
550,729 identified cases of IPR violations in the United States and the European Union
(EU) (CBP, 2012; European Commission, 2012). While this seems a staggering number
and the trend is increasing, it is likely that many more counterfeits enter markets than are
seized. Estimates on the magnitude of counterfeiting in the world economy suggest it to
be 2% of the world trade in goods, amounting up to approximately $250 billion in 2007
(OEDC, 2009).
A continued look into these data reveals that a large portion of counterfeited and
pirated goods originate or are transshipped from China and other countries with emerging
markets. In the EU, the greatest portion of counterfeit and pirated goods that are seized,
reported as a percentage of the total number of articles seized, originate from China
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(72.95% of cases in 2011), with Hong Kong (7.67%), Greece (4.79%) and India (3.29%)
rounding out the top exporting countries for pirated and counterfeit goods (European
Commission, 2012). In the US, the greatest portion of pirated and counterfeit seizures,
reported as a percentage of the total number of cases, come from China (55% of CBP
seizure cases in 2011), followed by Hong Kong (27%) and Turkey (2%) (CBP, 2012).
While the US percentage for China seems low for 2011, it is plausible that some items
originating in China are transshipped via other countries such as Myanmar, Dubai, United
Arab Emirates, and Nigeria (UNODC, 2008).
Counterfeiting – A Double-edged Sword for Emerging Markets
Emerging markets are defined as countries that are experiencing rapid growth and
advancement in industrialization. International firms are leveraging the opportunities
within these markets by outsourcing production, distribution and service activities to
these nations, with the hope of reducing the costs of products made for domestic and
foreign consumption. In their efforts to expand into these markets, firms share their
intellectual property in a variety of ways, from sharing patented manufacturing processes
and specifications, dyes, molds, and models, to sharing trademarked packaging and brand
images for use in the production and distribution of products. Unfortunately, the level of
intellectual property rights (IPR) protection at the national and local level varies greatly
in these markets. Additionally, worker rights and health and safety protections may not
be to the level expected in the firm’s home country.
Companies and governments in emerging markets are eager to grow their
business and economy, but there are some firms and individuals who are willing to do so
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at the expense of intellectual property rights of their partners as well as at the expense of
human rights and consumer safety, and counterfeiting products is one way they achieve
this goal.
Counterfeiters do not limit their sales to foreign countries; they sell the goods in
their own nations as well, putting the health and safety of the local populace at risk. In
2009, the Chinese government arrested 24 people for the production and sale of
counterfeit baby formula that led to the malnutrition and deaths of more than 50 children
in Fuyang city (McDonald, 2009). Additionally, counterfeit producers will force workers,
including children, to endure long hours for minimal pay in sweatshop conditions
(Boniface, 2010; Thomas, 2009). The people taking these jobs generally face poverty or
are the victims of human trafficking.
The staggering facts about product counterfeiting can leave even the most callous
feeling somewhat uneasy and disturbed, and while we hope that everyone can understand
the consequences of the proliferation of the counterfeit economy, the method we chose to
help address the problem was to explain how supply chain academics and practitioners
can begin to examine the antecedents of supply chain vulnerability to counterfeiting as
well as explain some of the potential effects of counterfeits on supply chains.
Identification of the gap in supply chain research
Despite this growing call to action on the part of industry and government, there
exists only a limited amount of academic research in the supply chain management
discipline dedicated to explaining what factors in supply chains allow for the infiltration
of counterfeits; quantifying the risks associated with counterfeits, both the probabilities of
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occurrence and the magnitude of impact; and the resultant effect on supply chain
performance outcomes. Other disciplines have examined counterfeiting from a marketing
and economic perspective, but none from a supply chain security and quality perspective
(see Tables 2.1 and 2.2 and Appendix A for specific details).
The overarching intended contribution of this chapter is to serve as a theoretical
and conceptual development piece that articulates the relevance and contemporary
importance of studying product counterfeiting in supply chain management research. Our
specific objectives for this effort are to present an overview of product counterfeiting and
the magnitude of this problem, discuss the current state of supply chain literature, identify
the gaps that exist in the area of product counterfeits, present a conceptual framework for
examining counterfeiting in supply chains, offer a research agenda for product
counterfeiting in the supply chain management discipline, and recommend potential
theoretical lenses that can be used to evaluate this issue.

2.3

Construct Definition and Differentiation
To examine the current body of knowledge on product counterfeiting, particularly

as related to supply chain management, we first conducted a review of the literature
within the management discipline to identify the current state of the discipline’s research
in this area. Within the operations management literature, we found a limited initial set
of investigations related to counterfeiting (Stevenson and Busby, 2015; Cho, Fang and
Tayur, 2015). We also found calls to study counterfeiting as part of the broader issue of
supply chain security (Flynn, 2008; Maruchek, Greis, Mena, Cai, 2011). We then
expanded our research to include works from other disciplines to achieve a more holistic
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view of the subject. Our review indicates a very limited amount of research that has been
conducted in the management discipline, but a far greater base of knowledge in other
fields, particularly in marketing and business economics. The goal of our literature
review was to serve as a grounding for our key constructs and to identify different lenses
that might be relevant for exploring this problem from a supply chain management
perspective.
Construct Definitions for Product Counterfeiting
Product counterfeiting is a long-standing problem with one of the earliest attempts
in history being a stopper for a Roman wine amphora, dated 27 BC, in Arles, France
(Phillips, 2005), so that locally made French wine could be counterfeited and sold as the
more expensive Roman varietal. Equally longstanding is the history of currency
counterfeiting, which demonstrates the need first to differentiate and distinguish our
focus area, product counterfeiting, from related topics. Counterfeiting, which broadly
speaking, is the imitation of another item, be it a product, monetary instruments (currency
or checks) or signatures, is classified as a type of intellectual property rights infringement
(Staake, Thiesse and Fleisch, 2009). In addition to counterfeiting, intellectual property
rights infringements include digital piracy, illicit parallel imports and patent violations
(Staake et al., 2009).
In academic research, a thorough literature review in the area of counterfeiting
was completed by Staake et al. in 2009, including an assessment of academic and
industry publications from 1976 to 2006. This review provides definitions for
counterfeiting and related terms. Figure 2.1 depicts their classification scheme for terms
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related to counterfeiting. Counterfeiting is a subset of illicit trade and intellectual
property right infringements that is separate from contraband trade, illicit trade in
controlled goods and trade in stolen goods. Counterfeiting can occur in the area of money
and official documents, services and physical goods. It can be of a deceptive or nondeceptive nature. In deceptive counterfeits, the consumer is unaware that the item is, in
fact, a counterfeit, whereas with non-deceptive counterfeits, the consumer is fully aware
of the illicit nature of the product. The counterfeit medicine examples mentioned in the
introduction section of this chapter are deceptive counterfeits, while the purchase of
knock-offs of designer purses are examples of non-deceptive counterfeiting. Phillips’
(2005) book on counterfeiting includes a discussion of “brand bandits” and “counterfeit
alley” examples of non-deceptive counterfeits. While both deceptive and non-deceptive
counterfeits are important, for the purpose of supply chain quality management research,
our focus is in the area of deceptive counterfeiting as it impacts the licit supply chains of
manufacturers, distributors, wholesalers, retailers, and end-users of products.
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Illicit Trade

Contraband
Trade

Illicit Trade in
Controlled
Goods

IPR
Infringements

Trade in Stolen
Goods

Counterfeiting

Services

Money/Official
Documents

Physical Goods

Deceptive

Non-Deceptive

FIGURE 2.1 – CLASSIFICATION OF COUNTERFEITING AND RELATED TERMS
SOURCE: STAAKE ET AL., 2009
The other notable contribution of Staake et al.’s (2009) work is that it identifies
four primary research focus areas related to counterfeiting: (1) general descriptions of
counterfeiting, (2) impact analyses, which investigate the consequences of counterfeits,
(3) supply-side investigations, which address production settings, tactics and motives of
illicit actors and how their products enter the legitimate supply chain, and (4) demandside investigations, which focus on consumer behavior and attitudes related to counterfeit
goods. Staake et al. (2009) concede that the amount of academic research related to
supply-side investigations is limited, acknowledging that very few publications are
dedicated to these issues, despite the importance of understanding how this side operates,
and how licit companies can fight illicit producers. This essay serves to motivate a
research agenda focusing on counterfeits in supply chains.
15

Numerous definitions for counterfeits can be found across industries and
government agencies (GAO, 2010). Efforts are being made to develop such standards in
industries and government agencies, both at the national and international level. For
example, SAE International (2009) has developed AS5553, Counterfeit Electronic Parts;
Avoidance, Detection, Mitigation, and Disposition. In this standard, two definitions are
provided. A “Suspect Part” is defined as a part where there exists, through inspection,
testing or other information, evidence that it may have been misrepresented by the
supplier or manufacturer. A “Counterfeit Part” has a more stringent definition stating that
the part is a suspect part that is also a copy or substitute without legal right or authority to
do so or one whose material, performance, or characteristics are knowingly
misrepresented by a supplier in the supply chain. This more stringent definition identifies
the deceptive element of counterfeit as well as the intellectual property rights element of
these items.
Other examples of definitions were found in the Aerospace Industries
Association’s (AIA) 2011 report on counterfeit parts and the World Health
Organization’s (WHO, 2008; WHO, 2012) task force on counterfeit pharmaceuticals. The
AIA defined a counterfeit as “product produced or altered to resemble a product without
authority or right to do so, with the intent to mislead or defraud by presenting the
imitation as original or genuine” (AIA, 2011). The WHO defined a counterfeit medicine
as “one which is deliberately and fraudulently mislabeled with respect to identity and/or
source. Counterfeiting can apply to both branded and generic products and counterfeit
products may include products with the correct ingredients or with the wrong ingredients,
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without active ingredients, with insufficient active ingredients or with fake packaging”
(WHO, 2012).
These various definitions of counterfeits in industries demonstrated to us that
there exists a need for a parsimonious and relevant definition of product counterfeits that
could be used in a broad variety of supply chain management research applications. To
develop this general definition, we conducted an extensive literature review of numerous
academic, government and industry publications. Table 2.1 is the summary of the
definitions we found in our research. From the research conducted by Staake et al. (2009)
and this list of definitions, a set of characteristics for our definition of deceptive product
counterfeits in legitimate supply chains emerged.
Authors

Year

Staake, Theisse
and Fleisch

2012

Mavlanova and
Benbunan-Fich

2010

Sood, Das and
Pecht

2011

Aerospace
Industries
Association

2011

Yang and Fryxell

2009

Definition
Counterfeit trademark goods: any goods, including
packaging, bearing without authorization, a trademark
that is identical to the trademark validly registered in
respect of such goods or that cannot be distinguished
in its essential aspects from such a trademark, which
thereby infringes the rights of the owner of the
trademark in question under the law of the country of
importation (WTO, 1994 TRIPS Agreement).
Product counterfeiting is the unauthorized
manufacturing or commercialization of goods whose
characteristics are protected by trademarks, patents or
copyrights.
Counterfeit electronic part is one whose identity (e.g.,
manufacturer, date code, lot code) has been
deliberately misrepresented.
Counterfeit parts are defined as a product produced or
altered to resemble a product without authority or
right to do so, with the intent to mislead or defraud by
presenting the imitation as original or genuine.
Counterfeiting-- the unauthorised imitative production
of products and/or services that are protected by
owners' intellectual property rights (IPR) in the
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pursuit of profit.
Uses Cordell et al.’s (1996) definition - product
counterfeiting involves any unauthorized
2009 manufacturing of goods whose special characteristics
are protected as intellectual property rights, or
trademarks, patents and copyrights.
Counterfeiting denotes the unauthorized reproduction
of goods, services, or documents in relation which the
state confers upon legal entities a statutory monopoly
to prevent their exploitation by others. Deceptive
Staake and
counterfeiting -- refers to cases where a person or
2008
Fleisch
organization purchases counterfeit goods in the belief
they are buying genuine articles. Non-deceptive
counterfeiting shall refer to cases where a person or
an organization purchases counterfeit goods knowing
of their counterfeit nature.
Counterfeiting, which means “to imitate exactly
Yang, Sonmez
something valuable or important,” such as
2004
and Bosworth
counterfeited money, with intent to defraud or
deceive.
Any unauthorized manufacturing of goods whose
Cordell et al.
1996 special characteristics are protected as intellectual
property rights (trademarks, patents, and copyrights)
Counterfeiting is the unauthorized production of
Shultz and
1996 goods that are legally protected by trademarks,
Saporito
copyrights or patents.
TABLE 2.1 – DEFINITIONS OF PRODUCT COUNTERFEITING IN EXTANT
LITERATURE
Chaudhry,
Zimmermann
Peters and
Cordell

The underlined terms in Table 2.1 highlight the common characteristics of
counterfeit definitions that are applicable to our conceptualization of deceptive product
counterfeits as related to the field of supply chain management. In these definitions, three
elements emerged which constitute the core of our definition of deceptive product
counterfeit: 1.) unauthorized manufacture

or production of a tangible good, 2.)

violating/infringing on another’s intellectual property rights, and 3.) misrepresenting the
nature of the product in order to deceive the buyer into believing that the counterfeit is an
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authentic item. Figure 2.2 depicts these three elements, integrating them into a formal
definition:
Deceptive Product Counterfeiting is the unauthorized manufacture and/or
distribution and sale of goods, misrepresenting these goods as genuine articles
that are protected as the specific intellectual property of an individual and/or
organization.
This definition of deceptive product counterfeiting applies to the action of committing the
counterfeiting. The outcome of this act is the good that constitutes a deceptive product
counterfeit, specifically defined:
Deceptive Product Counterfeit is any product that has been manufactured and/or
distributed and sold by an entity that is not authorized by the intellectual property
rights’ owner and is intentionally misrepresented by the seller as a genuine
article.
Three Dimensions of Deceptive Product Counterfeiting
To ensure a comprehensive and parsimonious conceptualization of this construct,
we will break this definition into parts and discuss them individually. Figure 2.2
illustrates the three dimensions of deceptive product counterfeits explained in detail
below.
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Deceptive
Product
Counterfeiting
Intent to Deceive Purchaser

FIGURE 2.2 – THREE DIMENSIONS OF DECEPTIVE PRODUCT
COUNTERFEITING
Unauthorized Manufacture
The first dimension of deceptive product counterfeiting is the unauthorized
manufacture or distribution and sale aspect of the act. In this context, unauthorized
manufacturing or distribution refers to either producing or distributing a good without the
consent of the intellectual property owner. This includes a variety of types of
counterfeiting activities, such as reversed engineered “knock-offs,” refurbished items and
inferior scrap items sold as new items, and factory overruns. Factory overruns occur
when a contractor with a license from an intellectual property owner produces goods in
excess of the limit of the licensing or distribution contract granted by the intellectual
property holder (Staake and Fleisch, 2009).
While other researchers (Staake and Fleisch, 2009) do not include factory
overruns and seconds sold on the gray market in their definitions of counterfeits, we
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chose to incorporate them because practitioners and industry groups perceive these as
issues of counterfeiting and include them in their counts of counterfeit goods. Staake and
Fleisch (2009) are correct in that this is a breach of contract more so than intellectual
property infringement, but the effect on a firm’s profits, loss of sales, and branding
impact are essentially the same. As such, we chose to include these for the sake of
comprehensiveness. In a similar vein, we included positioning refurbished items as new
as part of counterfeiting because industry and government entities incorporate this into
their working definitions of counterfeiting (SASC, 2012; SAE Aerospace, 2009).
Since supply chains are complex and involve many stages where manufacturing,
sourcing, assembly, distribution and disposal occur, we incorporate all of these stages
into our definition because counterfeits could enter the supply chain at any point in these
activities. The situation becomes even more complex when the supply chain also includes
product recovery nodes (see Fleischmann, Krikke, Dekker and Flapper, 2000, for a
description of product recovery activities in supply chains), which allow for additional
source nodes of materials to be converted into counterfeit items.
Violating Owner’s Intellectual Property Rights (IPR)
Deceptive product counterfeits can enter into a licit supply chain through multiple
mechanisms, all of which amount to an IPR violation of some form. Any legal entity (e.g.
individual, corporation or an industry standards group) can hold intellectual property
rights, including patents, trademarks and copyrights. Intellectual property refers to the
“creations of the mind, such as inventions; literary and artistic works; designs; and
symbols, names and images used in commerce” (World Intellectual Property
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Organization, 2015). Intellectual property is often shared with supply chain partners
under license in subcontract arrangements.
A subcontractor can engage in “third shift” manufacturing of factory overruns,
whereby the subcontractor fills the order for the intellectual property owner using the day
and swing shift operations in a factory and then “sells” the production capacity of a third
shift of workers to a counterfeiter, or the subcontractor actually becomes a counterfeiter,
selling the additional units of production “out the back door” or “off the back of a truck,”
to use two common euphemisms for counterfeit operations (Parloff, 2006). This practice
has impacted brand-name companies like New Balance shoes (Parloff, 2006).
Counterfeits are also produced by subcontractors after their licensing agreements with
intellectual property owners are terminated or product lines are discontinued (Parloff,
2006).
Reverse engineering of components is another source of counterfeits. When
addressing reverse engineering as a source of counterfeits, it is important to distinguish it
from reverse engineering for the purposes of making a competitive product (Minagawa,
Trott and Hoecht, 2007), which is part of how other firms learn and compete in markets.
Producing an item through reverse engineering, coupled with claiming it is the genuine
article protected as intellectual property, results in a counterfeit deceptive product.
Another entry of counterfeits into supply chains occurs in scrap, disposal and
reclamation activities. Inferior goods are disposed of by intellectual property owners or
upstream and downstream participants in the supply chain and then repackaged by
counterfeiters and sold as the original quality item. In all of these examples, counterfeits
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enter supply chains posing as genuine articles violating an owner’s intellectual property
rights.
Intent To Deceive
The final dimension of deceptive product counterfeiting is that the counterfeiter
intends to defraud the purchaser of the counterfeit product into believing that the goods
are the genuine article that is someone else’s intellectual property. This intent to deceive
is what differentiates a deceptive product counterfeit from a non-deceptive counterfeit,
the two categories defined by Staake et al. (2009).
Deceptive product counterfeiting exists when the buyer is unaware that the
product is a counterfeit good, while a non-deceptive counterfeiting situation occurs where
the buyer is aware that the item being procured is a counterfeit product. Non-deceptive
counterfeit situations are often the case in the area of luxury brand name goods, such as
Rolex watches, Coach and Burberry leather goods, and iPhones. There is a substantial
literature stream in the marketing discipline that examines consumer attitudes regarding
non-deceptive counterfeit goods (e.g. Grossman and Shapiro, 1988a and b; Wee, Ta, and
Cheok, 1995; Tom, Garibaldi, Zeng and Pilcher, 1998). This chapter focuses on
deceptive product counterfeiting, approaching the topic from a supply chain management
perspective; therefore, we differentiate deceptive product counterfeits from other types of
parts quality constructs.
Deceptive Product Counterfeit – Construct Differentiation
As illustrated in Figure 2.3, nonconforming, and defective products are concepts
related to deceptive product counterfeits, but that are distinctly different constructs. In
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fact, these items can potentially become deceptive product counterfeits if an entity
attempts to hide the nature of the defect and pass the article off as a genuine, functional,
first-quality part protected as another person’s or organization’s intellectual property.
Because these concepts are on the periphery of our research and related to our subject of
deceptive product counterfeits, it is necessary to isolate our subject area from these
related terms.

FIGURE 2.3 – DECEPTIVE COUNTERFEIT CONSTRUCT DIFFERENTIATION
The concept of a nonconforming product is based in quality management. Such a
product is one that fails to operate to the expected level of performance as documented in
the product’s technical specifications and requirements. The ISO 9000 standards focus
on controlling and eliminating such non-conformities. APICS addresses nonconformance
by defining nonconforming materials as “any raw material, part, component, or product
with one or more characteristics that depart from the specifications, drawing, or other
approved product description” (APICS, 2015). The American Society for Quality has a
similar definition for nonconformity, stating that is “the nonfulfillment of a specified
requirement” (ASQ, 2015). Another term, often used synonymously, yet erroneously,
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with nonconforming product is defective product. This concept is actually a legal term
that constitutes the very core of the area of product liability law. A defective product is
defined as a product that has the tendency or propensity to do harm to its ordinary user,
meaning an item manufactured to the expected standards and conforms to specifications
may still be a defective product in the legal sense if its design has the propensity to cause
physical harm to a normal user.

2.4 Theoretical Lenses for Exploring Counterfeiting Within Supply
Chains
The theoretical bases we use to explain why these antecedents are positively
related to vulnerability to counterfeiting are Normal Accident Theory (NAT), Signaling
Theory, Deception Theory and Crime Prevention Theory. We then apply Signaling
Theory, Deception Theory and High Reliability Theory (HRT) to explain why the Six Ts
of Supply Chain Quality Management (Roth et al., 2008) can be used to moderate the
relationship between vulnerability to counterfeiting and the performance impacts
associated with it.
Normal Accident Theory
Normal Accident Theory, first developed by Perrow (1984) as part of analyzing
the Three Mile Island disaster, then later applied to investigations like the space shuttle
Columbia disaster, states that accidents are inevitable and are a normal occurrence in
systems that are tightly coupled and complex in terms of the interactions among elements
of the systems. This systems theory has been applied to a variety of academic and
industry sectors such as healthcare (Tamuz and Harrison, 2006) and petrochemical
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production (Wolf, 2001; Wolf and Sampson, 2007). The two dimensions at the core of
Normal Accident Theory are complexity of interactions and coupling. Complexity of
interactions refers to the degree of interactions that are unanticipated, unfamiliar events,
particularly when these events are hard to visualize and difficult to analyze in terms of
the firm being able to immediately comprehend their impact on processes (Perrow, 1984).
Tight coupling refers to a large interaction and dependence among processes in the
system.
In the discipline of supply chain management, Normal Accident Theory has been
used to examine supply chain security, disruptions and adverse events (Speier, Whipple,
Closs and Voss, 2011; Skilton and Robinson, 2009). Speier et al. (2011) propose that a
firm experiences complex supply chain interactions when its processes involve unfamiliar
events, specifically when these events are not directly visible and their impact on
processes cannot be readily and completely comprehended by the firm. They further posit
that when supply chains are tightly coupled, lacking buffering either in the form of
suppliers, production centers or personnel, they have less potential to recover from an
incident than those supply chains with some slack resources and slack designed into
them. In their application of NAT to supply chain disruptions and security, Speier et al.
(2011) recognize that some accidents are unintentional and some intentional. This is an
important consideration when exploring the issue of counterfeiting in supply chains,
which can be an intentional or unintentional accident.
Outside parties can target a vulnerable supply chain at multiple points. They could
target the firm itself, the firm’s upstream suppliers or the firm’s downstream customers as
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the victims of counterfeiting. If the upstream supplier is targeted and that firm uses a
counterfeit part in a subcomponent, the supplier will have unintentionally allowed a
counterfeit part to infiltrate the focal firm’s supply chain. In the case of “third-shift”
production of counterfeits, the supplier becomes an intentional counterfeiter of products,
selling the focal firm’s products to customers without paying appropriate royalties or fees
to the intellectual property owners. While Normal Accident Theory can be used to
explain how the structure of supply chains can contribute to accidents or, in our case, the
infiltration of counterfeits, High Reliability Theory can provide insights into how to
construct processes to be highly reliable, even in high-risk situations.
High Reliability Theory
While NAT assumes that some accidents are inevitable events, High Reliability
Theory (HRT) posits that most accidents and disruptions are preventable, stating that,
even in high risk scenarios (e.g. nuclear power plants, aircraft carrier operations),
organizations can develop strategies to reduce problems and encourage organizational
reliability (Weick, 1987). To cultivate a high reliability organization, the firm needs to
focus on the potential for failure and foster a culture of mindfulness that enables it to
develop cognitive processes to detect the occurrence of problems and direct attention to
take the actions necessary to address these problems before they escalate out of control
(Weick, Sutcliffe and Obstfeld, 2008). High reliability is related to quality processes. In
their discussion of high reliability organizations, Weick and colleagues (2008, p. 60)
propose “if high reliability organizing is understood in part as a strategy to deploy
attention, quality practices could be viewed as devices to direct and channel that
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attention.” Our view is that employing a strategy of supply chain quality management can
improve the ability of a firm to detect and resolve issues of counterfeiting before they
escalate out of control. Employing quality management across the supply chain will
allow even tightly coupled supply chains with complex interactions to prevent and detect
counterfeiting issues.
Roth and colleagues (2008) developed the Six Ts framework for supply chain
quality management and improvement for the purpose of improving the safety and
security of food supply chains, as a result of the growing complexity of supply chains due
to globalization. According to their framework, implementing traceability, transparency,
trust and training programs, while considering time and testability factors, can improve
the quality management of supply chains (Roth et al., 2008). Following the logic of
Weick and colleagues (2008), it is reasonable to expect that employing quality
management across the supply chain can focus the attention of managers on variances in
quality that would be indicative of counterfeit problems, such as identifying illicit
distribution channels, deceptive packaging and non-conformities in product information
and labeling.
Signaling Theory
As we examine the entry of counterfeits into supply chains, the primary point may
occur during the purchasing decision. As such, Signaling Theory, (Spence, 1974),
provides valuable insight into how training might prove beneficial in preventing
counterfeits. In situations of information asymmetry, agents can convey information,
either honest or dishonest, that causes a principal to alter his/her behavior (Spence, 1974).
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This concept has been applied in consumer counterfeit situations by Mavlanova and
Benbunan-Fich (2010), where they examined consumers’ abilities to process trust and
deception signals in e-commerce purchasing situations involving potential counterfeits.
More recently, Stevenson and Busby’s (2015) qualitative research expands upon the
understanding of the signals used in counterfeits, offering insights into how counterfeiters
utilize signals by obscuring information, transmitting signals, acting upon demand signals
from the markets, and exploiting signals. They go on to offer potential strategies for
addressing the counterfeit threat to licit supply chains.
Crime Prevention Theory
In their work on supply chain security, Speier, Whipple, Closs and Voss (2011)
used a combination of NAT and HRT with situational crime prevention theory and
disaster management processes to posit that organizations that are able to prevent, detect,
respond and recover from security incidents can create resiliency and ensure the
sustainability of their supply chains. They argue that intentional acts against supply
chains are a result of an opportune target and location, lack of sufficient guardianship and
an offender willing to seize the opportunity to attack a vulnerable supply chain.
While being able to detect and eliminate counterfeits as they enter the supply
chain is important, it is equally important to attempt to prevent the infiltration from
occurring in the first place. One way to achieve prevention is to understand the ways in
which a counterfeiter could operate to sell deceptive counterfeits across a supply chain.
Deception Theory serves as a lens by which firms can understand how a counterfeiter
might attempt to fool elements of a supply chain into purchasing deceptive counterfeits.
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Deception Theory
Deception Theory explains how an entity uses a combination of simulative and
dissimulative tactics to deceive a target into believing a falsehood (Bowyer, 1982;
Whaley, 1982; Bell and Whaley, 1991; Johnson, Grazioli and Jamal, 1993; Santos and
Johnson, 2004). This theory has been applied with signaling theory to understand product
counterfeiting in consumer e-commerce purchasing by Mavlanova and Benbunan-Fich
(2010). Simulative tactics, including mimicking, inventing a false reality, and decoying,
are used in an attempt to attract a victim through showing false information to lure them
into believing a falsehood, while dissimulative tactics, such as masking, repackaging and
dazzling, are attempts to make the false goods blend into the normal environment, thus
hiding their true nature (Santos and Johnson, 2004). In the case of deceptive product
counterfeiting, masking and repackaging are commonly used simulative tactics. In the
electronics industry, there are documented cases where older circuits have their parts and
serial numbers removed and newer numbers marked on them in an attempt to make the
older materials seem newer. Using deception theory to help understand the ways in which
counterfeiters may accomplish their deceit can be helpful in developing tailored strategies
to prevent and detect the occurrence of counterfeiting in supply chains.
There is very limited research on how counterfeiters accomplish their deceit due
to the illicit nature of counterfeiting (Staake, Theisse and Fleisch, 2008). Minagawa and
colleagues (2007) conducted case-based research on counterfeiting, imitation and reverse
engineering from a Chinese perspective, using information from three key informants to
provide insights into why firms engage in non-consensual acquisition of technology.
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Staake and colleagues (2012) used cluster analysis of industry experts’ assessments of
counterfeited items to derive business strategies used by counterfeiters, identifying five
strategic groups: disaggregators, imitators, fraudsters, desperados and smugglers. While
these two studies serve as valuable theory-building opportunities, we believe that the
incorporation of deception theory in this research area will enable more theoretical clarity
by providing insights as to “how” counterfeiters conduct their activities, thus enabling
supply chain managers to select and implement tailored anti-counterfeiting strategies.

2.5 A Product Counterfeiting Research Framework For Supply Chain
Management
Figure 2.4 depicts our conceptual framework for exploring product counterfeits
from a supply chain perspective. At the core of this model is the construct we call
“Vulnerability to Product Counterfeits,” defined here as susceptibility, or a
predisposition, for having counterfeits enter the firm’s supply and demand chain because
of a combination of product attributes and supply chain practices, processes and
characteristics. Our conceptualization of vulnerability to product counterfeits builds on
existing work on supply chain disruption and supply chain vulnerability, refining and
applying it specifically to the case of counterfeits. We propose that a supply chain quality
management approach can be used to mitigate the potential impacts of counterfeits in
supply chains.
In supply chain disruption literature, the construct of supply chain vulnerability is
viewed as a “function of certain supply chain characteristics” (Wagner and Bode, 2006,
p. 304), a vulnerability that is based on susceptibility to loss due to practices or
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conditions within an organizational structure (Barnes and Oloruntoba, 2005). In their
work on relating vulnerability to risk impacts, Wagner and Bode (2006) view supply
chain vulnerability as a driver of detrimental results to the demand and supply side of
caused by supply chain disruptions. Later work by these authors articulates the concept
more precisely, stating there are characteristics of supply chains that are antecedents of
the chain’s overall vulnerability to disruption, characteristics that affect both the
likelihood of the occurrence of disruptions and the resulting magnitude of the impact of
these disruptions to the operation of the supply chain (Wagner and Bode, 2009).

FIGURE 2.4 – THEORETICALLY-DRIVEN CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR
VULNERABILITY TO PRODUCT COUNTERFEITING AND MITIGATION IT’S
IMPACT USING SUPPLY CHAIN QUALITY MANAGEMENT
Antecedents of Vulnerability to Product Counterfeits
There are five antecedents of Vulnerability to Counterfeiting identified in our
model: 1.) upstream supply chain complexity, 2.) customer expectations, 3.) intellectual
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property sharing, 4.) sourcing factors, and 5.) component desirability. We posit that each
of these elements increases a firm’s vulnerability to product counterfeits entering the
supply chain. There are two theoretical foundations from which we derive our
antecedents. Normal Accident Theory’s constructs of complexity and coupling can be
applied to explain how supply chain complexity, customer expectations and intellectual
property sharing create the types of supply chain processes that make it more likely for
the “intentional accident” of counterfeiting to occur. Similarly, Crime Prevention
Theory’s concepts of targets, lack of guardians, and willing offender explain how the
antecedents of component desirability and intellectual property sharing can create
additional vulnerability to counterfeiting.
Upstream Supply Chain Complexity
Upstream supply chain complexity is comprised of both detail and dynamic
complexity (Bozarth, Warsing, Flynn and Flynn, 2009) within the focal firm’s upstream
supply base. Detail complexity refers to the number of components or elements that
comprise a system, while dynamic complexity deals with the degree of resultant
unpredictability in the system’s response to a given set of inputs (Bozarth et al., 2009).
Bozarth et al. (2009) further conceptualize the number of suppliers, long supplier lead
times, and globalization of the supply base as the sources of increased upstream supply
chain complexity, with the number of suppliers capturing detail complexity and lead
times and globalization capturing detail and dynamic complexity in the upstream supply
base (Bozarth et al., 2009).
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As Bozarth and colleagues (2009) explain, the number of suppliers increases
detail and dynamic complexity by increasing the required number of information flows,
physical goods flows, and relationships that need to be managed. Similarly, they posit
that long and unreliable lead times capture both detail and dynamic complexity by
requiring the focal manufacturing plant to adapt their planning processes to include
longer planning horizons and increased levels of detail (Bozarth, Warsing, Flynn and
Flynn, 2009). The final dimension they include is globalization, which they base on the
work of Nellore, Chanaron and Soderquist (2001), arguing that it increases dynamic
complexity due to the increase in cultural differences, currency exchange rate
fluctuations, and longer lead-times, all of which can shift the purchasing firm from
strictly focusing on price to including other factors in the decision process for selection of
suppliers (Bozarth et al., 2009).
We refine their conceptualization by adding three dimensions to their
conceptualization of this complexity: 1.) operations in emerging markets, 2.) the number
of upstream outsourced production activities, and 3.) the number of transportation
methods used in the delivery of goods from upstream suppliers. We add these dimensions
to capture additional detail and dynamic complexity within the upstream supply base that
we believe is related to vulnerability to product counterfeits.
We posit that operations in emerging markets add to dynamic complexity in
addition to the elements captured in the globalization dimension. The globalization
dimension applies to operations in both established and emerging markets, but there are
specific factors related to operations in emerging markets that increase dynamic
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complexity. In work evaluating counterfeit production in China, Chaudhry, Cordell and
Zimmerman (2005) and Chaudhry (2006) identify a lack of protection of intellectual
property rights, a culture where IPR violations are not morally wrong, organized crime,
and local willingness to purchase counterfeits as explanations for China’s high level of
product counterfeiting. Similarly, other emerging markets have considerable diversity in
the levels of intellectual property protection, local corruption and organized crime
(Chaudhry et al., 2005; Roth et al., 2008). As such, the factors that a firm must consider
while conducting operations in these markets increase, thereby increasing the dynamic
complexity of the management of the upstream supply chain.
While operations in emerging markets add to dynamic complexity, the number of
upstream outsourced production activities adds to both the dynamic and detail complexity
in the upstream supply chain. When production activities are outsourced, the focal firm’s
products move through the supply chain in various states of completion. There is an
increase in the amount of information needed regarding the amount of work in process at
each location and in-transit information between production activities. By decentralizing
production, the amount of coordination between the focal firm and its outsourced
production providers is added to the amount of coordination that was required in the
supply chain without outsourcing of production.
In addition to the supply and production nodes within a supply chain, there are
also transportation nodes and networks, which can vary from very simple to very
complex. Simple transportation activities include, for example, where the focal firm that
has its own fleet of vehicles and only operates in a small local area. More complex
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transportation networks involve multiple modes of transportation (e.g. automotive, rail,
air, and ship), multiple providers/carriers, and a greater span of distances in the network
(e.g. interstate, trans-continental, or trans-oceanic), as well as customs and inspections
processes for shipments between countries. Integrating information from multiple modes,
providers, exchanges and inspection points adds dynamic and detail complexity to supply
chain management.
As mentioned in our review of NAT, the amount of complexity in a system can
increase the likeliness of accidents occurring in a supply chain. Following the analysis of
Speier and colleagues (2011), criminal activities directed at a supply chain can be viewed
as a type of accident; therefore, deceptive product counterfeiting would be expected to
occur in more complex supply chains, where the odds of the Roth and colleagues’ (2008)
Six Ts elements being consistently present are very low. Following this logic, we view
supply chain complexity as an antecedent to vulnerability to counterfeiting since complex
supply chains have a large number of entry points (locations) and a large number of items
of supply (targets) that could potentially attract counterfeiters (offenders).
Challenging Customer Expectations
Customers seek parts, particularly replacement items, in the right quantity, the
with right quality, and in the right timeline. There is pressure in business-to-business
markets to make products better, faster and cheaper. But this kind of demanding customer
relationship can unintentionally add to the potential for counterfeits to find their way into
the licit supply chain. Suppliers want to be customer-focused and responsive to the
expectations of their customers, meaning they may go the extra mile to satisfy these
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requirements. When parts or products are needed but not available at the focal firm, we
posit that the firm will look to other suppliers or entities in the market to obtain what they
need to fulfill customer expectations. If the lead time for an item is not going to meet
required delivery dates, the firm may seek alternative sources for the parts, such as trying
to find the item from a source other than a currently qualified vendor (i.e. gray market or
aftermarket distributors). While the distributor may genuinely believe he is providing the
focal firm a legitimate good, it could be a counterfeit part.
Demanding customers can inadvertently create situational opportunities for
counterfeits to enter their supply chains. Based on the Normal Accident Theory, external
demands from customers can force the focal firm to operate outside of its normal
operating environment, increasing the dynamic complexity of its purchasing
environment, by “thinking outside the box” in order to satisfy and retain customers,
creating the conditions or “location” for a counterfeiter to perpetuate his fraud.
While customer demands are one factor that can create the opportunity for a
counterfeiter’s illicit activities, there is another factor that is equally or even more likely
to create vulnerability to counterfeiting. This situation occurs when production activities
are outsourced or shifted to new production centers and intellectual property is shared
with these locations.
Intellectual Property Sharing
Intellectual property sharing occurs when the focal firm provides or authorizes
use of its intellectual property right protected documents, equipment, tooling, and/or
processes with upstream suppliers, distributors and/or vendors. As mentioned by Berman
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(2008), Parloff (2006) and Norman (2001), sharing intellectual property can encourage
the authorized user to misuse the property and engage in third-shift production and
counterfeiting activities. This problem is compounded by operations in emerging
markets, such as China, where the level of IPR protection enforcement by the
government is considered low and organized crime is prevalent

(Chaudhry, 2006;

Berman, 2008). Considerable research has been conducted in the area of IPR protection
in outsourcing situations, most in the marketing discipline (Chaudhry et al., 2009, Kumar
and Ellingson, 2007; Shultz and Saporito, 1996; Chaudhry, Cordell and Zimmerman,
2005). There is also substantial published research in international business and legal
reviews. Crime Prevention Theory suggests that a willing offender, opportune target and
a lack of sufficient guardianship are all potentially

present in situations where

intellectual property is shared outside of its owner’s direct management, particularly in
cases where legal recourse does not act to support guardianship of the property rights.
Sourcing Factors
We define sourcing factors as how the focal firm conducts its procurement and
sourcing activities. This antecedent focuses on how the firm orchestrates its purchasing of
supplies and materials for its operations. The aspects of sourcing that are posited to
increase vulnerability to counterfeits include a lack of experience, training and time on
the part of buyers to enable them to understand and detect counterfeits, as well as the use
of gray markets, independent and aftermarket brokers, (Berman, 2008) and independent
distributors (Livingston, 2013). Also included as a sourcing factor is the use of internet
auctions and suppliers of parts. The purchasing and supply chain management function of
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a firm serves as the guardian of the supply chain, guarding against the purchase of
counterfeit items. In order to serve as an effective guardian, the purchasing team should
be trained to detect indications of counterfeits during the purchasing decision process,
including understanding whether the materials, components or sub-assemblies they
purchase are potential targets for counterfeiters to exploit. For example, the electronic
sub-component sector is a ripe target for counterfeiters as a result of the e-waste stream
and the rapidly changing part specifications.
Impacts of Counterfeits
We characterize the impact of counterfeits as the negative outcomes associated
with the incursion of deceptive counterfeits into a legitimate supply chain. As such, we
view them as generally negative consequences related to the firm’s operating
performance, the consumer’s health and safety, and the country’s fiscal well-being. Since
we are focused on supply chains, we will present a more detailed review of the literature
in the area of firms after providing a brief summary of information on the consumer and
societal impacts.
Before we discuss the impacts, it is important to acknowledge that other authors
have also articulated that there are positive effects associated with counterfeiting, such as
increasing competition in the market through technology transfer to emerging markets
(McDonald and Roberts, 1994). IPR infringements, while not specifically limited to
counterfeits, are also noted as having consumer benefits (Feinberg and Rousslang, 1990)
and satisfy market demands, a positive outcome from an economic perspective
(McDonald and Roberts, 1994). The literature also reveals that from a marketing
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perspective, companies may experience an increase in brand awareness (Barnett, 2005;
Yao, 2005). While these positive outcomes are interesting to note, the literature indicates
that the effects of counterfeits on the legitimate firm’s supply chain are primarily
negative, so we focus on the impacts from that perspective.
Consumer Health and Safety
From a consumer perspective, there are two general impacts of deceptive
counterfeiting. First, the consumer is the victim of a fraud, where the counterfeiter
misleads the customer into believing that he or she is procuring a genuine item when, in
fact, it is an unauthorized reproduction of an IPR-protected legitimate item. Secondly,
there are potential health and safety consequences associated with procuring counterfeit
items. Tim Phillips’ (2005) book Knock Off: The Deadly Trade in Counterfeit Goods
analyzes how the global counterfeit trade is related to organized crime, corruption,
violence and even death. One area in particular that is a health and safety concern for
consumers, as mentioned in our introduction, is pharmaceuticals. Cockburn, Newton,
Agyarko, Akunyili, and White (2009) provide a detailed discussion of the magnitude of
the problem in the pharmaceutical industry, citing estimates that 10% of the world’s
supply is counterfeit and that this results in unnecessary morbidity and mortality.
Societal Impacts
While consumer impacts are generally associated with the use of deceptive
counterfeit goods, country-level impacts are generally conceptualized in terms of the loss
of tax and tariff revenues associated with counterfeits, both deceptive and non-deceptive,
in this situation (Chaudhry, Zimmerman, Peters and Cordell, 2009). While there are
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concerns about how the estimates of lost revenue due to counterfeiting activities are
generated (GAO, 2010; SASC, 2012), national and local agencies have posted estimates.
For example, according to a 2004 report, the New York City comptroller’s office
estimated that counterfeit trade in New York City was $23 billion, resulting in $1 billion
in lost tax revenues (NYC Comptroller, 2004).
Firm Operational Impacts
While the consumer and governmental impacts are important, our focus is on the
impact to the firm. When a firm’s products are counterfeited, there is a potential for loss
of brand equity (Wilke and Zaichkowsky, 1999), as well as loss of demand and sales
(Green and Smith, 2002) since counterfeit items are generally sold below the price of the
genuine product. This assumes that the purchaser would have paid the firm’s price for the
legitimate item, were the counterfeit good not available, an assumption that is not
necessarily true for non-deceptive counterfeits become some would not purchase the
genuine item because of the cost (Chaudhry et al., 2008). Different types of goods have
different price elasticity of demand, but, in the case of deceptive counterfeits, the
purchaser expects to pay for the genuine article, so they want the real thing and are
willing to pay the price for it.
Further, when some another entity is filling a demand that would normally be
satisfied by the firm, there is a loss of demand to the counterfeit market. Knowing the
actual demand losses is difficult since gathering data on illegal activities is difficult, we
assert that obtaining the firm’s perceived loss of demand from a subject matter expert
might provide insights in the absence of direct data on losses.
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Interestingly, studies have evaluated the potential impact of loss of brand image
and equity, finding that consumers’ perceptions of the original product’s brand image
was not affected by the proliferation of counterfeits (Nia and Zaichkowsky, 2000);
however, this study examined luxury brands, which are generally non-deceptive
counterfeits, so it is difficult to apply these conclusions to deceptive counterfeit
situations. While brand image may not be affected by counterfeits, profits are generally
expected to be. There are no studies as yet that document the perceived loss of demand
from the firm’s perspective, but the resultant loss of profits associated with lost sales is a
concern that is often raised in media, interest group and practitioner literature.
Another impact to the firm that is cited in literature is an increase in costs as a
result of having to implement anti-counterfeiting measures. There are numerous
countermeasures available and firms should tailor them based on their specific counterfeit
risks and potential ways that counterfeiters might attack their supply chain. While these
increase costs, they are recommended to be perceived as an investment because, if
effective, these intellectual property protection measures should prevent counterfeit
proliferation and help the firm prevent loss of market share in the short-term, mid-term
and long-term (Fuchs and Zhao, 2010). Intellectual property protection programs may be
costly, but they are necessary in the battle against counterfeiting. In addition, firms face
the costs of remediating counterfeits in supply chains. These can be extensive, especially
when dealing with counterfeits that have infiltrated complex or capital intensive
investment items or those items that have consumer safety concerns.
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With so many potential sources of vulnerability to counterfeits and such
substantial potential impacts, it begs the question of what can be done to “counter” the
potential for counterfeits entering the supply chain. Academic research has dedicated a
considerable amount of effort into understanding how firms deal with counterfeiting and
have provided a plethora of options to consider regarding how to deal with counterfeiting.
Strategies to Mitigate Counterfeiting – A Supply Chain Quality Management
Perspective
There have been many articles offering strategies for addressing the counterfeit
problem, but they are not organized in a manner to easily facilitate an examination using
a supply chain management lens. We will provide a general overview of the strategy
literature and then apply Roth et al. (2008) Six Ts of Supply Chain Quality Management
as a structure for developing a typology for organizing counterfeit mitigation strategies.
This framework is intended to enable managers and researchers to approach the issue of
quality in supply chains at the strategic level. As mentioned in our discussion of
theoretical lenses, the holistic nature of the Six Ts (Roth et al., 2008) enables a firm to
improve mindfulness and detect and prevent quality issues proactively, an approach
consistent with the mindfulness objectives in the High Reliability Theory (Weick, 1987).
Strategies for Addressing Counterfeiting
In their literature review on counterfeiting, Staake et al. (2009) identify 24 articles
that offer strategies and recommendations for addressing counterfeiting, some of which
offer general strategies, while others are more specific, recommending strategies tailored
to specific countries (Chaudhry et al., 2008). This is not surprising, given that a large
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percentage of the U.S. and E.U. seized counterfeits appear to originate in China (CBP,
2012; EU, 2012) and China’s recorded of respecting intellectual property rights has been
assessed as poor by the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (2012), putting the
country at the top of the Priority Watch List.
Early strategy articles address how firms can respond to the issue of illicit actors
obtaining firm’s confidential information, allowing them to generate counterfeits (Harvey
and Ronkainen, 1985; Harvey, 1987; Harvey, 1988), discussing how firms can establish
relationships with dealers and distributors to collaborate on combating counterfeiting
(Olsen and Granzin, 1992; Olsen and Granzin, 1993). Some articles take a broad
approach, offering general strategies to managers of affected firms. For example, Shultz
and Saporito’s (1996) recommendations include using a combination of product markings
and labeling technologies, educating customers, encouraging legislation for IPR and
participating in coalitions.
More contemporary articles that make strategy recommendations include Berman
(2008), Staake and Fleisch (2008), Stumpf and Chaudhry (2010), Li (2013), and
Stevenson and Busby (2015). Berman (2008) offers a variety of potential courses of
action, including establishing investigations (internal or external to the firm), using
product authentication technologies, controlling outsourcing, training customers, and
monitoring markets for counterfeits. Li (2013) extends Berman (2008), discussing the
advantages and disadvantages of various product authentication, tracing, and tracking
technologies, including watermarks, RFID, digital product coding and laser markings,
among others.
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Stumpf and Chaudhry’s (2010) cross-country research evaluated managerial
perceptions of various anti-counterfeiting actions, generating five recommendations for
approaching the problem from a less U.S.-centric approach, including improving global
discourse and media attention on what encourages counterfeit production and buying in
different countries, working with agencies to stop the flow of funding for the illicit trade
of goods, improving understanding and influencing consumer buying behavior to
discourage the purchase of counterfeit goods, and considering and testing various
different solutions to similar problems across nations.
Typology of Counterfeit Mitigation Strategies Using the Six Ts (Roth et al., 2008)
During our review of strategies for addressing counterfeiting, several common
recommendations emerged, ones that are critical to the conceptual framework we propose
for combating counterfeits in supply chains, particularly since they echo the key
constructs in Roth and colleagues’ (2008) Six Ts framework: Traceability, Transparency,
Trust, Training, Time and Testability.
Traceability
Traceability refers to the ability to “map” the supply chain (Roth et al., 2008),
specifically the ability to identify and verify the components and chronology of events
(Skilton and Robinson, 2009) across supply chain processes. There are ways to improve
the traceability of parts and products in the chain, including requiring unique item
identification and product authentication technologies (Berman, 2008; Li, 2013; Stumpf
and Chaudhry, 2010). Unique physical markings, electronic tracking systems, part
numbering and serialization are proposed to assist in preventing and detecting
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counterfeiting in the supply-side of the firm’s supply chain. These would also be
beneficial for B2B customers who also rely on technologies to authenticate items that
focal firms provide to the demand-side, thereby ensuring that counterfeit versions of their
products do not enter the downstream supply chain (Lehtonen, Michahelles and Fleisch,
2007). Traceability measures must be updated and refreshed, as it is possible for
counterfeiters to attempt to replicate them, especially the physical ones (Stevenson and
Busby, 2015).
Transparency
Transparency is a measure of completeness of sharing of information via formal
and informal agreements (Roth et al., 2008) Improving transparency within the firm, the
supply chain and across industries was also a common theme in the proposed strategies to
deal with counterfeiting. As previously explained, Stumpf and Chaudhry (2010) are
proponents of using what has been successful in some countries to assist other firms in
their efforts. Within the firm, Staake and Fleisch (2008) make several recommendations
for improving the transparency of information related to addressing counterfeits, such as
using defined processes to govern response to counterfeits, monitoring processes,
standardized counterfeit reporting tools, and indicators to evaluate the effectiveness of
anti-counterfeiting measures. Looking across the supply chain, they recommend having
suppliers return all scrap, seconds, and intellectual property as part of their contracts
(Staake and Fleisch, 2008). They also suggest improving transparency between business
and governmental, including law enforcement, and non-governmental organizations, as
do Wilcock and Boys (2013). This is consistent with Shultz and Saporito’s (1996)
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recommendation to use coalitions to help organizations with similar interests in IPR to
leverage pooled knowledge and resources to combat counterfeiting. In a more extreme
application of transparency, Minagawa, Trott and Hoecht (2007) propose working with
counterfeiters to make them a component of the licit supply chain, rather than a
competitor of it.
Testability
In situations where complete transparency is not possible or desired, testing of
products can help verify that products are authentic. Testability refers to the ability to
detect whether or not expected attributes of a product are present (Roth et al., 2008).
Testing can be invasive (destructive) testing or non-invasive (such as inspecting
packaging for signs of tampering or alteration). For items such as electronic components,
sending samples to independent testing labs is also an option. Sood et al. (2011) proposed
a methodology for detecting counterfeit electronic parts that includes a discussion of
testing. Like all counterfeit mitigation and prevention strategies, testing has an associated
cost and has to be the right fit for a particular firm’s needs.
Trust and Time
Complimenting transparency are trust and time. Trust is defined as the
expectation that supply chain partners will act in good faith, not opportunistically, and
with honesty in negotiations (Roth et al., 2008; Hosmer, 1995). While “blind trust” is not
something we would advocate as ideal for supply chains, having a list of “trusted” and
qualified suppliers, (particularly those with which the focal firm has a longstanding
business relationship) from which to procure parts or materials might reduce the potential
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for counterfeit infiltration because these suppliers are motivated to maintain a strong
business relationship and not violate the trust of a valuable long-time business partner.
Another aspect of trust that can be used to mitigate the risk of counterfeits is to evaluate
if signals of trust are present in the purchasing transaction as recommended by
Mavlanova and Benbunan-Fich (2010).
Complementing the trust consideration is the time consideration. Time, for our
purposes, characterizes the duration of processes within the supply chain (Roth et al.,
2008) as well as the aspects of time pressure associated with decision making and
customer expectation. Time pressure is related to poor decision making quality (Hahn,
Lawson and Lee, 1992). We propose that it is critical to recognize the effects of time
pressure on decision making quality in supply chain and purchasing decisions,
particularly if a customer has set challenging delivery schedule deadlines or requires
rapid responses to requests for proposals.
Training
Another consistently echoed theme among the recommendations and strategies in
the literature is the necessity of training, including training of customers, the general
public, and stakeholders within the supply chain. For our purposes, training refers to
ensuring that the purchasing and supply chain management team are trained (Roth et al.,
2008) on the nature of product counterfeits and ways to prevent, detect and eliminate
them from the firm’s supply chain. Berman (2008), Shultz and Saporito (1996), Stumpf
and Chaudhry (2010), and Staake and Fleisch (2008) recommend educating consumers
on the risks of counterfeits, including health and safety aspects, as a means to reduce the
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level of demands for counterfeiting. They propose a variety of means by which to do this,
including 1.) publishing information for users on how to authenticate products and detect
counterfeits (Berman, 2008; Staake and Fleisch, 2008), 2.) providing users with
information on the risks and impacts of using counterfeits (Stump and Chaudhry, 2010;
Shultz and Saporito, 1996), and 3.) providing customers with ways to report suspect
counterfeit parts (Berman, 2008).
Within the firm itself, training of personnel is posited to be part of an anticounterfeiting strategy. Staake and Fleisch (2008) recommend that firms develop
country-specific knowledge of the market for counterfeits, the import and distribution
routes, the capabilities of counterfeit producers and the consumer market that would
procure counterfeit goods. They further recommend that firms should transform the tacit
knowledge of counterfeiting experts within the firm into explicit knowledge that can be
shared across business units. Finally, they and others (Wilkcock and Boys, 2013)
recommend educating purchasing departments on how to spot counterfeit parts.
Potential Research Opportunities
To illustrate how the Six T’s framework can serve as a means to categorize the
counterfeit mitigation options, we constructed the typology in Table 2.2 to demonstrate
how researchers can organize and analyze various strategies proposed in the literature
from a supply chain quality management perspective. This table is abbreviated at the
source level. See Appendix A for a more detailed list that includes the specific strategy
suggestions in each article. The table identifies the number of proposed counterfeit
mitigation approaches, revealing several insights for potential research opportunities.
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TABLE 2.2 – SIX Ts TYPOLOGY OF COUNTERFEIT MITIGATION STRATEGIES
First, we observe that one or more than one of the Six T’s can be reflected within
a proposed mitigation strategy. For example, a strategy that maps to several dimensions
of the Six Ts simultaneously is offered by Stevenson and Busby (2015). They propose
implementing contracts that include closer relationships, auditing and monitoring. This
recommendation maps to three of the Six Ts: traceability, testability and trust. Their
observation is important because it acknowledges the multi-dimensional nature of supply
chain quality and that a single counterfeit mitigation item can potentially have achieve
synergistic improvements in supply chain quality. It also serves as a caution that when
conducting empirical research using the Six Ts framework, it is crucial to invest the
appropriate amount of construct refinement and development of appropriate
measurement scales for these constructs to ensure that instruments are reliable and
provide the necessary convergent and discriminant validity.
Another interesting observation in this typology is that it suggests that the time
considerations surrounding counterfeit mitigation strategies have received less note and
attention in the literature with only six mappings versus the other five, all of which have
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14 or more. The time element may be an area where opportunities for new research exist.
Some of the time considerations that could be explored include analysis of the
relationship between the time between the infiltration of counterfeits and their
remediation and the resultant cost impacts. Additionally, exploring the influence of time
pressure on the quality of sourcing decisions where potential counterfeit infiltration exists
is worthwhile, as it would expand the understanding of the influence of time as a risk
factor in purchasing decisions.

2.6 Conclusions
The issue of counterfeiting is a contemporary, critical issue for supply chain
management researchers and practitioners alike from both a cost and risk perspective. As
all supply chains are vulnerable to this crime, it is critical to understand the sources of the
vulnerability. Only then can we hope to provide insights on how to reduce the realized
outcomes of this vulnerability, including the impacts to firms, their customers and society
in general.

The complex nature of counterfeiting and the multiple strategies and

deception tactics used by perpetrators of this crime against supply chains requires us as
supply chain researchers to expand beyond the traditional agency and information
processing theories that dominate our field’s research paradigm and to incorporate
perspectives from other fields such as economics and criminology. By broadening our
approaches and utilizing these additional perspectives, such as Normal Accident Theory
and Crime Prevention Theory, we can gain a more thorough understanding of the
complete set of antecedents to this vulnerability.
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Applying a supply chain quality management lens by employing Roth and
colleagues’ (2008) Six Ts framework enables us to organize the various options for
combating counterfeits by applying a structured set of quality considerations to this
phenomenon. This enables us to provide an organization for orienting our continued
exploration of this critical issue within supply chain management.
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Chapter 3

Essay Two: Avoiding Deceptive
Counterfeits: A Behavioral
Experiment Informed by Signaling
and Crime Prevention Theories
3.1 Introduction
This essay addresses the importance of Signaling and Crime Prevention Theories
as a strategy to understand the supplier selection decision process in situations involving
a potential deceptive counterfeit situation. Counterfeiting is a pervasive problem for
consumers, companies, and governments. From a supply chain management perspective,
counterfeit parts are a problem from both a financial and a safety and security
perspective. The intended contribution of our research is two-fold. First, we extend the
experimental research of deceptive counterfeits into the business-to-business purchasing
situation. Prior experimental research has focused on the consumer purchasing domain
(Mavlanova and Benbunan-Fich, 2010). Second, we seek to determine if time and
workload pressure affect the ability to detect the counterfeit signals.
The costs associated with remediating counterfeits from supply chains and
compensating customers can be substantial. In addition to the costs associated with
removal and remedy, there can also be fines for knowingly using a counterfeit part, as in

53

the case with contractors providing supplies to the Department of Defense (NDAA,
2013). In addition to the costs, there are risks associated with counterfeits as a result of
the potential substandard construction of counterfeit items, and the health and welfare
concerns for those using counterfeit goods as well as those producing them.
Counterfeiting is a criminal activity that is perpetrated against unwitting victims,
both consumers and organizations. How can a company protect itself and avoid
counterfeits from entering its supply chain and, more specifically, what are the signs
available to the purchasing specialist to help identify a situation where a counterfeit item
might be offered? Since the purchasing specialist is the individual in the unique position
to make a selection decision, it is important that this person be prepared to defend the
supply chain against targeting by counterfeit part providers.
To explain how a purchasing specialist can detect signals of counterfeits and
avoid the purchase of them, we employ Signaling Theory and Crime Prevention Theory
as the theoretical lenses for facilitating our research. Through these lenses we construct
an experimental test to determine whether buyers can successfully detect and avoid
counterfeit parts in the sourcing decision process. The buying decision serves as a critical
moment at which the potential for a counterfeit to enter a legitimate supply chain is
either realized or avoided. As such, we focus our research on counterfeit vulnerability to
examine how buyers behave when faced with this scenario. With that perspective in
mind, we offer the following as specific research questions we seek to answer:
1. Given a specific level of counterfeit signaling, low or high, will a buyer avoid
the counterfeit offeror’s proposal?
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2. Does the amount of time pressure, low or high, affect the quality of the source
selection decision?
3. Does the amount of workload pressure, low or high, affect the quality of this
source selection decision?
4. Does time pressure interact with the perception of workload pressure to
negatively affect the ability to non-select (avoid) the counterfeit offer?
To answer these questions, we present a literature review to define our relevant
constructs; ground them in Signaling and Crime Prevention Theories; and develop,
execute, and analyze an experiment to test whether a buyer will select a supplier’s offer,
given one of three levels of counterfeit signaling (low, medium or high) in the proposal at
two different levels of workload pressure and two levels of time pressure.
The remainder of this essay is structured as follows. In the literature review we
define the concept of deceptive counterfeits, how they can enter legitimate supply chains,
what strategies companies can employ to avoid and detect them, and finally discuss the
purchasing decision, which we offer as the critical juncture at which the risk of a
counterfeit entering a supply chain is either realized or avoided. After the literature
review, we present our research model and the four hypotheses that we will test using a
scenario-based role playing experiment. In the Experimental Model and Hypotheses
Section, we provide a graphical depiction of our experimental model as well as specific
variable definitions and develop hypotheses for our test. In the Methods Section, we
describe the population of interest and our sample composition as well as the design and
execution of our experiment, including pre- and post-design considerations and the
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necessary checks such as realism and manipulation checks. We provide a summary of our
analysis in the Results Section and finish this essay with the Conclusions Section, which
includes a discussion of our findings and implications for practice and research as well as
limitations and future opportunities to expand the body of knowledge in this area.

3.2 Literature Review
There are numerous definitions for counterfeits as well as deceptive counterfeits.
A thorough discussion on the construct definition and differentiation can be found in
Staake, Thiesse and Fleisch (2009) and in the recent working paper by Watson and Roth
(2015). We use the Watson and Roth (2015) definition as our definition of a deceptive
counterfeit, specifically defining it as “any product that has been manufactured and/or
distributed and sold by an entity that is not authorized by the intellectual property rights’
owner and is intentionally misrepresented by the seller as a genuine article.” Deceptive
counterfeits are a very specific subset within the broad domain of illicit trade activities
(Staake et al, 2009). They are different from non-deceptive counterfeits in that purchasers
of non-deceptive counterfeits are very much aware that they are purchasing a fake. For
example, if a person knowingly buys a knock-off of a luxury brand item, such as a fake
Rolex watch or Coach purse from a street vendor, those purchasers are not deceived in
any way; therefore, the purchase is a non-deceptive counterfeit. The intent to deceive and
defraud is what differentiates deceptive counterfeits from non-deceptive counterfeits.
Applying Crime Prevention and Signaling Theories to Prevent Counterfeits in
Supply Chains
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Counterfeiting is a criminal act against intellectual property owners and unwitting
businesses and consumers who purchase goods. There are multiple ways that deceptive
counterfeits can be produced and presented to legitimate supply chains. Three examples
of sources of counterfeits are 1.) overproduction by subcontractors, also known as the
third shift or ghost shift (Parloff, 2006), 2.) reverse engineering, particularly if the item is
not a technically complex product, and 3.) the recycling of earlier versions of an item or
e-waste/scrap items as is seen in the electronic subcomponents sector (SAE, 2015).
With so many potential avenues of entry for counterfeits, how can a company
secure its supply chain and avoid their infiltration? There are numerous guidelines
available, and several articles have been published on how to address the counterfeit
problem from the marketing and brand management academic (Berman, 2008), supply
chain management academic (Stevenson and Busby, 2015) and practitioner standards
perspectives (SAE, 2009; Department of Commerce, 2010; Aerospace Industries
Association, 2011; SASC, 2012). These strategies include everything from legislative to
law enforcement, to industry standards, to testing of components and minimizing waste
and reuse opportunities, and finally to training purchasing specialists to identify and
avoid potential counterfeits (Berman, 2008; Department of Commerce, 2010). The
strategies relating to what the purchasing firm can do to avoid the entry fall within the
purview of the supply chain management discipline.
As the saying goes, “an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of the cure.” This is
certainly true for the deceptive counterfeit problem. Avoidance is the best option because
it requires far less investment than other approaches, such as testing or remediation after
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the problem manifests itself downstream in the manufacturing or distribution process. So,
if it is better to avoid counterfeits, how can this be accomplished? In this case, the threat
to the supply chain’s security is a criminal act, so normal quality management theories
may fall short in addressing the deliberate deceit. Recent work by Speier, Whipple, Closs
and Voss (2011) applies Crime Prevention Theory to the understanding of supply chain
security issues. This theory posits that crime is the result of the combination of an
opportune target, a willing offender and lack of sufficient guardianship.
Applying this concept to our specific area of concern, deceptive counterfeits,
suggests that companies with supply chain requirements are the opportune target, willing
offenders are the counterfeiters seeking to make a profit from the sale of counterfeit
goods, and the guardianship is the supply chain and purchasing management
infrastructure. Purchasing specialists are the first line of defense and are one of the
critical guardians of the quality and security of the supply chain as they serve as the
interface between the internal operations of a company and the external marketplace.
Purchasing specialists need to be mindful of the market and avoid potential
counterfeits by detecting signals in proposals that a product being offered is not a
legitimate good but rather a deceptive counterfeit. Signaling Theory suggests that
individuals involved in a transaction can convey information that is either honest or
dishonest, causing the other participant to alter his decision making behavior (Spence,
1974; applied to counterfeit situations by Mavlanova and Benbunan-Fich, 2010). Being
able to isolate those signals from other considerations in a sourcing decision is no small
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challenge as sourcing is not as simple as choosing A, B or C; rather it is a complex
decision making process, one that is critical in terms of supply chain security.
The Sourcing Decision – The Tipping Point
Based on the premise that the sourcing decision is the pivotal moment when the
potential vulnerability to counterfeit can materialize as a realized counterfeit infiltration,
our research examines some of the factors that influence the buyer’s ability to detect
signals of a deceptive product counterfeit in sourcing documentation. While Mavlanova
and Benbunan-Fich (2010) examine this relationship in e-commerce situations where
consumers are making a purchase in an electronic environment, we have not found
studies examining buyer behavior in business-to-business (B2B) situations. We seek to
remedy this gap in the literature by extending this research into a B2B situation.
While all buyers have some knowledge and ability to evaluate offers in the
marketplace, the industrial buyer has a larger sphere of influence than a consumer one
where the potential impacts of the sourcing decision will not only affect him or her but
also the firm as well as the firm’s downstream customers or product users. To understand
industrial buyer behavior, we consulted Sheth’s (1973) seminal work, a model of
industrial buyer behavior, as well as additional contemporary research to identify the
relevant aspects of buyer behavior to consider in the design of our experiment.
Industrial Buyer Behavioral Considerations
Sheth’s (1973) model of industrial buyer behavior is one of the most
comprehensive and, arguably, one of the seminal papers in industrial marketing literature.
This model identifies three aspects as critical influences on expectations of suppliers in
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organizational buyer behavior: 1.) the psychological world of the individual making the
decision, 2.) the level of autonomy or jointness in the buying decision, and 3.) conflict
that can arise as a result of the buying decision making process. For our purpose the most
critical aspect is the psychological world of the buyer, which includes the buyer’s
background, information sources, the amount of active search, perceptual distortion and
satisfaction with past purchases (Sheth, 1973).
Because we are trying to examine how a buyer’s decision could potentially cause
a counterfeit to enter a supply chain, our research controls the autonomy of the decision
making, not allowing the scenario to be a joint one, which, consequently also reduces the
potential for conflict. That said, we certainly acknowledge the value of jointness and
teamwork in buying situations as the incorporation of engineering, quality, financial and
program management viewpoints usually improves the quality of a buying outcome.
Extending this research to a joint buying decision would certainly be a meaningful
addition to the body of literature.
In terms of the psychological world of the buyer, the background of individuals
refers to the educational background, lifestyle, professional values, and demographics of
the person (or people, if a joint decision) making the buying decision. Previous
experimental research in sourcing has examined experience, education, gender and
industry sector as relevant individual characteristics to consider in sourcing decisions
(Hall and Roth, 2015). Information sources, which refers to the various means by which
buying- related information is communicated to a buyer, includes everything from sales
to trade shows, internet search, word-of-mouth or direct mailings and distribution lists.
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Active search refers to the amount of effort needed to seek out buying-related
information, which Sheth (1973) contends is largely relegated to the purchasing
specialist.
Related to the seeking of information is the perceptual distortion that can occur
when evaluating information. Purchasing specialists will potentially view objective
information differently from engineering or manufacturing specialists (Sheth, 1973). This
may be particularly true for counterfeiting signals as an engineer is likely to focus on the
quality aspects of a proposal, while a purchasing specialist would potentially focus on the
cost and delivery schedule. If counterfeit signals are present in one area and not the other,
the ability to detect them would be different for an engineer versus a purchasing
specialist. Satisfaction with past purchases refers to the degree to which a buyer (or
buying team) perceives that a supplier delivered a product that met the needs of the
organization. This satisfaction could vary between members of team. For our research,
we controlled for this variable by explaining that our previous suppliers are not available
so a new supplier must be found.
In addition to the endogenous aspects that influence expectations among buyers,
Sheth (1973) also identifies exogenous factors that can influence the outcome of a buying
decision, including product, company, and situational specific factors. Product factors
include considerations such as the cost of the item, its riskiness, and time pressure. Time
pressure, or the need to make a decision rapidly, is of particular interest to our research.
Sheth (1973) contends, and we agree, that time pressure will likely result in the buying
decision being delegated to one individual so that is how we designed the decision in our
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experiment. In consumer research, time pressure has been shown to adversely affect the
quality of decision making in purchasing situations (Hahn, Lawson and Lee, 1992), so it
is reasonable to test to determine if time pressure impacts purchasing specialists.
Company specific factors include size, degree of centralization and company
orientation. These are factors that we identified and controlled in our experiment.
Situational factors, such as price controls, recession, or strikes (Sheth, 1973), also
influence a buyer’s decision making process. For the purposes of our research we aim to
assess the quality of the decision making process in a challenging situation. We propose
that a supply chain disruption is a realistic situational factor to study because it requires a
company to make a decision on a new supplier in a short timeframe. In addition to the
buyer factors proposed by Sheth, it is necessary for us to understand what aspects of the
purchase are of greatest importance to the buyer.
Supplier Selection Criteria
There has been much discussion in the operations management literature on the
criteria that buying firms use to select suppliers. Some of these criteria are related to the
product being purchased, such as the price or product quality, while others relate to the
characteristics of the supplier, including supplier finances, service, or technology
capability. In research in the automotive industry including manufacturers and direct and
indirect suppliers, Choi and Hartley’s (1996) factor analysis identified eight supplier
selection factors based on an initial 26 supplier selection criteria. These were finances,
consistency, relationship, technological capability, service, reliability and price. Krause,
Pagell and Curkovic (2001) examined competitive priorities for purchasing and found

62

them similar to the competitive priorities for operations management, identifying the five
factors of cost, quality, delivery, flexibility and innovation. More recently, in a review of
multi-criteria decision making for evaluating suppliers, Ho, Xu and Dey (2010) identified
quality, delivery and price/cost as the most frequently used evaluating criteria. Ho et al.
(2010) also identified manufacturing capability, service, management, technology,
research and development, and finance as additional frequently used criteria. Each of
these criteria were identified in at least 23 papers published between 2000 and 2008.
Price is a particularly troublesome aspect of purchasing. By and large, purchasing
specialists are charged to get the best deal that they can when procuring materials,
components, sub-assemblies and the like. That said, there is a point where the price is
simply “too good to be true.” An item that is priced too low or below the normal
competitive range should raise suspicion in terms of its legitimacy or its provenance. In
the context of deceptive counterfeits, this is often the case. We specifically modeled the
price as too low in our high counterfeit signal groups.
Purchasing and supply chain managers have a substantial task in evaluating and
assigning priority to these criteria. While the extant literature identifies quality, price and
delivery as the principal criteria, there is not necessarily consensus on which of these
factors is most important. In research combining a survey of perceived importance and a
discrete choice analysis experiment of supplier selection, Verma and Pullman (1996)
found that while buyers espouse the importance of quality, they actually select suppliers
based on cost and delivery. Subsequent research conducted by Gray, Roth and Tomlin
(2009) found the same to be true in a survey of manufacturers’ outsourcing priorities.
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Choi and Hartley’s (2001) research, which contradicts these findings, concluded
that price was one of the least important considerations in supplier selection, while
delivery and quality (together comprising a single factor of consistency) were the most
important selection criteria. One potential explanation for this is that the concepts of cost
and price, while related, are different from each other. The lack of consensus in the
literature is not surprising since the reality of sourcing is that there are situational factors
that affect the degree of importance of each factor.
For the purposes of our research, we focused on the selection criteria of cost,
quality and delivery, as these three factors are the most universally applied to sourcing
research (Giffi, Roth and Seal, 1990; Gray et al., 2009). We carefully applied counterfeit
signals to both the cost and quality factors, offering only a little variation in proposed
delivery schedules in the design of our experimental scenario to ensure it is a
comprehensive and realistic depiction of a real-world sourcing decision problem.

3.3 Research Model and Hypotheses
Figure 3.1 is a graphical depiction of the specific research model we examined
using a web-based role-playing scenario experiment methodology. It represents a 3x2x2
factorial experimental design, with three independent variables of interest; 1.) the level
counterfeit signaling in the counterfeit supplier’s offer, 2.) workload pressure and 3.) time
pressure. Our dependent variable is the binary outcome representing the avoidance
(versus selection) of the counterfeit supplier’s offer. In addition to the direct effects of the
workload and time pressure variables, we also propose that their interaction has an
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additional moderating effect on the strength of the relationship between counterfeit risk
signals and supplier avoidance.

FIGURE 3.1 – COUNTERFEIT SUPPLIER AVOIDANCE EXPERIMENTAL MODEL
In addition to assessing the actual selection or avoidance of the counterfeit
supplier, we asked the participants to report the extent to which they preferred their given
supplier over the supplier they did not select. As a corollary to our hypothesis regarding
counterfeit signals and their effect on supplier avoidance, we posited that the degree of
supplier preference would also be positively related to counterfeit signals. That is to say
that we expected that those in the high and medium level counterfeit signal groups would
display a greater preference for their chosen supplier because they were responding to
specific elements of the supplier’s proposal that they find inadequate or unsatisfactory.
As depicted in Figure 3.1, the experimental model contained the operational
independent variable of counterfeit signaling and the dependent variable of counterfeit
supplier avoidance. We define counterfeit risk signals, our independent variable,
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specifically as the combined set of product information, situational factors and
supporting information available about the supplier to a potential buyer indicating that
an offered product has a risk of actually being a counterfeit item rather than the genuine
article. Counterfeit risk signals are poor attempts at deception that a buyer can, if
properly identified, use to weed out and non-select a potential counterfeit supplier.
Practitioner literature and expert interviews suggest that missing or incorrect part
numbers, lot numbers, and incomplete or missing parts traceability information are all
signals of a potential counterfeit situation (Metz, 2013; Livingston, 2013) in addition to
the previously mentioned price that is too low.
We posit that two types of pressure will also affect the counterfeit supplier
avoidance, specifically, the variables workload pressure and time pressure. We define
workload pressure as the set of experimental cues intended to make the participant feel
that his role as a purchasing specialist is particularly overburdened with many work
duties to accomplish. We define our second moderating variable, time pressure, as the
degree to which the time available to make a decision is constrained. Finally, we define
our dependent variable, counterfeit supplier avoidance, as successfully avoiding selection
of a supplier offering a deceptive product counterfeit.
Hypotheses
Our first hypothesis describes the predicted negative relationship between the
level of counterfeit signaling and the decision to avoid a deceptive product counterfeit
supplier. Our specific hypothesis is:
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H1: The level of counterfeit signaling will be positively related to counterfeit
supplier avoidance.
This hypothesis is based on Economic Signaling Theory, which was originally employed
by Spence (1973, 1974) to explain job market signals and feedback. This theory was
subsequently tested in deceptive counterfeit purchasing situations for consumers by
Mavlanova and Benbunan-Fich (2010) and further investigated in exploratory research by
Stevenson and Busby (2015). Signaling Theory, as applied to counterfeit situations,
suggests that agents can convey information, either honest or dishonest, that causes a
principal to alter his/her behavior, particularly in situations where information asymmetry
exists. In the case of counterfeiting, success depends upon masking attributes of the item
that would signal it is a fake and highlighting attributes that make the item appear
genuine (Mavlanova and Benbunan-Fich, 2010). We posit that if the signals are
incomplete or inconsistent with expectations, a purchasing specialist should avoid
selecting that item.
Crime Prevention Theory states that sufficient guardianship can help prevent a
crime from occurring. As the point of entry into a company’s supply chain, purchasing
specialists are in the unique position to serve as guardians. To effectively fulfill this
guardianship, they need to be able to detect known signals of counterfeit items. Table 3.1
lists the potential counterfeit signals that might be present in a sourcing decision.
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COUNTERFEIT SIGNALS AVAILABLE PRIOR TO SUPPLIER
SELECTION
• Part being procured is an obsolete item
• Independent parts distributor
• Missing certification and industry standard inspection information
• Missing/inaccurate part numbers, lot numbers or serial numbers
• Product type has history of being counterfeited (e.g. microcircuits,
pharmaceuticals)
• Supplier is on list of debarred suppliers
• Supplier reluctance to provide sample item for inspection
• Item priced below the competitive range of previous purchases
TABLE 3.1 – POTENTIAL COUNTERFEIT SIGNALS DURING SOURCING
DECISION
While we cannot use all of these signals in our experiment, we mention them all as
important considerations for researchers and practitioners alike. For our experiment at the
medium level, we included the quality aspects of counterfeit risk signals of 1.) the part is
an obsolete item, 2.) the counterfeit supplier is an independent distributor and 3.) the
product type, industrial fasteners, has a history of being counterfeited. Additionally, the
proposal itself had quality problems, including missing and incomplete information
regarding lot numbers and industry certifications. At the high level of signaling, we
included a price that is substantially below the competitive range listed in the scenario’s
part history information in addition to all of the elements included in the medium level of
counterfeit risk signals.
In a perfect world, purchasing specialists would have ample time and workload
levels to conduct thorough information searches and evaluations of proposals for each
item they procure. In reality, purchasing specialists can be overworked or have to make
decisions under time constraints. As this is the reality for most purchasing departments,
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we must include these considerations and assess their impact on the quality of decision
making in purchasing situations.
Time pressure exists when a person has a limited time to make a decision. This
construct has been employed in a wide variety of decision making situations in studies of
decision making and risk under time pressure (Kocher, Pahlke and Trautmann, 2013, Ben
Zur and Breznitz, 1981). In the situation most relevant to our research, experimental
research in consumer purchasing decision making has shown that quality is negatively
affected by time pressure (Hahn et al., 1992). This is consistent with Sheth’s (1973)
inclusion of temporal considerations in his model of industrial buyer behavior. Based on
this information, we believe that time pressure will have a negative impact on the
purchasing specialist’s decision quality. Specifically, we hypothesize that:
H2: The level of time pressure will be negatively related to supplier avoidance.
Simply put, we posit that time constraining the decision process will result in failure to
adequately process the signals, thus resulting in lower levels of supplier avoidance in the
selection decision.
Similar to time constraints, feeling overburdened with a great deal of work can
cause a buyer to develop coping mechanisms, such as problem-solving skills, shortcuts or
schemas, to reduce the burden associated with task accomplishment. In these situations,
techniques to “work smarter, not harder” may be employed to limit the processing burden
associated with tasks. While these mechanisms may improve processing speed, they may
inadvertently degrade the quality of decision making by causing the buyer to miss
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important and relevant information in the decision situation. Specifically, we
hypothesize:
H3: The level of workload pressure will be negatively related to supplier
avoidance.
Similar to our hypothesis for time pressure, we posit that workload pressure cues will
negative affect the decision process and result in failure to adequately process the signals,
thus resulting in lower levels of supplier avoidance in the decision.
Our final hypothesis acknowledges that the combination of workload pressure and
a time constrained decision will act synergistically to further detract from the ability to
avoid the counterfeit supplier. This interaction will further amplify the noise and detract
from decision quality. Specifically, we hypothesize:
H4: Workload pressure and time pressure will interact to further negatively
moderate the relationship between counterfeit signaling and supplier avoidance.
We present our 3x2x2 factorial design matrix in Table 3.2.
Group
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12

Counterfeit Workload
Time
Signals
Pressure Pressure
Low
Low
Low
Low
Low
High
Low
High
Low
Low
High
High
Medium
Low
Low
Medium
Low
High
Medium
High
Low
Medium
High
High
High
Low
Low
High
Low
High
High
High
Low
High
High
High
TABLE 3.2 – DESIGN MATRIX
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3.4 Research Methods
Fundamentally, our research explores the managerial decision making process for
purchasing specialists dealing with counterfeit situations that affect supply chains.
Studying the human decision making processes that affect operations processes positions
our research within the domain of behavioral operations management (Crosan, Schultz,
Siemsen and Yeo, 2013). Experimentation is an ideal methodology for sourcing and
purchasing management questions and for exploring decision making because it enables
the researcher to directly manipulate the variables of interest and draw causal inferences
while also relaxing some of the dependency on traditional mathematical modeling
assumptions regarding trust and rationality (Bendoly, Donohue and Schultz, 2006). Our
experiment is a 3 x 2 x 2 factorial design, with three levels of counterfeit signals and two
levels of time pressure and workload pressure.
Target Population and Sample Characteristics
As we explored the ability to detect counterfeit signals during a purchasing
decision, our target population was comprised of individuals who participate in
purchasing decisions in a business or public sector organization (not consumer
purchasing). As noted by Sheth (1973), purchasing decisions can be individual or joint
ones. Purchasing specialists, contracting specialists, engineers, supply chain managers
and program managers are potential participants in purchasing decisions. With that in
mind, we wanted to select a sample of individuals from professional backgrounds that fit
the profile of our intended population. We requested participation from the Logistics
Officers Association, which is a professional organization of more than 2700 military
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officers and civilians in the acquisition, technology and logistics professions. LOA is an
appropriate sample because it contains individuals who participate in acquiring and
sustaining defense systems, particularly significant here because the defense sector has
been identified as a target of deceptive counterfeits. There are additional professional
organizations that could also serve as representative samples, for example the Institute for
Supply Management, the Council of Supply Chain Professionals, and the National
Contracts Management Association.
Sample Composition
Table 3.3 details the demographic information of our sample. As not all of the
participants answered all of the demographic questions, the table includes a column
providing a response count for each question. There are some notable demographic
factors that must be addressed as potential limitations of our sample in terms of
generalizability. Firstly, our sample was comprised of individuals who belong to a
professional society, which means they may be more interested in doing their jobs well
and developing their skills in their fields. Secondly, our sample was predominantly male
(76% male versus 24% female), which, while not surprising and consistent with the
demographic composition of the military, does present a concern we must address.
Previous studies using more general purchasing populations, such as the membership of
the Institute for Supply Management (Hall and Roth, 2015), indicate that the gender of
purchasing specialists is more evenly distributed, closer to 60% male and 40% female. As
such, we specifically tested for gender effects in our models. Our sample was also largely
college educated, with 96% having a Bachelor’s degree, and 70% holding an advanced
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degree (Master’s or higher). As these educational attainment rates are higher than those
observed by Hall and Roth (2015), we also tested for an education effect to assess
whether this difference is relevant to the sourcing decision.
Age
20-29
30-39
40-49
50-59
60-69
70-79
Not Reported

Gender
N
27
25
26
19
8
1
4

%
24.55%
22.73%
23.64%
17.27%
7.27%
0.91%
3.64%

Position Level
Top Management
Middle Management
Supervisor
Professional
Other

N
27
25
26
19
8

%
24.55%
22.73%
23.64%
17.27%
7.27%

Male
Female
Not Reported

N
%
82 74.55%
26 23.64%
2 1.82%

Education
High School / GED
Some College
Associate's
Bachelor's
Master's
Post Master's
Doctoral
Not Reported

N
%
0 0.00%
1 0.91%
1 0.91%
29 26.36%
65 59.09%
7 6.36%
5 4.55%
2 1.82%

Overall N = 110
TABLE 3.3 – SAMPLE DEMOGRAPHIC SUMMARY
Scenario Based Role Playing Experiments
Because of the potential quality impacts to real-world organizations, field
experimentation in an applied setting is not possible without negative consequences. As
such, we were constrained to selecting between a laboratory-based or scenario-based
experiment. Lab experiments can require substantial investment in facilities and support
as well as scheduling of researchers and participants, thus making them cost prohibitive
in large scales. Fortunately, our research involved signals present in sourcing
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documentation, so we were able to use a scenario-based role playing experimental
approach. This approach can leverage the paperless world of internet-based research
software platforms to reduce costs while being representative of the real-world
purchasing environment, which is largely conducted in the context of electronic
commerce and involves reviewing online information to enable decision making. For
these reasons, a scenario-based role playing experimental approach is a relevant and
effective method for studying the sourcing decision making process in situations with a
potential counterfeit hazard.
While scenario-based role playing experiments reduce the investment burden
compared to laboratory experiments, it, in no way, should be construed that they require
less design effort. Because it is important to make the participant in this method feel
immersed in the experience to elicit the desired realistic response, it is of the utmost
importance to spend considerable time and effort focusing on the design of the scenario
and specific vignettes. We followed the design approach recommended by
Rungtusanatham, Wallin and Eckerd (2011), which offers specific considerations in three
phases of research: the pre-design, design, and post-design stages.
Pre-Design Stage
The pre-design stage is focused on two areas, becoming familiar with the context
of the situation that the research seeks to examine and then understanding the relevant
factors that influence it (Rungtusanatham et al, 2011). We conducted extensive literature
reviews in the academic and practitioner literature as well as conducted interviews with
two subject matter experts in the area of counterfeit problems in industrial buying
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situations so that we could craft a realistic scenario that would be representative of a real
world purchasing decision. Our working paper on the theoretical bases for exploring the
counterfeit phenomena provides a detailed description of our literature review and
interview findings (Watson and Roth, 2015). Additionally, we examined existing
purchasing documents available on the world-wide web to understand the typical
documents that would be used in these purchasing situations.
Design Stage
To develop our experiment’s common module and experimental cues module, we
followed Rungtusanatham et al.’s (2011) recommendations where we could. We included
appropriate purchasing language and formats into the scenario and supporting document
artifacts to make them reasonable and representative of purchasing situation artifacts. The
deceptive counterfeit phenomenon has not been explored in previous supply chain
management research so there were no available vignettes to reuse. That said, our
literature review of the practitioner literature provided us with examples of counterfeit
items and the paperwork related to them to help construct realistic experimental products.
Post-Design Stage
Once we had initial drafts of the vignettes and questions, we asked purchasing
experts to provide reviews, and we conducted two rounds of Q sorts to refine the
language to improve the clarity and reliability of the instruments. After we had
reasonable instruments, we uploaded them into the Qualtrics online research software and
conducted three rounds of pilot testing to further improve the instruments.
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Our first round of pilot testing involved a small group (n = 12) of executive
supply chain management Master’s degree students at a Midwest university using only
three of our experimental groups. We used this group of students because they were a
reasonable proxy group for our population of interest, purchasing and supply chain
management professionals. This group provided initial valuable feedback and
constructive criticism in terms of realism and the quality of the experiment.
The next two rounds of pilot testing were conducted using MBA students at a
university in the Southeast. This second round of pilot testing was based on refinements
from the first round and included a larger scale (n = 90) to allow us to run all of our
proposed scenarios. During the second round of pilot testing, we had two levels of each
of our factors. The results from the pilot test suggested that it would be worthwhile to add
a third level of the counterfeit signal independent variable so that we could isolate the
price counterfeit signal (i.e. priced too good to be true) from the non-price elements of
the counterfeit signal.
The manipulation checks during the second round identified one error in the
design. We had included information that one of the offerors was an “independent parts
distributor” in the low level. Since this is a counterfeit signal, it should not have been
incorporated. This was subsequently corrected, and the third round of pilot testing
provided suitable responses on all of the manipulation checks. Our final round of pilot
testing also enabled us to have a complete run of our final instrument. In the end, all pilot
rounds were beneficial to improving the overall design, identifying errors, and improving
the clarity and realism of the experiment.
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Experimental Procedure
As mentioned previously, we prepared our experimental instrument and used
Qualtrics software to enable internet distribution and participation. To assist in the
recruitment of participants for our research, the Logistics Officers Association sent an
invitational email and advertised the request for participation on its website and in its
social media post, “The Logistics Pulse.” As a result of these efforts, we received 245
responses. Of them, 130 did not agree during the informed consent or did not proceed to
answer the selection decision question, and 5 others dropped out of the experiment before
completing all of the answers. After these reductions, our remaining sample was a total of
110 participants for an approximate response rate of 3.94%, based on LOA’s 2,791 active
members. Our experiment was activated for three weeks during the fall of 2015, during
which time one reminder advertisement in “The Logistics Pulse” was sent out.
Experimental Design Checks
Manipulation Checks
For the purpose of assessing convergent validity, we examined whether the
participants’ perceptions of our manipulations were interpreted as we had intended. This
is consistent with Perdue and Sommers’ (1986) view that manipulation checks ensure that
the subject in an experiment is actually aware of and responding to the variables of
interest. To test for whether our manipulations were effective, we asked a combination of
closed-ended questions and 7-point Likert Scale items. For our counterfeit signal
variable, we asked whether the part was an obsolete item and if the supplier was an
independent parts distributor. For the time pressure variable, we asked to identify if there
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was a timer present in the experiment (only true for the high time pressure groups).
Finally, for the workload pressure variable, we asked the participants questions regarding
whether they felt pressure (these questions were the Likert-scaled items).
All of our questions, with the exception of the independent parts distributor
question, were significant as detailed by the regression summaries in Table 3.4. The fact
that the independent parts distributor cues were not processed by the participants may be
more attributable to the fact that the participants in the low counterfeit signal group were
told that one supplier was a parts distributor while those in medium and high groups were
told that the supplier was an independent parts distributor. It is possible that the
distinction between the two was too subtle a differentiation for participants to
comprehend easily.
DV
IV
N
F (1, 108) Prob > F
R2
ManipObs
CS
110
9.31
.0029
.0794
ManipIndPart
CS
110
0.20
.6562
.0018
ManipTime
TP
110
514.88
.0000
.8266
TooMuchWork
WP
110
16.83
.0001
.1359
LargeQuantityWork
WP
110
3.40
.0677
.0306
FeltOverwork
WP
110
20.78
.0000
.1613
TABLE 3.4 – SUMMARY OF MANIPULATION CHECK REGRESSIONS
Overall, our manipulation checks present statistical support for the fact that the
participants were responding to the experimental design.
Realism Checks
In addition to checking whether participants respond to intended manipulations, it
is equally important to ensure that the scenarios in the experiment are realistic and
represent situations that the sample,

and, by extension, the population of interest,

encounter in the real world. To ensure our experimental design accounts for this
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important consideration, we adapted the scale developed by Pilling, Crosby and Jackson
(1994) to assess the extent to which our scenarios were realistic and likely for our
participants to encounter in the real world. The answers were based on a 7-point Likert
scale with 1 being Strongly Disagree and 7 being Strongly Agree. Table 3.5 details the
specific questions and the means and variances of the responses to each question.
Realism Check Question
Mean Std. Dev
The scenario described in the study is realistic.
5.66
1.18
I took my role described in the scenario seriously.
6.23
1.01
In my work, I rarely encounter the issues discussed in these scenarios. 3.70
1.87
I am highly aware of the issues raised in this scenario.
5.25
1.70
TABLE 3.5 – REALISM CHECK SUMMARY STATISTICS
These results suggest that our participants found our scenarios to be realistic, familiar and
reasonable and that they took their roles seriously. We do note that some of the
participants do not encounter these issues in their work. This is not entirely unreasonable
for our sample as some members of the Logistics Officers Association work in such
fields as aircraft maintenance and thus, do not directly purchase parts. They do, however,
manage maintenance actions that utilize the products of business-to-business type
transactions.
Common Methods Variance Checks
One potential source of error that must be proactively addressed is the issue of
systematic error associated with common methods bias. To address this potential source
of bias, we employed two ex-ante items to control for common methods. We inserted
four items from the General Self Efficacy scale (Schwarzer and Jerusalem, 1990) and one
question on whether childhood vaccination exemptions should be granted only in the case
of medical need. We aggregated the responses on the four questions regarding problem
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solving from the General Self Efficacy scale (on a 7-point Likert scale for level of
agreement) specifically:
“When I am confronted with a problem, I can usually find several solutions.”
“I can solve most problems if I invest the necessary effort.”
“I am confident that I could deal efficiently with unexpected events.”
“I can always manage to solve difficult problems if I try hard enough”
The response on this scale did not relate to the response on our dependent variable,
supplier selection. Based on the lack of statistical significance, we can reasonably
conclude that common method bias, or systemic error as a result of common instrument,
is not present in our data.
When examining beyond a simple regression of the vaccination question on our
dependent variable, if we apply Harman’s (1976) single factor approach to our common
methods variance questions, we find that each individual factor analysis reveals that the
five common methods variance questions and the dependent variable do not map well
onto a single factor (Eigenvalues all less than 1), suggesting that in total, common
methods bias is not present in our model. Finally, Siemsen, Roth and Oliviera (2010)
demonstrate common methods variance is less problematic for models that contain
interaction terms, even in the case where the additional factors have common methods
variance. As our model contains interaction terms, this provides additional support for
our assessment that common methods variance is not a problem for our model.
Model Specification
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We analyzed our data using logistic regression in Stata 12.0. Logistic regression is
an appropriate technique for analyzing relationships involving dichotomous dependent
variables. Our model included the independent variables of interest, the moderating effect
of the interaction of time pressure and workload pressure, and the demographic variables
of interest, specifically age, gender, education level, industry and non-native English
language. In our models, Counterfeit Signals (abbreviated CS) has three levels, 0, 1 or 2,
with 0 being Low signaling, 1 being Medium level of signaling, and 2 being a High level
of signaling. Time Pressure (TP) and Workload Pressure (WP) are binary variables, with
0 indicating that the condition did not apply and 1 indicating that the condition applied to
the participant’s group. Finally, the interaction of time pressure and workload pressure is
indicated as (TP X WP).
We created multiple dummy variables for our categorical demographic variable
for Industry Sectors. We had options for twenty industry sectors, but not all of them were
used, so we created dummy variables only for those reported in the data using the Stata
command tabulate Sector, generate (Industry) to create dummy variables for the 11
sectors reported by participants.
We modeled Education as a categorical variable in ascending order from high
school to doctoral degree. Binary dummy variables were created for gender (Male = 0,
Female = 1) and non-native English speaking (Native = 0, Non-Native = 1). Additionally,
we added variables for capturing purchasing and logistics/supply chain experience, the
annual purchasing volume (categorical, ascending in $) and the number of purchases the
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participant was involved in during the last year. The specification of our level 1 model is
as follows:
̂
𝑝

𝑙𝑛 [1−𝑝𝑖̂] = 𝐵𝑖 𝑋𝑖 + 𝐵0

(Equation 1)

𝑖

where 𝑝̂𝑖 = the predicted probability of i being a case and where i = the individual
participants in our experiment.
Our Level Two model is written as follows:
Bi =

B0 + B1 (CS) + B2 (TP)+ B3 (WP) + B4 (TP X WP) + B5 (Female) + B6
(Education) + B7 (Educational Services) + B8 (Finance & Insurance) + B9
(Information) + B10 (Management of Companies and Enterprises) + B11
(Manufacturing) + B 12 (Other Services (except Public Administration)) +
B13 (Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services) + B14 (Public
Administration) + B15 (Retail Trade) + B16 (Transportation and
Warehousing) + B17 (Wholesale Trade) + B18 (Purchasing Experience) +
B19 (Logistics / Supply Chain Experience)
(Equation 2)

If, as anticipated, none of the demographic variables are significant, the level two model
reduces to the simpler structure of:
Bi =

B0 + B1 (CS) + B2 (TP) + B3 (WP) + B4 (TP X WP)
(Equation 3)

Another equation we used to examine our model is the unweighted effects coding
version, which allows us to make comparisons of means between our sample groups even
though the number of participants is not equally balanced across all groups (Cohen,
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Cohen, West and Aiken, 2003). For this model, we constructed grouping variables, with
our control group (Group 1) as the reference group, which was coded onto the Group2
through Group12 variables with a value of -1, while all other groups were coded as 0 and
1. The unweighted effects coded model specification, with B0 representing our control
group, Group1, is as follows:
Yi =

B0 + B1Group2 + B2Group3 + B3Group4 + B4Group5 + B5Group6 +
B6Group7 + B7Group8 + B8Group9 + B9Group10 + B10Group11 +
B11Group12 + ri

While in most cases, using ordinary least squares regression on a dichotomous
dependent variable produces coefficients that are difficult to interpret, in this particular
case, the coefficients represented the differences in means compared to the mean of
Group1, which is simply the proportion of participants who avoided the counterfeit
supplier in the selection decision.

3.5 Results
Logistic Regression
We analyzed our data using logistic regression. When we constructed the model
as detailed in Equation 2, which included the demographics as predictor variables, only
counterfeit signaling and the supply chain experience demographic variable were
significant predictors of the selection decision. The logistic regression model results for
the relationships of interest, including demographics, as specified in Equation 2 are
presented in Table 3.5.
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In terms of finding support for our predicted relationships, only one of our four
hypotheses was supported. We found the level of counterfeit signaling to be a significant
predictor of supplier avoidance. That is to say, participants had a higher probability of
avoiding the counterfeit supplier in the medium and high counterfeit groups than the
participants assigned to the low level groups for the counterfeit signal variable.
Additionally, we found that the years of supply chain or logistics management experience
was a significant predictor of counterfeit avoidance. As the years of this experience
increased, the probability of avoiding the counterfeit supplier increased.
Variable
Intercept
CS
WP
TP
TP X WP
Female
Education
Industry
1. Manufacturing
2. Wholesale Trade
3. Transportation &
Warehousing
4. Information
5. Retail Trade
6. Finance & Insurance
7. Prof, Scientific &
Technical Services
8. Mgt of Companies &
Enterprises
9. Educational Services
10. Other Services (except
Public Administration
11. Public Administration
Purchasing Experience
Logistics / Supply Chain
Experience

Model
Coefficient
Std Error
-2.611
1.847
1.018**
0.294
.895
0.759
-.591
0.773
-.172
1.033
-.465
0.597
.134
0.337

Hypothesis
1
2
3
4

-.756
Omitted
Omitted

1.201

.170
Omitted
Omitted

.869

-.107

1.016

-.723
Omitted

1.07

.749
Omitted
-0.005

.912
0.049

0.058**

0.027
χ2(13) = 24.97

N = 98
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Prob > χ2
= 0.023**
Pseudo R2 = 0.185

Log Likelihood = -55.114

**p ≤ 0.05; ***p ≤ 0.01; Bold indicates statistically significant regression coefficients

TABLE 3.5 – LOGISTIC REGRESSION MODEL STATISTICS
In terms of a simple regression of the supplier selection variable on the
unweighted experimental group means, the overall model was found to be statistically
significant, with the majority of the group means being statistically different from the
reference (Group1) group’s mean. The summary of this regression is provided in Table
3.6. In this case, the reported mean is the mean of the Select variable for that Group,
which can be interpreted as the proportion of participants in that group who avoided the
counterfeit supplier in the selection decision (the Select variable is coded 0 for the
counterfeit supplier and 1 for the non-counterfeit supplier), while the coefficients for
Groups 2 – 12 represent the difference between the unweighted mean of that Group and
mean of all the Groups, which is the coefficient of the intercept (.554). The overall model
is statistically significant with an N of 110, 11 degrees of freedom for the model and 98
degrees of freedom for the residual. The F value for the model (F 11, 98) is 2.82, with a
p value of .0031, indicating the overall model is a highly significant model.
The groups with the most substantial difference in selection were groups 2 and 4,
in which participants were far more likely to select the counterfeit supplier. In these cases
where the counterfeit signals were lower, the negative coefficient indicates that the
participants were more likely to select the counterfeit rather than avoid it. This is
consistent with our hypothesis. It should be noted that Group 3 was only marginally
statistically significant at the p < .10 in terms of unweighted mean difference. The small
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sample sizes of our groups make it difficult to achieve statistical significance in mean
differences in every group.
Group

Counterfeit
Signals
Low
Low
Low
Low
Medium
Medium
Medium
Medium
High
High
High
High

Workload
Pressure
Low
Low
High
High
Low
Low
High
High
Low
Low
High
High

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
Intercept
* p <.10, ** p <.05, *** p <.01

Time
Pressure
Low
High
Low
High
Low
High
Low
High
Low
High
Low
High

Mean

N

Coefficient

0.375
0.000
0.300
0.308
0.700
0.400
0.818
0.769
0.700
0.857
0.750
0.667

8
6
10
13
10
5
11
13
10
7
8
9

#
-0.554
-0.254
-0.246
0.146
-0.154
0.265
0.216
0.146
0.303
0.196
0.113
0.554

P value

0.002***
0.072*
0.050**
0.296
0.425
0.051*
0.086*
0.296
0.067*
0.206
0.441
0

TABLE 3.6 – UNWEIGHTED EFFECTS CODED REGRESSION
Post-estimation Test for Heteroscedasticity
To ensure our model was free of heteroscedasticity, we conducted post-estimation
testing on our regression model. For heteroscedasticity, we used the Breusch-Pagan /
Cook-Weisberg test (hettest command in Stata 12.0) for heteroscedasticity, which tests to
determine if variances are consistent across all fitted values. Not surprisingly, our
heteroscedasticity tests were not significant for the selection dependent variable (χ2 (1) =
.09, prob > χ2 = .762).
Relationship Between Select Decision and Degree of Supplier Preference
While we find that the level of counterfeit signaling does have a significant effect
on the avoidance of the supplier, we wanted to examine if there was a substantial
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difference in the extent of preference between those who selected the counterfeit supplier
(Select = 0) and those who avoided the counterfeit supplier (Select = 1). A simple
regression of the outcome of our 7-pt scaled question asking for the extent of preference
revealed a significant difference in the degree of preference. The regression coefficient of
Prefer was 1.36, which can be interpreted as those in the group who avoided the
counterfeit supplier, on average, assessed their preference as higher by 1.36 points on a 7point scale. Table 3.7 contains the specific regression information.
Source
Model
Residual
Total

SS
48.9443
192.0649
241.0092

df
1
107
108

Prefer
Coef.
SE
Select
1.356798 0.259834
Intercept 3.913043 0.197539

MS
48.9443
1.794999
2.231566

N
F(1, 107)
Prob > F
R2
Adjusted R2
Root MSE

T
5.22
19.81

P>t
0.000
0.000

=
=
=
=
=
=

109
27.2700
0.0000
0.2031
0.1956
1.3398

95% CI
0.841707 1.871889
3.521
4.304

TABLE 3.7 – REGRESSION OF PREFERENCE ON SELECTION DECISION

3.6 Discussion
In terms of our a priori model, only H1, the hypothesis that counterfeit signaling
is positively related to supplier avoidance, was supported. This result is consistent with
Signaling Theory, which proposes that as the level of signaling increases, the ability to
detect and process the signal increases. As expected, as the level of counterfeit signaling
increased, the participants were more likely to avoid the supplier.
While we found that the medium and high levels of counterfeit signals resulted in
supplier avoidance; however, the degree of difference between these two levels was not
statistically significant, meaning that we can’t conclude that purchasing specialists
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specifically avoided an item priced below the competitive range seen in previous
purchases. As such, further research is required to isolate and test for this specific
consideration. This is also true for the other signals of counterfeits. It is possible that
these signals are multi-faceted, and it would be worthwhile to test whether one particular
signal is more important than the others. Given the ongoing debate we identified earlier
in the article regarding price versus schedule versus quality, understanding the hierarchy
of importance of counterfeit signals might prove worthwhile in explaining why
counterfeits make it into supply chains even in situations where experienced and qualified
guardians exist.
In regards to time pressure, workload pressure and their interaction, we did not
find statistical support for these three hypotheses. There are two potential explanations
for this. First, our sample size was small (N = 110) relative to what is desired for a 3x2x2
full factorial experimental design, thus limiting the power of our analysis. It is possible
that a relationship might exist but that we are unable to detect it in a statistically
significant way. Another potential explanation involves our sample group. The members
of the Logistics Officer’s Association are largely associated with the military, and, as
such, may demonstrate a greater ability to deal with high pressure situations, both in
terms of workload complexity and time constraints. While this particular sample may not
react to time pressure, we did see evidence in our second pilot study that time pressure
has an impact on the decision process. To resolve this apparent inconsistency, we
recommend that further analysis be conducted with a broader range of purchasing
specialists in a variety of supply chains. Finally, the experimental design may not have
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been substantial enough to trigger a response to the pressure cues. One method to assess
the quality of these pressure cues in evoking an actual stress response is to conduct a test
of the experiment in a controlled setting and measure participants’ levels of alphaamylase, a hormone produced by individuals experiencing stress, prior to and
immediately following administration of the experiment to objectively measure if
participants experience a higher level of stress in the time and workload pressure groups.
This approach has been utilized in research in management information systems
(Galluch, Grover and Thatcher, 2015)
As our first-order independent variables were not significant predictors of the
selection decision, it is not surprising that our hypothesis regarding the interaction effect
of time pressure and workload pressure was not substantiated. Again, this is likely the
result of the small sample size and its effect on the statistical power of our analysis.
Limitations
As mentioned earlier, there are two primary limitations in terms of the
generalizability of our findings. First, our sample was drawn from a professional society
in one industry sector. As such it may not be representative of the larger purchasing
population across industries in terms of education, gender and personality traits.
The second limitation of our research is that we were not able to directly
determine whether price or quality is more important in the decision. The design of our
counterfeit signal variable was additive in nature, with price being included at the high
level in addition to the quality signals in the medium level. To remedy this problem, the
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counterfeit signal variable should have four levels, with the additional level containing
price signals only to allow for direct analysis of this relationship.
Opportunities for Future Research
This essay represents an initial study on the behavior of purchasing specialists in
terms of their responsibilities as guardians of the supply chain. There are several ways in
which this research can be extended. First, there are several dimensions of Sheth’s Model
of Industrial Buyer Behavior (1973) which we controlled in our design for the sake of
simplicity. Several of these factors may influence the quality of decision making in
counterfeit situations. Most notably, we limited the purchasing decision to a single buyer
acting autonomously. In many business situations, complex and/or expensive purchasing
decisions usually involve teams of technical specialists and purchasing experts, so it
would be worthwhile to design the experiment to enable two or more people to
collaborate on the decision to see if joint decision making improved the ability to detect
the counterfeit signals. Doing so would also provide insights into the priorities that
different occupational specialties place on price, schedule and quality in purchasing
decisions.
Another opportunity for future research is related to understanding the relative
importance of each of the counterfeit signals identified in Table 3.2, particularly as they
relate to specific types of products or subcomponents. While the price being below the
competitive range might be a universally relevant signal of potential counterfeiting, some
of the other signals may be more or less relevant across different types of purchases.
Incorrect lot or part number information would clearly not be relevant in a situation
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where raw materials are being purchased. Developing and typologies or taxonomies of
counterfeit signals would provide insights into the phenomena that would benefit
practitioners and potentially enable tailoring of counterfeit prevention training and
development of quality controls for purchasing decisions.
A final recommended extension of this research stream is to assess the effects of
prior experience with counterfeiting and training on counterfeits on the quality of the
purchasing decision. This would provide additional insights into the guardianship of the
supply chain that might improve the firm’s ability to avoid counterfeit infiltration. To be
comprehensive, further research should examine what elements of training and
experience have the most benefit to supply chains.
From a methodological perspective, we employed a scenario-based experimental
design because it allowed for control and ease of execution by means of distribution via
email and participation in a distributed setting at a time that was convenient for
participants. To broaden the understanding of the counterfeit problem in applied settings,
case-based research and surveys could be employed as methods to explore the
phenomenon. Case-based research would be particularly useful in refining the list of
potential signals of counterfeits by working with companies that have experienced
counterfeit problems in their supply chains.

3.7 Conclusion
The goal of this research was to add to the body of knowledge in supply chain
management regarding deceptive counterfeits, which is an important contemporary
problem facing practitioners across all supply chains. Using a Signal Theory and Crime
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Prevention theoretical lens to examine the problem, we constructed a realistic and
effective set of scenarios to test whether purchasing and supply chain personnel could
detect signals of counterfeits in purchasing decisions.
Overall, our effort has contributed to answering the call to examine supply chain
security issues, which is a growing stream of literature in our discipline that is of
paramount importance to practitioners. This experiment successfully extends the work of
Mavlanova and Benbunan-Fich (2010) from the consumer into the B2B sector, testing a
set of counterfeit signals proposed in the practitioner literature and knowledge base. We
found that an increase in the collective level of signals of a potential counterfeit situation
(e.g. parts obsolescence, item having been subject to counterfeiting in the past, priced
below the competitive range, and missing and inaccurate proposal, part numbers and lot
numbers) had the collective effect of causing participants to avoid selection of the
counterfeit supplier.
While we also sought to understand the effects of time and workload pressure in
the decision making process where counterfeits are concerned, we did not have sufficient
power, largely the result of our small sample size, to find a meaningful relationship
between these proposed sources of noise and the ability to successfully detect counterfeit
signals. Future research should focus on refining the time and workload pressure
measures and determining what types of adaptive and compensating behaviors assist in
overcoming them.
Due to our small sample size and frame, we recognize the limitations of the
generalizability of the findings of our research. To improve the overall relevance and
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reach of this work, future research efforts should test these scenarios using a broader
sample of purchasing specialists. This research could also be improved by incorporating
considerations for joint or team purchasing decisions by obtaining dyads of purchasing
and technical team members and employing a multi-level mixed modeling approach to
assess individual and team effects on decisions involving potential counterfeit situations.
Counterfeits remain a real problem for supply chain managers, and we have only
begun to explore this phenomenon. Because of the criminal nature of counterfeiting and
the potential profits, perpetrators of the crime will continue to adapt and respond to the
prevention and detection techniques used to protect supply chains. As such, the research
in this area will need to keep pace and evolve over time to react and respond
appropriately.
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Chapter 4

Essay Three: Objective Versus
Perceptual Measures of Time
Pressure: An Exploratory
Methodological Note
4.1 Introduction
This essay is a methodological note that explores the relationship of perceptual
assessments of time pressure and measures of the observed amount of time spent in
decision making to determine if these are strongly related to one another. It is also
intended to provide insight into whether these two approaches for assessing time pressure
are equally valuable in terms of their relationship to actual time constraints and decision
quality in a scenario-based role playing experiment involving a business-to-business
purchasing situation.
Too often, purchasing specialists are burdened with time constraints, meaning
they have only a limited amount of time to spend on a purchasing decision as a result of
large workloads or insufficient quantities of personnel in buying organizations.
According to a 2014 analysis by Economic Modeling Specialists International in the Wall
Street Journal, approximately half of purchasing manager positions advertised were
going unfilled (Weber, 2014). Given this shortfall, it is reasonable to conclude that
existing staff are being asked either to do less purchasing or to spend less time
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accomplishing the same purchasing tasks, calling into question the quality of the decision
process.

Quality failures in supply chains are a relevant contemporary issue in supply

chain management, with one of the most cited works in this area by Roth, Tsay, Pullman
and Gray (2008) providing a thorough discussion of supply chain quality management.
There has been considerable research on the perception of time versus the actual
passing of time in a variety of psychology and marketing books and research journals.
Some of the most commonly cited examples include Hornik’s (1984) and Antonides,
Verhoef, and Van Aalst’s (2002) works on consumers’ perceptions of time versus the
actual time spent waiting in line. Focusing more specifically on the perception of time
pressure and decision making are the works of Ben Zur and Breznitz (1981); Zakay and
Wooler (1984); Hahn, Lawson and Lee (1992); and, more recently, Kocher, Pahlke and
Trautmann (2013). We contend that a thorough understanding of the effect of time on
decision making quality requires consideration of 1.) the actual amount of time spent
making the purchasing decision, 2.) the perceived amount of time pressure on the part of
the individual and 3.) whether actual time pressure (i. e. time constraint) is present in the
decision process.
While we found numerous articles related to time and decision making quality in
organizational behavior, economics, consumer marketing, and psychology, we found a
limited exploration of the combination of these concepts in supply chain management
literature. We seek to contribute to remedying this gap in the literature. Understanding
the effect of time on the individual purchasing specialist’s decision making quality is an
important behavioral operations management issue as buyers serve a critical role in
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providing both financial and quality value to the supply chain. The decisions made by
purchasing specialists and managers have a broad reach and, as such, are important to the
success of a firm’s operations. Specifically, we seek to answer the following research
questions:
1. Do self-reported perceived time pressure responses correlate to the actual time
spent making a decision, given a certain level of time pressure?
2. Do the baseline reading time, age and gender of individuals affect the actual
time spent on making a decision?
3. Do time pressure (time constraint), perceived time pressure, and actual time
spent in decision making affect the quality of a sourcing decision?
4. Do time pressure (time constraint), perceived time pressure, and actual time
spent in decision making affect the recollection of information from the
decision process?
In addition to contributing to the purchasing decision making body of knowledge,
we also provide a methodological contribution by determining if perceptual measures of
time pressure provide additional clarity to the decision making quality above and beyond
the actual time spent making the decision. Understanding this relationship can help
improve the design of behavioral experiments in supply chain management.
To answer our research questions, we constructed an a priori model of our
variables of interest. We gathered data for analysis as part of a scenario-based role
playing experiment involving the selection of a supplier in a potential counterfeit risk
situation. As part of the experiment, we obtained data on the baseline reading time for
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participants as well as information on the amount of time they spent on the decision
portion of the experiment. In addition to obtaining these measures, we randomly assigned
participants to either a time pressured group or to a group without time pressure. After the
selection decision, participants were provided with a questionnaire covering the factors
that influenced their decision, their perceived time pressure, and their demographic
information. The questionnaire items can be found in Appendix B. We then used this
information to test our a priori model.
The remainder of this essay is structured as follows. We present our a priori
model, including the definitions of our time and demographic variables, and our
hypotheses regarding their relationships to one another and to decision quality and
accuracy. After the model is introduced, we describe our data collection methods and
present the results of our structural equation model analysis. We then assess the merits of
our a priori model and present an alternative model in the Discussion Section, concluding
this essay with a brief discussion regarding limitations and potential opportunities for
additional research related to time and decision quality.

4.2 A Priori Model
Based on information from our literature review, we constructed the structural
model seen in Figure 4.1as our a priori model. This model contains our two time
measurement variables, Decision Time (denotated as DecideTime in our model) and
Baseline Time (BaseTime), and our independent variable, Time Pressure (TP), as well as
our latent variable, perceived time pressure (denoted as PerceivedTimePress in our
model). In addition to the time-related variables, we also include age and gender (denoted
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as Female) in our model, as previous research has suggested that these demographic
items are related to risk aversion and decision outcomes in time pressure situations
(Kocher et al., 2013; Hahn et al., 2003). The outcome variables in our model are supplier
selection decision quality and accuracy on manipulation check questions.
Variable Definitions and Measurements
Perceived time pressure is defined as the participant’s perception that there is
insufficient time to complete the given amount of work, a definition that has been applied
consistently in management literature (e.g. Cooper, Dewe, & O’Driscoll, 2001; Pearsall,
Ellis, & Stein, 2009; Maruping, Venkatesh, Thatcher & Patel, 2015). We modeled this as
a latent construct comprised of four items on a seven-point Likert response scale. The
measures we used were:
1. I felt like I had enough time to review the information provided for the
selection decision.
2. I felt rushed to make a selection decision.
3. Overall, I felt a sense of time pressure when completing the experiment.
4. I felt too rushed to adequately address the supplier selection in this
experiment.
Confirmatory factor analysis of our data revealed that these measures map consistently
onto one factor (χ2 = 348.51, Prob> χ2 = 0.0000), with a factor Eigenvalue of 2.940 and
proportion of explained variance of 1.0397 (unrotated). Factor loadings are provided in
Table 4.1.
Unrotated Principal Factors Analysis
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Factor

Eigenvalue

Difference

Proportion

Cumulative

Factor1

2.94014

2.88651

1.0397

1.0397

Factor2

0.05363

0.11726

0.019

1.0586

Factor3

-0.06363

0.0385

-0.0225

1.0361

Factor4

-0.10213

.

-0.0361

1

N = 107

Chi2 = 348.51

Prob > Chi2 = 0.000

Factor Loadings (Pattern Matrix and Uniqueness)
Variable
I felt like I had enough time to review the information
provided for the selection decision.
I felt rushed to make a selection decision.
Overall, I felt a sense of time pressure when completing
the experiment.
I felt too rushed to adequately address the supplier
selection in this experiment.

Factor1

Factor2

Uniqueness

-0.7138

0.1625

0.4641

0.9394

0.0378

0.1162

0.8837

0.1494

0.1968

0.876

-0.0589

0.2292

TABLE 4.1 – CONFIRMATORY FACTOR ANALYSIS OF PERCEIVED TIME
PRESSURE MEASURES
For our objective measures of time, we gathered two data points for each
participant. First, we obtained a measure of baseline time by monitoring the amount of
time spent on the screen that provided the background information on the scenario.
Software captured the start and end times for the page, so subtracting the start from the
end calculated the amount of time spent on the page, which we termed Baseline Time.
The second measure of time, which was gathered during the decision process page, was
calculated in the same manner. We defined this as Decision Time. The rationale for
obtaining these two time measures was to determine if general processing times, which
vary based on the individual, have an effect on our outcome variables. If so, we can
isolate and control for this effect.
The final time element in this model is time pressure, which is the actual time
limited condition that was randomly assigned to participants in the experiment. In the
time pressure condition, participants were given a written cue in the scenario that they
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have five minutes to make the decision before a meeting. Additionally, a clock was
displayed that counted up to five minutes.
The Female variable in our model was a dummy variable coded 0 for males and 1
for females, based on the self-reported gender question in the post-experiment
questionnaire. Age, which was measured in years, was also self-reported by the
participant.
The outcome variables of interest in our model were selection decision quality
and manipulation check accuracy. The selection decision quality was a binary outcome
variable. In the scenario, one of the suppliers was a potential counterfeit supplier and the
other was not. Participants who selected the counterfeit supplier were coded as 0, while
participants who selected the non-counterfeit offer were coded as 1. Manipulation check
accuracy was scored on a 4-point scale from 0 to 3, with a 0 indicating none of the
manipulation checks were answered correctly and a 3 indicating that the participant
answered all of the manipulation checks correctly. Manipulation check accuracy is a
reasonable measure of decision accuracy because the questions assess whether the
participant is able to recall the specifics of the particular scenario.
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FIGURE 4.1 – A PRIORI MODEL OF TIME CONSIDERATIONS AND DECISION
QUALITY AND ACCURACY
Hypotheses
Based on our literature review, we developed ten hypotheses regarding the
variables in our model. First, we addressed the expected relationships surrounding the
actual time pressure condition and the decision time. We expected that assigning a time
constraint would reduce the amount of time that participants would spend making the
decision and that this response to the time constraint would be consistent with results
observed by Kocher et al. (2013). Specifically, our hypothesis was:
H1 – Participants in the time constrained condition will spend less time making
the selection decision than the unconstrained condition.
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In addition to spending less time making the decision, we anticipated that
participants assigned to the time constrained condition would also report higher levels of
perceived time pressure. In their experiment, Kocher et al. (2013) found that participants
reported feeling more stress and perceived the decision task as more difficult than those
in the unconstrained condition. It is reasonable to expect that participants may be
overwhelmed by having to accomplish tasks in a short period of time, particularly those
with high information loads, the impact of which will manifest in lower quality and
accuracy in decision making (Hahn et al., 1992). If the information load is not high, then
the time constraints should be less relevant in terms of the decision outcomes. As such,
we hypothesize that:
H2 – Participants in the time constrained condition will report higher levels of
perceived time pressure than participants in the unconstrained condition.
H3 - The perceived time pressure will be negatively related to the accuracy on the
selection decision variable.
H4 - The perceived time pressure will be negatively related to the accuracy on the
manipulation check outcome variable.
In general, we expect that participants who spend more time reviewing the
information on the background and decision pages of the experiment will absorb more of
the relevant information to use in the decision process. This should result in better
decision outcomes. As such, we hypothesize:
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H5 – Participants with lengthier baseline times will (a) spend more time making
the selection decision and (b) make more accurate selection and manipulation
check decisions.
H6 – Participants who spend more time making the decision will exhibit more
accuracy on the selection decision.
H7 – Participants who spend more time making the decision will exhibit more
accuracy on responses to Manipulation Checks
As mentioned when we defined our model variables, there are two demographic
factors discussed in the literature that are potentially relevant to our study of time
perception and pressure and decision quality. There is a substantial literature stream on
age-related effects on cognitive and non-cognitive processing times (see Salthouse, 1996,
as a seminal work). As this study used an adult population, we expect that the amount of
time spent for both the baseline and decision times will be positively related to age.
H8 – Age will be positively related to a) baseline time and b) time to decide, and
negatively related to c) perceived time pressure.
Another demographic consideration is gender. As Kocher and colleagues (2013)
found, women are more risk averse in decision making than men. As such, it is
reasonable to expect they may take more time to process information to assist in
assessing the various risks associated with each supplier’s offer in the scenario. As such,
the hypothesis for gender was:
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H9 – Female participants will, on average, (a) spend more time on the selection
decision than males, (b) have higher baseline times than males, and (c) report
higher levels of perceived time pressure.

4.2 Methods
As mentioned in the introduction, we used a scenario-based role playing
experiment to collect our data. Specific details regarding the scenarios and the post-hoc
questionnaire used in the experiment can be seen in Appendix B. The population of
interest was purchasing and supply chain management specialists. Specifically, our
sample was comprised of 104 members of the Logistics Officers Association, a
professional association of logistics and acquisition personnel in the defense sector, both
in military and private sector organizations, who responded to an email solicitation
containing a hyperlink to the online experiment. We initially received 110 responses;
however, as some participants declined to report age and/or gender responses, those cases
were not included in our structural equation model analysis. This represents a response
rate of approximately 3.5%, based on an email distribution to 2,971 active members of
the organization.
In the online experiment, participants were provided a description of their role
and the decision at hand, as well as some background information on the part they were
purchasing, a specialized industrial fastener. Participants were then given information on
the offers from two suppliers and asked to make a purchasing decision between them, one
of which was designed to be a counterfeit provider and the other a legitimate one. While
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they were reviewing the background information and decision information, the software
recorded the start and finish times for each page.
After making their selections, participants were asked a series of post-hoc
questions regarding the degree of supplier preference, the importance of various factors
in their decision (e.g. quality, cost, delivery schedules), demographic questions and, most
important for this research, the manipulation check and perceived time pressure
questions. After the data were collected, we analyzed the set for outliers, finding two
cases where the times for the decision time variable were more than 7 times greater
(times in excess of 7000 seconds) than the next cluster of times. We eliminated these two
outliers even though they had only a limited effect on the model. In addition, the
incomplete cases in regards to omission of age, gender and/or missing responses to
perceived time pressure items were not included in our analysis. Our distribution of
genders was also notably skewed, with the predominant number of participants being
male. To analyze our data, we utilized Stata 12.0 software to construct our structural
equation model and generate the structural and measurement components.

4.3 Results
Figure 4.2 depicts our estimated model. While overall it possesses general
goodness of fit for our data, many of the relationships we predicted in our hypotheses
were not supported. We present our results in three areas: overall goodness of fit
statistics, model estimates, and findings supporting our hypotheses.
A Priori Model Goodness of Fit
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In general, our a priori model exhibits a satisfactory goodness of fit. The
Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square for our model has a low χ2 value (χ2 = 46.923, p > χ2 =
0.801), indicating that we can reject the null hypothesis that our model has perfect fit for
the population of interest. Because the hypothesis that a model has perfect fit is largely
implausible, additional assessments of fit should be analyzed (Kline, 2005).
Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) is an index that is seen as
“parsimony-adjusted,” meaning that this formula is structured with a correction for model
complexity (see Kline (2005) for the RMSEA formula). As a result, when comparing two
models with similar explanatory power, the RMSEA will show a preference for the
simpler of the two. The RMSEA actually measures how poorly a model fits; thus, a value
of zero for the RMSEA is considered desirable. The RMSEA value for our a priori model
was 0.000, with a 90% confidence interval lower bound of 0.000 and an upper bound of
0.041.
In addition to RMSEA, we examined the Comparative Fit Index (CFI) and
Standardized Root Mean Square Residual of our model (SRMSR). The CFI for our model
was 1.000, and the SRMSR was 0.058, both of these values also indicating a reasonable
fit. CFI values near 1.00 indicate good fit, and SRMSR values near 0 indicate that bad fit
is absent (Kline, 2005).
Model Estimates
Table 4.2 lists the test results for each of the relationships in the structural model
for our a priori model, including our hypothesized relationships.
Structural Model
Decision Time → Select

Coef
0.000

Std Err
0.000
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Z
0.670

P > |z|
0.501

95% CI
0.000

0.001

Baseline Time → Select
Perceived Time Pressure → Select
Time Pressure → Select
Cons→ Select
Decision Time → Manip Accuracy
Baseline Time → Manip Accuracy
Perceived Time Pressure → Manip
Accuracy
Time Pressure → Manip Accuracy
Cons→ Manip Accuracy
Baseline Time → Decision Time
Time Pressure → Decision Time
Age → Decision Time
Female → Decision Time
Cons → Decision Time
Age → Baseline Time
Female → Baseline Time
Cons → Baseline Time
Decision Time → Perceived Time
Pressure
Time Pressure → Perceived Time
Pressure
Age→ Perceived Time Pressure
Female → Perceived Time Pressure
Measurement Model
Perceived Time Pressure → Felt
Rushed
Cons → Felt Rushed
Perceived Time Pressure → Felt
Time Press
Cons → Felt Time Press
Perceived Time Pressure → Too
Rushed
Cons → Too Rushed
Perceived Time Pressure → Enough
Time
Cons → Enough Time
Measurement Model Variances
Felt Rushed
Felt Time Press
Too Rushed
Had Enough
Select
Manip Accuracy
Decision Time
Baseline Time
Perceived Time Pressure
Measurement Model - Covariances
Select ↔ Manip Accuracy

0.000
-0.080
0.011
0.608
0.000
0.000
-0.071

0.000
0.026
0.101
0.109
0.000
0.000
0.041

-1.950
-3.060
0.110
5.600
-1.180
0.490
-1.750

0.052*
0.002***
0.915
0.000
0.236
0.621
0.079*

0.000
-0.130
-0.188
0.395
-0.001
0.000
-0.151

0.000
-0.029
0.210
0.821
0.000
0.000
0.008

-0.169
2.673
0.000
-115.344
4.214
-74.543
203.041
62.376
2501.597
-2371.976

0.158
0.155
0.004
46.189
1.840
55.708
81.738
44.306
1334.403
1943.806

-1.070
17.270
0.000
-2.500
2.290
-1.340
2.480
1.410
1.870
-1.220

0.284
0.000
1.000
0.013**
0.022**
0.181
0.013
0.159
0.061*
0.222

-0.478
2.370
-0.008
-205.872
0.608
-183.728
42.837
-24.461
-113.784
-6181.765

0.140
2.977
0.008
-24.815
7.819
34.641
363.245
149.214
5116.979
1437.814

0.001

0.001

0.630

0.527

-0.001

0.002

0.386
3.780
0.015
-0.510
0.450
1.000
Std Err
Z
Constrained

0.000***
0.612
0.316
P > |z|

0.702
-0.037
-0.431

2.216
0.022
1.333
95% CI

1.459
-0.008
0.451
Coef
1
3.052

0.683

4.470

0.000

1.713

4.391

0.943
3.305

0.057
0.649

16.450
5.090

0.000***
0.000

0.830
2.033

1.055
4.577

0.784
2.908

0.054
0.542

14.590
5.370

0.000***
0.000

0.679
1.847

0.890
3.970

-0.720
5.128
Coef
0.291
0.864
0.760
2.078
0.213
0.519
53134.450
3.17E+07
3.336
Coef

0.078
-9.200 0.000***
0.513
9.990
0.000
Std Err
0.118
0.151
0.135
0.306
0.030
0.073
7440.312
4432711
0.521
Std
Z
P > |z|
Err
0.095
0.034
2.75 0.006***
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p <.01
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-0.873
-0.567
4.122
6.134
95% CI
0.132
0.645
0.613
1.218
0.537
1.077
1.557
2.774
0.162
0.281
0.394
0.683
40381.660
69914.660
2.41E+07
4.17E+07
2.456
4.532
95% CI
0.027

0.162

As detailed in this table, many of the paths that we predicted to be significant were not
substantiated; moreover, we found some interesting findings that contradict our
hypotheses in some cases. The most significant portion of our model is the measurement
model for perceived time pressure, its relationship with actual time pressure, and its
resultant effect on selection decision and manipulation check accuracy. The other portion
of the model that deserves attention regards decision time and its relationships with two
of its predictors, time pressure and age. Table 4.3 summarizes the results as applied to our
hypotheses. We elaborate on the insights from each of these in the Discussion Section.
Hypothesis
H1 – Participants in the time
constrained condition will spend less
time making the selection decision
than the unconstrained condition.
H2 – Participants in the time
constrained condition will report
higher levels of perceived time
pressure than participants in the
unconstrained condition
H3 - The perceived time pressure will
be negatively related to the accuracy
on the selection decision variable.
H4 - The perceived time pressure will
be negatively related to the accuracy
on the manipulation check outcome
variable.
H5 – Participants with lengthier
baseline times will (a) spend more
time making the selection decision
and (b) make more accurate selection
and (c) manipulation check decisions.
H6 – Participants who spend more
time making the decision will have
more accuracy on the Selection
decision.
H7 – Participants who spend more
time making the decision will have
more accuracy on responses to
Manipulation Checks

Path

Coeff

P Value

Conclusion

-115.344

0.013**

Supported

Time Pressure →
Perceived Time Pressure

1.459

0.000***

Strongly
Supported

Perceived Time Pressure
→ Select

-0.080

0.002***

Strongly
Supported

Perceived Time Pressure
→ Manip Accuracy

-0.071

0.079*

Marginally
Supported

a. 0.000

a. 1.000

b. 0.000

b. 0.052*

c. 0.000

c. 0.621

Time Pressure →
Decision Time

a. Baseline Time →
Decision Time
b. Baseline Time →
Select
c. Baseline Time →
Manip Accuracy

a. Not
Supported
b. Not
Supported
c. Not
Supported

Decision Time → Select

0.000

.501

Not
Supported

Decision Time → Manip
Accuracy

0.000

0.236

Not
Supported
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H8 – Age will be positively related
to: a) baseline time and b) time to
decide, and negatively related to c)
perceived time pressure
H9 – Female participants will, on
average, (a) spend more time on the
selection decision than males, (b)
have higher baseline times than
males, and (c) report higher levels of
perceived time pressure.

a. Age → Baseline Time

a. 62.376

a. 0.159

b. Age → Decision Time
c. Age → Perceived
Time Pressure
a. Female → Baseline
Time
b. Female → Decision
Time
c. Female → Perceived
Time Pressure

b. 4.214
c. -0.008

b. 0.022*
c. 0.612

a.
a. 0.061
2501.597
b. -74.543 b. 0.181
c. .451

c. 0.316

a. Not
Supported
b. Supported
c. Not
Supported
a. Marginally
Supported
b. Not
Supported
c. Not
Supported

TABLE 4.3 – CONCLUSIONS FOR A PRIORI HYPOTHESES

4.4 Discussion
At the start of this essay, we stated that our intended contributions were to provide
insights into the relationships between time pressure, both actual and perceived, and
purchasing decision quality, including examining the effects of gender and age as
potential demographic variables of interest that might affect decision speed and quality of
outcomes. In addition, we sought to make a methodological contribution by assessing the
relationship between perceived time pressure and time spent making decisions. While our
data do not permit us to provide insights into all dimensions of these research objectives,
we have several noteworthy findings. We begin our discussion with a description of those
findings and discuss some of the limitations of our research. We then transition our
discussion toward future research opportunities, presenting a brief review of a simpler,
more parsimonious model that appears to be a better fit for our data and conclude with
opportunities for future research.
Actual and Perceived Time Pressure and Their Effects on Decision Quality
Overall, our data suggest three important findings regarding time pressure, both
actual and perceived. First, actual time pressure is detected by individuals and is related
to their self-reported level of perceived time pressure. Our analysis suggests that being in
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a time-constrained situation increases the perception of time pressure. In addition to the
increased perception of time pressure, actual time pressure reduced the average amount
of time spent making decisions, a finding consistent with those of Kocher and colleagues
(2013). That said, we did not find support for a subsequent reduction in decision quality
as a direct result of actual time pressure.
Second, as predicted, our measures for assessing individuals’ perceptions of time
pressure adequately map onto our single latent factor of perceived time pressure. Lastly,
the perceived time pressure construct provides predictive power in the accuracy of
decision making in terms of a supplier selection decision as well as in terms of
recollection of information as measured by accuracy on manipulation checks, negatively
affecting both outcomes.
Our findings are consistent with those observed by Hahn and colleagues (1992)
regarding time pressure, particularly in situations of information overload. These results
suggest that perceived time pressure may affect the quality of purchasing decision
outcomes. From a supply chain quality management perspective, purchasing specialists
are posited to serve as guardians (Watson and Roth, 2015), ensuring that the material
input into the firm’s supply chain is of suitable quality. Time pressures may negatively
affect the quality of purchasing outcomes, adding a quality risk to the supply chain.
Baseline and Decision Times, Age and Gender
While extant literature led us to hypothesize that age, gender and baseline time
spent reading the background would be related to decision times, we found support only
for the relationship between age and decision time and marginal support for the
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relationship between gender and baseline time. Similarly, our prediction that time spent
making decisions would be positively related to more accurate results in supplier
selection and manipulation check accuracy variables was also not substantiated by our
data.
There are two potential explanations for our findings providing only limited
support for the relationships involving these variables. First, while we intended the
measures of baseline times and decision times to represent the actual time spent
accomplishing these tasks, it is possible that some participants were not actively engaged
in the tasks for the entire duration the materials were on their computer screens. Since
this experiment was conducted in a virtual forum, we have no way of knowing if
participants were distracted while accomplishing the tasks (e.g. taking phone calls,
working on other activities, responding to emails) or engaged in such behaviors such as
surfing the internet, engaging in small talk with coworkers, checking social media or
texting on cell phones. It is possible that our direct measures of time have noise in them.
Second, as mentioned at the beginning of this essay, our sample was drawn from a
military professional organization and the gender distribution of our participants is
skewed, with a larger proportion of males than is observed in other samples of purchasing
and supply chain specialists. As such, our failure to find support for the hypothesized
gender relationships may be a function of our sample characteristics. While we did not
find support for the gender relationships observed in extant literature, we also cannot say
that our data conflict, merely that an observed relationship was not present in our data.
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Comparing our a priori model against an alternative model helps to illustrate the
true nature of the relationships of the variables in our data set. This simpler model has an
overall better fit for our sample than our a priori model.
A More Parsimonious Model
Figure 4.2 presents an alternative model for explaining the relationships observed
in our data set.
5

Female

BaseTime

Select

7

ManipAcc

8

TP

PerceivedTimePress
1

FeltRushed

2

FeltTimePressure

TooRushed

3

4

HadEnoughTime

6

FIGURE 4.2 – ALTERNATIVE MODEL OF TIME PRESSURE AND PURCHASING
DECISION QUALITY/ACCURACY
To arrive at this model, we systematically and sequentially removed paths from the a
priori model that were not statistically significant. The path loadings, measurement
model, and test statistics for this model are provided in Table 4.4. As illustrated, there are
far fewer paths in this model than in the a priori model while maintaining a similar
goodness of fit.
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The Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square for the alternative model is χ2 = 38.567, p > χ2 =
0..703, which is lower than our a prior model’s value (χ2 = 46.923, p > χ2 = 0.801), and
the RMSEA for the alternative model is 0.000 with an lower bound of 0.000 and an
upper bound of 0.052. Our a prior model’s RMSEA is 0.000, with a 90% confidence
interval lower bound of 0.000 and upper bound of 0.041. In addition to the RMSEA, we
examined the Comparative Fit Index (CFI) and Standardized Root Mean Square Residual
of our model (SRMSR). The CFI for the alternative model was 1.000 and the SRMSR
was 0.063. The CFI for our a priori model was 1.000 and the SRMSR was 0.058.
Overall, the alternative model achieves a similar fit with fewer paths, making it a
more parsimonious and elegant model for our data.
Structural Model
Baseline Time → Select
Perceived Time Pressure → Select
Cons→ Select
Female → Baseline Time
Cons → Baseline Time
Time Pressure → Perceived Time
Pressure
Measurement Model
Perceived Time Pressure → Felt
Rushed
Cons → Felt Rushed
Perceived Time Pressure → Felt
Time Press
Cons → Felt Time Press
Perceived Time Pressure → Too
Rushed
Cons → Too Rushed
Perceived Time Pressure → Had
Enough Time
Cons → Had Enough Time
Manip Accuracy → Perceived Time
Pressure
Cons → Perceived Time Pressure
Measurement Model Variances
Felt Rushed
Felt Time Press
Too Rushed
Had Enough
Select
Manip Accuracy

Coef
-.000
-.083
.660
2257.996
215.142
1.415
Coef
1

Std Err
7.77e-06
.024
.053
1284.472
626.758

Z
-2.17
-3.41
12.48
1.76
.034

P > |z|
0.030**
0.001***
0.000
0.079*
0.731

95% CI
-.000
-1.66e-06
-.131
-.035
.557
.764
-259.522
4775.514
-1013.281
1443.565

.364
3.88
Std Err
Z
Constrained

0.000***
P > |z|

.701

2.129
95% CI

3.027

.256

11.85

0.00

2.526

3.528

.951
3.280

.057
.256

16.67
12.81

0.000***
0.000

.839
2.778

1.063
3.781

.797
2.900

.054
.219

14.83
13.25

0.000***
0.000

.692
2.471

.902
3.329

-.733
5.13

.078
.236

-9.40
21.78

0.000***
0.000

-.885
4.670

-.580
5.594

-.087
2.489
Coef
.315
.835
.738
2.028
.213
.540

.038
.079
Std Err
.115
.146
.131
.296
.030
.075

-2.28
31.31

0.023**
0.000

-.162
2.333
95% CI
.155
.593
.521
1.523
.162
.411

-.012
2.644
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.642
1.177
1.044
2.670
.279
.708

Baseline Time
Perceived Time Pressure
Measurement Model - Covariances

3.14e+07
3.255
Coef

4337206
2.40e+07
4.12e+07
.505
2.401
4.413
Std
Z
P > |z|
95% CI
Err
Select ↔ Manip Accuracy
.088
.034
2.56
0.011**
.021
.155
N = 105, Log Likelihood -2072.194, * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p <.01

TABLE 4.4 – SEM RESULTS FOR ALTERNATIVE MODEL
Limitations and Opportunities for Future Research
There are three noteworthy limitations to this research. First, our sample limits the
generalizability of our findings. Our sample was obtained from a professional
organization in the defense sector. The demographic composition of this sample is
different from more general professional organizations of purchasing specialists in terms
of gender and education level. As such, we recommend that this study be replicated using
a sample that is more representative of our population of interest, purchasing and supply
chain specialists. Replicating with a professional group, such as ISM, APICS, or
CSCMP, with a broader industry range and more variety in education and gender
representation would improve the generalizability of the findings. The second limitation
of this research is that our sample size was relatively small and reflects a low response
rate. Our small sample size likely contributed to a failure to obtain significance on some
of the hypothesized relationships. The replication suggested would also address this
limitation of our research.
As mentioned earlier in this discussion section, the third limitation of this research
is the issue of not being able to state whether participants were actively engaged in
reading the background and decision information their screens. As a result, it is possible
that these time measures include a combination of active participation in the experiment
and some inattentive behavior or distractions. To overcome this limitation, a future
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experiment should be conducted in a lab environment via an alternative form (paper
format) where the amount of inattention and the number of distractions could be
minimized. Analyzing the results as a nested model would provide a means of comparing
and controlling for inattention and distraction, eliminating noise from the objective
measures of baseline and decision times.
In addition to the replications mentioned above, there are two other opportunities
to extend this research. First, this model of time pressure does not account for familiarity
with the subject matter in the decision, nor does it account for the effects of training and
experience. To provide more actionable insights for practice, the model should be refined
to test for these considerations. Second, we only assessed decision quality in terms of
accuracy on the supplier selection and manipulation checks in an experiment. Decision
quality is likely a multidimensional construct, and additional outcome variables should be
designed and tested to present a more holistic picture of the influence of perceived and
actual time pressure on purchasing decision outcomes.

4.5 Conclusion
This research has demonstrated that time constraints and perceived time pressure
are related constructs that negatively affect decision quality in a supplier selection
decision. These results are consistent with previous studies (Kocher et al., 2013; Hahn et
al., 1992) and extends their findings into the domain of purchasing and supply chain
management decision making. While our a priori model was of satisfactory fit, we
identified a more parsimonious alternative model that also fits our data by eliminating
paths in the model that were not significant. Further research is warranted to extend this
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initial set of findings into more actionable recommendations for managers and
practitioners in the purchasing and supply chain management professions.
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Chapter 5

Conclusion
The issue of counterfeits in supply chains is a critical contemporary issue that
warrants continued attention by practitioners and further research by academia. To
contribute this growing field of work, this dissertation focused on examining the
counterfeiting issue from a supply chain quality management and behavioral operations
perspective.

5.1 Contributions
In Essay One, we developed a conceptual model and research agenda to use to
guide supply chain management researchers’ efforts in exploring the counterfeit
phenomena. Through employing a comprehensive set of theories, including Normal
Accident Theory and Crime Prevention Theory, we can gain a more thorough
understanding of the complete set of antecedents to this vulnerability.
We illustrated how the Six T’s framework can serve as a means to categorize the
counterfeit mitigation options, to enable practitioners to select tailored strategies for their
supply chain needs. Additionally, we constructed the typology in Appendix A to facilitate
continued research on the various strategies proposed in the literature from a supply chain
quality management perspective. Our typology suggests that more than one of the Six T’s
can be reflected within a proposed mitigation strategy, which suggests that multiple
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dimensions of supply chain quality can be addressed in a counterfeit mitigation strategy,
which potentially can achieve synergistic improvements in supply chain quality.
Essay Two’s primary contribution was to confirm that purchasing specialists can
detect signals of counterfeits in the purchasing decision process. We extended the work
of Mavlanova and Benbunan-Fich (2010) from the consumer marketing research into the
supply chain management discipline, and successfully tested a set of counterfeit signals
that were proposed in the practitioner literature and knowledge base. We observed that
increased potential counterfeit situation caused purchasing specialists to avoid selection
of the counterfeit supplier. This finding suggests that purchasing can act as a guardian of
the supply chain, potentially helping to prevent the counterfeit crime from being
perpetrated against the supply chain.
In Essay Three, we provided insights into the negative effects of time pressure
and perceived time pressure in purchasing decision quality. This exploratory work serves
to extend previous research into the supply chain discipline, and helps orient future
research in understanding the actual and perceived effects of time pressure on sourcing
decisions, which is an interesting and contemporary topic in the field of behavioral
operations management.

5.2 Implications for Practice
Throughout this dissertation, we observed several important findings that have
relevance for the practice of supply chain management. First, we identified areas of
vulnerability to counterfeits that supply chain managers can examine within their
organizations to help identify and reduce risks.
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A second implication from Essay One is that we proposed that counterfeit mitigation
strategies can be tied to multiple dimensions of supply chain quality management, which
means that firms can evaluate alternative strategies and obtain multiple quality benefits at
the same time.
The primary implication for practice from Essay Two is that we find support for
the role of purchasing specialists as guardians of the supply chain. Purchasing and supply
chain specialists can detect signals of counterfeits in proposals and can avoid them in
purchasing decisions. This suggests that the counterfeit signals proposed in practitioner
literature are valid and that purchasing specialists should be trained to look for the
specific signals that are relevant to their particular industry and purchasing decisions.
Turning to Essay Three, we find that perceived time pressure negatively effects
decision quality in a purchasing decision. Given the fact that purchasing specialist
positions are going unfilled across the country (Weber, 2014), it highlights that there is a
decision quality risk that may occur as a result of manpower shortages in purchasing
organizations.

5.3 Future Research
This dissertation serves as an initial contribution towards understanding product
counterfeit problem within the context of supply chain management research. There are
multiple opportunities to grow this research stream. First, we propose that the conceptual
model identified in Essay One be tested empirically to determine the validity of the
proposed relationships and their value in predicting counterfeit vulnerability and impacts.
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As part of this empirical testing, valid objective and perceptual measures would need to
be developed and tested to ensure sufficient construct validity is present.
As mentioned in the discussion section of Essay 2, there are multiple ways to
extend the experimental analysis of counterfeit signals in purchasing decisions, including
using dyads of technical specialists and purchasing experts, examine how collaboration
can affect the ability to detect the counterfeit signals, as well as offer insights into how
different functions in an organization perceive the importance of price, schedule and
quality in purchasing decisions.
An additional future research mentioned in Essay 2 is to test the relative
importance of each of the counterfeit signals identified in our research as they relate to
specific types of products or subcomponents. Future research should develop
categorizations of counterfeit signals that are industry or situation specific to enable
development of tailored counterfeit prevention training and quality controls for
purchasing decisions.
A final recommendation for future research from Essay 2 is to test the effects of
prior experience and training with counterfeiting in practice, in terms of their impacts on
the quality of the purchasing decision. This would continue the exploration of the supply
chain manager and purchasing specialist’s role as a guardian of the supply chain.
In Essay Three, we observed several limitations with our research that offered
opportunities for future research to replicate and extend our work. First, we proposed that
our experiment should be replicated in a more controlled environment via an alternative
form (paper format) to control for potential slacking behavior and distractions that could
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be a source of noise in our objective measures of time. Testing the nested model would
provide insight into the noise and potentially reduce the error in objective measures of
time.
To improve the practitioner relevance of our time pressure model, future research
should examine if additional factors, such as time pressure coping mechanisms, training
and experience interact with time pressure to mitigate its impact on decision quality.
Finally, the decision quality variable in our model was only measured in terms of
accuracy. Future research should assess the effect of time pressure on other aspects of
decision quality, such as responsiveness or thoroughness of decision making.
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Establish fake companies to purchase
counterfeit goods

Becker 2003

X

Employ private investigators

Berman 2008

X

Establish fake companies to purchase
counterfeit goods

Berman 2008

X

Have an internal investigation division to
monitor counterfeits

Berman 2008

X

Employ IP protections (trademarks,
copyrights, patents)

Berman 2008

Consumer education programs on
counterfeits

Berman 2008

Use product authentication technology in
demand (consumer) side

Berman 2008

X

Use product authentication technology in
supply side operations

Berman 2008

X

Publish information for consumers on how
to validate authenticity of products
Individual organization can develop
advertising about the safety, performance
and financial risks associated with
counterfeits
Trade group development of advertising
about the safety, performance and financial
risks associated with counterfeits
Joint (firms, government and/or Trade
group) development of advertising about
the safety, performance and financial risks
associated with counterfeits

Training

X

Trust

Balfour et al
2005

Time

Have an internal investigation division to
monitor counterfeits

Testability

Source

Transparency

Mitigation Strategy

Traceability

Appendix A – Detailed Typology of Counterfeit Mitigation Strategies
using the Six Ts of Supply Chain Quality Management (Roth et al,
2009)

X
X

Berman 2008

X

Berman 2008

X

Berman 2008

X

Berman 2008

X
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Train customers to report counterfeit goods

Berman 2008

Employ anti-counterfeiting product
markings and packaging

Berman 2008

Controlling outsourcing

Berman 2008

Select suppliers based on trust and past
performance

Berman 2008

Ensure Outsourcers return tech, production,
Berman 2008
sales and marketing information

X
X
X
X
X

Monitor outsourcing through surprise
inspection

Berman 2008

Use partial outsourcing to prevent having
all resources needed to replicate product

Berman 2008

X

Complete production at internal facilities

Berman 2008

X

Use website monitoring software to search
for counterfeits

Berman 2008

X

Take actions to shut down websites selling
counterfeits

Berman 2008

Take legal action against counterfeiters

Berman 2008

X

Berman 2008

X

Berman 2008

X

Reduce gray market activity by
withholding payment until product
verification is complete
Reduce gray market activity by not using
wholesalers who also sell in secondary
markets
Require suppliers to return all seconds and
out-of-spec items for disposal

X

X

Berman 2008

X

Develop Cloud-based low resource mobile
product authentication systems

Gogo 2010

X

Use product authentication technology in
demand (consumer) side

Lehtonen et al
2007

X

Use product authentication technology in
supply side operations

Lehtonen et al
2007
Minagawa,
Trott and
Hoecht 2007

Continuously alter product/component
characteristics to make it harder to imitate
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X

X

X
X

Collaborate with alleged or suspected
imitators to develop products for local sale
which would be mutually beneficial in
terms of accessing cheapest sources of
manufacturing supplies and efficient
distribution.
Price products to attract more customers,
which reduces the margin for counterfeits
and increases demand

Minagawa,
Trott and
Hoecht 2007

X

Minagawa,
Trott and
Hoecht 2007
Minagawa,
Consider product imitation as part of
Trott and
strategic decision making.
Hoecht 2007
Minagawa,
Focus on R&D efforts, since imitators don't
Trott and
have R&D capacity
Hoecht 2007

X

X

X

Employ private investigators

Palmer 2006

Do Nothing - sometimes this makes sense
from a cost/benefit scenario

Shultz and
Saporito 1996

X

Co-opt offenders - buy them out and make
them part of the licit supply chain
Educate stakeholders at the source - make
source countries understand the problems
of counterfeits related to their development
Don't despise, advertise - train customers to
be wary of counterfeits

Shultz and
Saporito 1996

X

X

Shultz and
Saporito 1996

X

Shultz and
Saporito 1996

X

Investigation and surveillance

Shultz and
Saporito 1996

High Tech Labeling

Shultz and
Saporito 1996

Create a moving target - keep changing
product attributes, packaging, etc.

Shultz and
Saporito 1996

Legislation

Shultz and
Saporito 1996

Coalitions

Shultz and
Saporito 1996

Cede the industry - developed countries
will not keep industries that cannot be
protected from IPR infringement
Utilize industry standards for inspection
and acceptance of parts sourced in the open
market (such as IDEA-STD-1010A)

X

Shultz and
Saporito 1996
Sood et al 2011
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X
X
X
X
X

X
X

X

Use External Visual Inspection

Sood et al 2011

X

Use X-Ray and other NDI of parts

Sood et al 2011

X

Use Material evaluation and
characterization

Sood et al 2011

X

Use packaging evaluation

Sood et al 2011

X

Use Die Inspection on electronic parts

Sood et al 2011

X

Determine the market share of counterfeit
goods

Staake and
Fleisch 2008

X

Investigate the characteristics of the
counterfeit producers

Staake and
Fleisch 2008

X

Understand the properties of the illicit
supply chain

Staake and
Fleisch 2008

X

Analyze the behavior of consumers of
counterfeits

Staake and
Fleisch 2008

X

Conduct a risk analysis and assess the
monetary loss
Analyze best practice strategies for anticounterfeiting from within and outside the
industry
Setup or refine your brand and product
protect task force

Staake and
Fleisch 2008

X

Staake and
Fleisch 2008

X

Staake and
Fleisch 2008

X

Implement defined monitoring and reaction
processes

Staake and
Fleisch 2008

X

Assess and select preventative measures

Staake and
Fleisch 2008

Consider the implementation of large scale
product checks

Staake and
Fleisch 2008

Signal top-management support

Staake and
Fleisch 2008

Develop knowledge of the supply side of
counterfeits

Staake and
Fleisch 2008

X

Develop country-specific knowledge of the
counterfeit trade

Staake and
Fleisch 2008

X

Know the impact of counterfeit trade on
your business

Staake and
Fleisch 2008

X
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X

X
X
X

X

Know the import roots of counterfeit
producers

Staake and
Fleisch 2008

X

Know the quality of counterfeit producers

Staake and
Fleisch 2008

X

Know the profiles of consumers of
counterfeits

Staake and
Fleisch 2008

X

Have defined processes to govern response
to counterfeits

Staake and
Fleisch 2008

X

Have defined processes to monitor for
existence of counterfeits

Staake and
Fleisch 2008

X

Standardize counterfeit reporting tools

Staake and
Fleisch 2008

X

Develop indicators to assess performance
of anti-counterfeiting measures

Staake and
Fleisch 2008

X

Appoint NGOs to assist in counterfeit
issues

Staake and
Fleisch 2008

X

Engage government to assist in counterfeit
issues

Staake and
Fleisch 2008

X

Engage industry groups to assist in
counterfeit issues

Staake and
Fleisch 2008

X

Protection technologies

Staake and
Fleisch 2008

Legal actions

Staake and
Fleisch 2008

Supply-chain security measures

Staake and
Fleisch 2008

X

Secure distribution systems

Staake and
Fleisch 2008

X

Participation in industry groups

Staake and
Fleisch 2008

Make anti-counterfeiting knowledge
explicit

Staake and
Fleisch 2008

X

Have multiple authorities across
departments on counterfeits
Use websites to help consumers be able to
identify counterfeits and risky supply
channels
Educate purchasing departments, suppliers
and vendors on how to spot counterfeits

Staake and
Fleisch 2008

X

Staake and
Fleisch 2008

X

Staake and
Fleisch 2008

X
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X
X

X

Use standardized processes, monitoring
and analysis of counterfeits

Staake and
Fleisch 2008

Employ anti-counterfeiting product
markings and packaging
Individual organization can develop
advertising about the safety, performance
and financial risks associated with
counterfeits
Trade group development of advertising
about the safety, performance and financial
risks associated with counterfeits
International discourse on countering the
problems

Stumpf and
Chaudhry 2010

Use product authentication technology in
supply side operations
Work with media outlets to educate the
public on the pervasive issues related to
counterfeit foodstuffs, pharmaceuticals,
etc.
Work with global agencies such as World
Bank to immobilize global flow of funds to
support counterfeiting activities

Stumpf and
Chaudhry 2010

X
X

X

Stumpf and
Chaudhry 2010

X

Stumpf and
Chaudhry 2010

X

Stumpf and
Chaudhry 2010

X
X

Stumpf and
Chaudhry 2010

X

Stumpf and
Chaudhry 2010

X

Reduced Price / Rebate

Stumpf and
Chaudhry 2010

X

Offer Site Licenses

Stumpf and
Chaudhry 2010

X

Emphasize Warranties

Stumpf and
Chaudhry 2010

X

Emphasize Benefits

Stumpf and
Chaudhry 2010

X

Lists of Authorized Sellers

Stumpf and
Chaudhry 2010

Stress Harmful Effects of Counterfeits

Stumpf and
Chaudhry 2010

Product Authentication Technologies

Li 2012

X

Product Tracking Technologies

Li 2012

X

Product Tracing Technologies

Li 2012

X

Inspections need to be accomplished in
short time span to be effective

Sood et al 2011
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X

X
X
X

X

X

Reporting Counterfeits needs to happen
quickly
Re-acquiring obsolete products,
incentivising returns by customers and
meeting the costs of returns
Requiring destruction of obsolete products
and components, incentivising destruction,
e.g. by paying for certificates of destruction
or destroyed items, and providing
resources for destruction processes
Informing inadvertent suppliers of
counterfeiters and incentivising them not to
supply counterfeiters, paying for
intelligence from suppliers, and designing
appropriate and perhaps exclusive supply
contracts
In-sourcing the production of particularly
critical materials

Berman 2008

X

Stevenson and
Busby 2015

X

Stevenson and
Busby 2015

X

X

X

Stevenson and
Busby 2015

X

X

X

Stevenson and
Busby 2015

X

X

Incorporating the potential for ‘leakage’ in
the supplier selection process

Stevenson and
Busby 2015

Avoiding the over-rapid discontinuation of
product lines

Stevenson and
Busby 2015

X

Undermining physical functions and
appearance, e.g. after a certain shelf life
Making it costly for counterfeiters to
change marks and labels that would show
components and materials have been in
prior use
Designing contracts that prohibit dealings
with counterfeiters

Stevenson and
Busby 2015

X

Enforcing contracts with closer personal
relationships, auditing and monitoring
Incentivising conformant behaviour, such
as by paying for intelligence about
counterfeits
Providing suppliers with strict quantities of
materials and components just in time

Stevenson and
Busby 2015

X

Stevenson and
B/usby 2015

X

Forbidding unauthorised subcontracting by
suppliers

Stevenson and
Busby 2015

X

Stevenson and
Busby 2015

X

Stevenson and
Busby 2015

Stevenson and
Busby 2015

TOTALS

X
X

X

X
X

35
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X

28

14

6

19

33

Appendix B – Experiment Scenarios and Questionnaire
Welcome to the Buyer, Purchasing and Supply Chain
Specialist Decision Making Experiment conducted by
Clemson University.
We know your time is precious and we greatly appreciate your participation
in this effort. Thank you for your support of this research !

Department of Management
Information about Being in a Research Study conducted by Clemson
University Buyer, Purchasing and Supply Chain Specialist Decision Making
Experiment
Description of the Study and Your Part in It
Jillian T. Watson and Dr. Aleda V. Roth are inviting you to take part in a research study.
Jillian T. Watson, a graduate student at Clemson University is the Project Director, and
working with Dr. Aleda V. Roth, Distinguished Professor of Supply Chain Management at
Clemson University. The purpose of this research is to examine decision making by
purchasing and supply chain management professionals given a variety of information about
two notional suppliers, including market research documents, industry analyses and
responses to requests for proposals.
Your part in the study will be to serve in the role of a supply chain manager for an automotive
parts manufacturer, who has to select a supplier to replace a current supplier that is no
longer able to produce the components you require to manufacture your products. It will
take you about 15-20 minutes to participate in this role-playing experiment.
Risks and Discomforts - We do not know of any risks or discomforts to you in this research
study.
Possible Benefits - We do not know of any way you would benefit directly from taking part in
this study. However, this research may help us to understand how certain types of
information and incentives affect purchasing and supply chain managers’ supplier selection
decisions.
Protection of Privacy and Confidentiality - We will do everything we can to protect your
privacy and confidentiality. As such, we don't collect any personally identifiable information
during this experiment.
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Choosing to be in the Study - Your participation in this study is voluntary. You may choose not to take
part and you may choose to stop taking part at any time. You will not be penalized in any way if you
decide not to participate in the study or stop taking part in the study.
Contact Information - If you have any questions or concerns about this study or if any problems arise,
please contact Jillian T. Watson at Clemson University at 571-334-8019, jilliad@g.clemson.edu.
If you have any questions or concerns about your rights in this research study, please contact the
Clemson University Office of Research Compliance (ORC) at 864-656-0636 or irb@clemson.edu. If
you are outside of the Upstate South Carolina area, please use the ORC’s toll-free number, 866-2973071.
Clicking on the "I agree" button indicates that:
• You have read the above information
• You voluntarily agree to participate
• You are at least 18 years of age
You may print a copy of this informational letter for your files.

Please select whether or not you agree to participate in this effort using the
buttons below.
I AGREE
I DO NOT AGREE

B2 - SCENARIO INFORMATION – LOW COUNTERFEIT SIGNAL, LOW
WORKLOAD PRESSURE, LOW TIME PRESSURE
INTRODUCTION
This experiment involves reading a scenario about a particular purchasing decision and then selecting
between two potential suppliers for the component.

YOUR ROLE – A PURCHASING SPECIALIST
In this role-playing scenario, you are serving as the purchasing specialist for Alpha Automotive
Accessories, a parts manufacturer that produces brakes, airbags, and powertrain accessories used by
automotive manufacturers, repair stations, and retail automotive stores. You manage the purchase
of approximately 100 components that are used by your company.

YOUR TASK - DECIDE BETWEEN TWO SUPPLIERS FOR A COMPONENT
Your job is to evaluate the purchasing situation, review supporting information to help you understand
your industry, the suppliers and their offers and make a purchasing decision between two suppliers,
Adurmis Fabrication and Agata Solutions. After reviewing the documentation, you will be asked a
series of questions about which supplier to select and why you did or did not select each supplier.
Following the experiment, you will be asked questions about your personal demographics, experience
and education.
These page timer metrics will not be displayed to the recipient.
First Click: 0 seconds
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Last Click: 0 seconds
#QuestionText, TimingPageSubmit#: 0 seconds
#QuestionText, TimingClickCount#: 0 clicks

FASTENER BACKGROUND
Your normal trusted supplier of specialized fasteners, Fasten-Nation Components, has experienced a
natural disaster which destroyed their primary production facility and they won’t be able to fill customer
orders for three months. Your company uses these fasteners on parts for late model vehicles and
heavy equipment. Your product line is sold at numerous auto parts stores, dealerships and heavy
equipment supply stores. The industrial fastener marketplace has had some problems in terms of
quality historically, including substandard materials, product quality inconsistencies and counterfeits.
Because of volatility of capacity demands, there is no guarantee that orders placed with US
manufacturers will actually be produced domestically. The outsourcing of manufacturing has caused
a substantial migration of demand to China, and recent trends show that the domestic sources for the
specific type of fasteners you require are diminishing.
Your supply chain management operations have been focused on lean and inventory minimization
principles to help keep operational costs down. Unfortunately, this means that you only have enough
stock on hand to continue manufacturing for two weeks. Your supervisor has asked you to select an
interim supplier for a limited time supply arrangement as a solution to the problem until your normal
supplier is able to resume operations.
The table below summarizes the history of this part, including the previous sources, their part
numbers, lot numbers, and the pricing and quantity lows, averages and highs for your recent
purchases of these fasteners.

Supplier History Information – Previous 24 Months
Supplier
Name

Type of
Supplier

Supplier
Part Number

Supplier Lot
Numbers

Current
Supplier:

Fastennation
Components

Manufacturer

FNC-8257894A

1086 – 3484

Previous
Supplier
(Original
Equipment
Manufacturer
- Now out of
business):

Zenith Component
Manufacturing

Manufacturer

ZEN-82-57894

11200 - 11565

Quantity and Price Information – Previous 24 months
Average Quantity
Procured
Quantity Range
Procured

569
450-1200

Average Price Per
Item
Price Range Per Item
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$1.37
$1.25 - $1.65

THE DECISION TO MAKE - DECIDING BETWEEN THE TWO PROPOSALS
You have sent out a request for proposal for new suppliers of the specialized fasteners, and you have
received two responses. The table below summarizes the two proposals. Hyperlinks to your request
for proposal, the two responses, as well as your demand history data are also provided to enable you
to make an informed decision.

Supplier

Agata Solutions

Adurmis Fabrication

Location

City of Industry, CA

Fresno, CA

Type of Supplier

Parts
Distributor

Manufacturer

Part Number Offered ZEN-82-57894
Lot Number Offered

11462 and 11504

Technical Solution

Use inventory
from another source
Parts are American
National Standards
Institute specification
compliant
ISO 9001 Certified

ZEN-82-57894
New Lot Numbers
beginning with A to
indicate manufacturing
at Adurmis
Manufactured under
short term license from
current supplier

Parts are American
National Standards
Institute specification
compliant

Certification
Information

SAE AS5553
ISO 9001 Certified
(Counterfeit Electronic
Parts; Avoidance,
Better Business
Detection, Mitigation
Bureau - A+ Rating
and Disposition) Compliant

Price per fastener

$1.38

$1.40

Total Price (including
$6,106.40
shipping and taxes
Beginning 2 weeks
Delivery Timeline
after order

$6,206.00
Beginning 2 - 3
weeks after order

SUPPORTING DATA FILES FOR USE IN YOUR DECISION
Request for quote Agata solutions proposal
Adurmis fabrication proposal
Demand history data v2
Background
133

These page timer metrics will not be displayed to the recipient.
First Click: 0 seconds
Last Click: 0 seconds
#QuestionText, TimingPageSubmit#: 0 seconds
#QuestionText, TimingClickCount#: 0 clicks

Please check after you have reviewed the supporting files
I have reviewed the supporting data files.

Based on your review of the suppliers’ proposals, which supplier do you
select?
Agata Solutions

Adurmis Manufacturing
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B3 - SCENARIO INFORMATION – LOW COUNTERFEIT SIGNAL, LOW
WORKLOAD PRESSURE, HIGH TIME PRESSURE
INTRODUCTION
This experiment involves reading a scenario about a particular purchasing decision and then selecting
between two potential suppliers for the component.

YOUR ROLE – A PURCHASING SPECIALIST
In this role-playing scenario, you are serving as the purchasing specialist for Alpha Automotive
Accessories, a parts manufacturer that produces brakes, airbags, and powertrain accessories used by
automotive manufacturers, repair stations, and retail automotive stores. You manage the purchase
of approximately 100 components that are used by your company.

YOUR TASK - DECIDE BETWEEN TWO SUPPLIERS FOR A COMPONENT
Your job is to evaluate the purchasing situation, review supporting information to help you understand
your industry, the suppliers and their offers and make a purchasing decision between two suppliers,
Adurmis Fabrication and Agata Solutions. After reviewing the documentation, you will be asked a
series of questions about which supplier to select and why you did or did not select each supplier.
Following the experiment, you will be asked questions about your personal demographics, experience
and education.
These page timer metrics will not be displayed to the recipient.
First Click: 0 seconds
Last Click: 0 seconds
#QuestionText, TimingPageSubmit#: 0 seconds
#QuestionText, TimingClickCount#: 0 clicks

FASTENER BACKGROUND
Your normal trusted supplier of specialized fasteners, Fasten-Nation Components, has experienced a
natural disaster which destroyed their primary production facility and they won’t be able to fill customer
orders for three months. Your company uses these fasteners on parts for late model vehicles and
heavy equipment. Your product line is sold at numerous auto parts stores, dealerships and heavy
equipment supply stores. The industrial fastener marketplace has had some problems in terms of
quality historically, including substandard materials, product quality inconsistencies and counterfeits.
Because of volatility of capacity demands, there is no guarantee that orders place with US
manufacturers will actually be produced domestically. The outsourcing of manufacturing has caused
a substantial migration of demand to China, and recent trends show that the domestic sources for the
specific type of fasteners you require are diminishing.
Your supply chain management operations have been focused on lean and inventory minimization
principles to help keep operational costs down. Unfortunately, this means that you only have enough
stock on hand to continue manufacturing for two weeks. Your supervisor has asked you to select an
interim supplier for a limited time supply arrangement as a solution to the problem until your normal
supplier is able to resume operations.
The table below summarizes the history of this part, including the previous sources, their part
numbers, lot numbers, and the pricing and quantity lows, averages and highs for your recent
purchases of these fasteners.
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Supplier History Information – Previous 24 Months
Supplier
Name

Type of
Supplier

Supplier
Part Number

Supplier Lot
Numbers

Current

Fasten-

FNC-82-

Supplier:

nation
Components

Manufacturer

57894A

1086 – 3484

Previous
Supplier
(Original
Equipment
Manufacturer
- Now out of
business):

Zenith Component
Manufacturing

Manufacturer

ZEN-82-57894

11200 - 11565

Quantity and Price Information – Previous 24 months
Average Quantity
Procured
Quantity Range
Procured

569
450 – 1200

Average Price Per
Item
Price Range Per Item

$1.37
$1.25 - $1.65

THE DECISION TO MAKE - DECIDING BETWEEN THE TWO PROPOSALS
You have sent out a request for proposal for new suppliers of the specialized fasteners, and you have
received two responses. The table below summarizes the two proposals. Hyperlinks to your request
for proposal, the two responses, as well as your demand history data are also provided to enable you
to make an informed decision. You have an end-of-day team meeting, so you only have five minutes
to complete this review and make a decision.

Supplier

Agata Solutions

Adurmis Fabrication

Location

City of Industry, CA

Fresno, CA

Type of Supplier

Parts
Distributor

Manufacturer

Part Number Offered ZEN-82-57894
Lot Number Offered

11462 and 11504

Technical Solution

Use inventory
from another source
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ZEN-82-57894
New Lot Numbers
beginning with A to
indicate manufacturing
at Adurmis
Manufactured under
short term license from
current supplier.

Parts are American
National Standards
Institute specification
compliant
Certification

Parts are American
National Standards
Institute specification
compliant.

ISO 9001 Certified

Information
SAE AS5553
ISO 9001 Certified
(Counterfeit Electronic
Parts; Avoidance,
Better Business
Detection, Mitigation
Bureau - A+ Rating
and Disposition) Compliant
Price per fastener

$1.38

$1.40

Total Price (including
$6,106.40
shipping and taxes
Beginning 2 weeks
Delivery Timeline
after order

$6,206.00
Beginning 2 - 3 weeks
after order

SUPPORTING DATA FILES FOR USE IN YOUR DECISION
Request for quote Agata solutions proposal
Adurmis fabrication proposal
Demand history data v2
Background
These page timer metrics will not be displayed to the recipient.
First Click: 0 seconds
Last Click: 0 seconds
#QuestionText, TimingPageSubmit#: 0 seconds
#QuestionText, TimingClickCount#: 0 clicks

Please check after you have reviewed the supporting files
I have reviewed the supporting data files.

Based on your review of the suppliers’ proposals, which supplier do you
select?
Agata Solutions

Adurmis Manufacturing
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B4 - SCENARIO INFORMATION – LOW COUNTERFEIT SIGNAL, HIGH
WORKLOAD PRESSURE, LOW TIME PRESSURE

INTRODUCTION
This experiment involves reading a scenario about a particular purchasing decision and then selecting
between two potential suppliers for the component.

YOUR ROLE – AN OVERWORKED PURCHASING SPECIALIST WITH A SUPPLY
CHAIN PROBLEM
In this role-playing scenario, you are serving as the purchasing specialist for Alpha Automotive
Accessories, a parts manufacturer that produces brakes, airbags, and powertrain accessories used by
automotive manufacturers, repair stations, and retail automotive stores. You are a very busy buyer,
managing the purchasing of over 100 components that are used by your company, which is twice the
normal amount for a buyer. Your workload is demanding and requires you to make numerous
purchasing decisions every day, and your supervisor is constantly reminding you of your to-do list and
the need to "get those orders filled for our production line".

YOUR TASK - DECIDE BETWEEN TWO SUPPLIERS FOR A COMPONENT
Your job (amongst all of the other tasks mounting on your desk between emails and phone calls from
customers and your supervisor) is to evaluate the purchasing situation, review supporting information
to help you understand your industry, the suppliers and their offers and make a purchasing decision
between two suppliers, Adurmis Fabrication and Agata Solutions. . After reviewing the documentation,
you will be asked a series of questions about which supplier to select and why you did or did not select
each supplier. Following the experiment, you will be asked questions about your personal
demographics, experience and education.

These page timer metrics will not be displayed to the recipient.
First Click: 0 seconds
Last Click: 0 seconds
#QuestionText, TimingPageSubmit#: 0 seconds
#QuestionText, TimingClickCount#: 0 clicks

FASTENER BACKGROUND
Your normal trusted supplier of specialized fasteners, Fasten-Nation Components, has experienced a
natural disaster which destroyed their primary production facility and they won’t be able to fill customer
orders for three months. Your company uses these fasteners on parts for late model vehicles and
heavy equipment. Your product line is sold at numerous auto parts stores, dealerships and heavy
equipment supply stores. The industrial fastener marketplace has had some problems in terms of
quality historically, including substandard materials, product quality inconsistencies and counterfeits.
Because of volatility of capacity demands, there is no guarantee that orders placed with US
manufacturers will actually be produced domestically. The outsourcing of manufacturing has caused
a substantial migration of demand to China, and recent trends show that the domestic sources for the
specific type of fasteners you require are diminishing.
Your supply chain management operations have been focused on lean and inventory minimization
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principles to help keep operational costs down. Unfortunately, this means that you only have enough
stock on hand to continue manufacturing for two weeks. Your supervisor has asked you to select an
interim supplier for a limited time supply arrangement as a solution to the problem until your normal
supplier is able to resume operations.
The table below summarizes the history of this part, including the previous sources, their part
numbers, lot numbers, and the pricing and quantity lows, averages and highs for your recent
purchases of these fasteners.

Supplier History Information – Previous 24 Months

Current
Supplier:
Previous
Supplier
(Original
Equipment
Manufacturer
No longer in
business):

Supplier
Name
Fastennation
Components

Zenith Component
Manufacturing

Type of
Supplier

Supplier
Part Number

Supplier Lot
Numbers

Manufacturer

FNC-8257894A

1086 – 3484

Manufacturer

ZEN-82-57894

11200 - 11565

Quantity and Price Information – Previous 24 months
Average Quantity
Procured
Quantity Range
Procured

569
450 – 1200

Average Price Per
Item
Price Range Per Item

$1.37
$1.25 - $1.65

THE DECISION TO MAKE - DECIDING BETWEEN THE TWO PROPOSALS
You have sent out a request for proposal for new suppliers of the specialized fasteners, and you have
received two responses. The table below summarizes the two proposals. Hyperlinks to your request
for proposal, the two responses, as well as your demand history data are also provided to enable you
to make an informed decision. Your supervisor is reminding you to get this decision done ASAP
because he’s got other tasks for you that will need to be completed before you leave tonight.

Supplier

Agata Solutions

Adurmis Fabrication

Location

City of Industry, CA

Fresno, CA

Type of Supplier

Parts
Distributor

Manufacturer

Part Number Offered ZEN-82-57894

ZEN-82-57894

Lot Number Offered

New Lot Numbers
beginning with A to
indicate manufacturing
at Adurmis

11462 and 11504

Use inventory
139

Manufactured under

Technical Solution

from another source

short term license from
current supplier

Certification
Information

States parts are ANSI
specification compliant Parts are built
American National
ISO 9001 Certified
Standards Institute
specification compliant
SAE AS5553
(Counterfeit Electronic ISO 9001 Certified
Parts; Avoidance,
Detection, Mitigation
Better Business
and Disposition) Bureau - A+ Rating
Compliant

Price per fastener

$1.38

$1.40

Total Price (including
$6,106.40
shipping and taxes
Beginning 2 weeks
Delivery Timeline
after order

$6,206.00
Beginning 2 - 3
weeks after order

SUPPORTING DATA FILES FOR USE IN YOUR DECISION
Request for quote Agata solutions proposal
history data v2

Adurmis fabrication proposal Demand
Background

These page timer metrics will not be displayed to the recipient.
First Click: 0 seconds
Last Click: 0 seconds
#QuestionText, TimingPageSubmit#: 0 seconds
#QuestionText, TimingClickCount#: 0 clicks

Please check after you have reviewed the supporting files
I have reviewed the supporting data files.

Based on your review of the suppliers’ proposals, which supplier do you
select?
Agata Solutions

Adurmis Manufacturing
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B5 - SCENARIO INFORMATION – LOW COUNTERFEIT SIGNAL, HIGH
WORKLOAD PRESSURE, HIGH TIME PRESSURE
INTRODUCTION
This experiment involves reading a scenario about a particular purchasing decision and then selecting
between two potential suppliers for the component.

YOUR ROLE – AN OVERWORKED PURCHASING SPECIALIST WITH A SUPPLY
CHAIN PROBLEM
In this role-playing scenario, you are serving as the purchasing specialist for Alpha Automotive
Accessories, a parts manufacturer that produces brakes, airbags, and powertrain accessories used by
automotive manufacturers, repair stations, and retail automotive stores. You are a very busy buyer,
managing the purchasing of over 100 components that are used by your company, which is twice the
normal amount for a buyer. Your workload is demanding and requires you to make numerous
purchasing decisions every day, and your supervisor is constantly reminding you of your to-do list and
the need to "get those orders filled for our production line".

YOUR TASK - DECIDE BETWEEN TWO SUPPLIERS FOR A COMPONENT
Your job (amongst all of the other tasks mounting on your desk between emails and phone calls from
customers and your supervisor) is to evaluate the purchasing situation, review supporting information
to help you understand your industry, the suppliers and their offers and make a purchasing decision
between two suppliers, Adurmis Fabrication and Agata Solutions. After reviewing the documentation,
you will be asked a series of questions about which supplier to select and why you did or did not select
each supplier. Following the experiment, you will be asked questions about your personal
demographics, experience and education.
These page timer metrics will not be displayed to the recipient.
First Click: 0 seconds
Last Click: 0 seconds
#QuestionText, TimingPageSubmit#: 0 seconds
#QuestionText, TimingClickCount#: 0 clicks

FASTENER BACKGROUND
Your normal trusted supplier of specialized fasteners, Fasten-Nation Components, has experienced a
natural disaster which destroyed their primary production facility and they won’t be able to fill customer
orders for three months. Your company uses these fasteners on parts for late model vehicles and
heavy equipment. Your product line is sold at numerous auto parts stores, dealerships and heavy
equipment supply stores.The industrial fastener marketplace has had some problems in terms of
quality historically, including substandard materials, product quality inconsistencies and counterfeits.
Because of volatility of capacity demands, there is no guarantee that orders placed with US
manufacturers will actually be produced domestically. The outsourcing of manufacturing has caused
a substantial migration of demand to China, and recent trends show that the domestic sources for the
specific type of fasteners you require are diminishing.
Your supply chain management operations have been focused on lean and inventory minimization
principles to help keep operational costs down. Unfortunately, this means that you only have enough
stock on hand to continue manufacturing for two weeks. Your supervisor has asked you to select an
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interim supplier for a limited time supply arrangement as a solution to the problem until your normal
supplier is able to resume operations.
The table below summarizes the history of this part, including the previous sources, their part
numbers, lot numbers, and the pricing and quantity lows, averages and highs for your recent
purchases of these fasteners.

Supplier History Information – Previous 24 Months

Current
Supplier:
Previous
Supplier
(Original
Equipment
Manufacturer
No longer in
business):

Supplier
Name
Fastennation
Components

Zenith Component
Manufacturing

Type of
Supplier

Supplier
Part Number

Supplier Lot
Numbers

Manufacturer

FNC-8257894A

1086 – 3484

Manufacturer

ZEN-82-57894

11200 - 11565

Quantity and Price Information – Previous 24 months
Average Quantity
Procured
Quantity Range
Procured

569
450 – 1200

Average Price Per
Item
High Price Per Item

$1.37
$1.25 - $1.65

THE DECISION TO MAKE - DECIDING BETWEEN THE TWO PROPOSALS
You have sent out a request for proposal for new suppliers of the specialized fasteners, and you have
received two responses. The table below summarizes the two proposals. Hyperlinks to your request
for proposal, the two responses, as well as your demand history data are also provided to enable you
to make an informed decision. Your supervisor is reminding you to get this decision done ASAP
because he’s got other tasks for you that will need to be completed before you leave tonight. You also
have an end-of-day team meeting, so you only have five minutes to complete this review and make a
decision.

Supplier

Agata Solutions

Adurmis Fabrication

Location

City of Industry, CA

Fresno, CA

Type of Supplier

Parts
Distributor

Manufacturer

Part Number Offered ZEN-82-57894

ZEN-82-57894
New Lot Numbers
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Lot Number Offered

11462 and 11504

Technical Solution

Use inventory
from another source

beginning with A to
indicate manufacturing
at Adurmis
Manufactured under
short term license from
current supplier.

Parts are American
National Standards
Institute specification
compliant
Certification
Information

Price per fastener

Parts are American
National Standards
Institute specification
compliant

ISO 9001 Certified

SAE AS5553
ISO 9001 Certified
(Counterfeit Electronic
Parts; Avoidance,
Better Business
Detection, Mitigation
Bureau - A+ Rating
and Disposition) Compliant
$1.38

$1.40

Total Price (including
$6,106.40
shipping and taxes
Beginning 2 weeks
Delivery Timeline
after order

$6,206.00
Beginning 2 - 3
weeks after order

SUPPORTING DATA FILES FOR USE IN YOUR DECISION
Request for quote Agata solutions proposal
history data v2

Adurmis fabrication proposal Demand
Background

These page timer metrics will not be displayed to the recipient.
First Click: 0 seconds
Last Click: 0 seconds
#QuestionText, TimingPageSubmit#: 0 seconds
#QuestionText, TimingClickCount#: 0 clicks

Please check after you have reviewed the supporting files
I have reviewed the supporting data files.

Based on your review of the suppliers’ proposals, which supplier do you select?
Agata Solutions

Adurmis Manufacturing
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B6 - SCENARIO INFORMATION – HIGH COUNTERFEIT SIGNAL, LOW
WORKLOAD PRESSURE, LOW TIME PRESSURE

INTRODUCTION
This experiment involves reading a scenario about a particular purchasing decision and then selecting
between two potential suppliers for the component.

YOUR ROLE – A PURCHASING SPECIALIST
In this role-playing scenario, you are serving as the purchasing specialist for Alpha Automotive
Accessories, a parts manufacturer that produces brakes, airbags, and powertrain accessories used by
automotive manufacturers, repair stations, and retail automotive stores. You manage the purchase
of approximately 100 components that are used by your company.

YOUR TASK - DECIDE BETWEEN TWO SUPPLIERS FOR A COMPONENT
Your job is to evaluate the purchasing situation, review supporting information to help you understand
your industry, the suppliers and their offers and make a purchasing decision between two suppliers.
They are Adurmis Fabrication and Agata Solutions. Adurmis is a manufacturer and Agata is an
independent parts distributor. After reviewing the documentation, you will be asked a series of
questions about which supplier to select and why you did or did not select each supplier. Following the
experiment, you will be asked questions about your personal demographics, experience and
education.
These page timer metrics will not be displayed to the recipient.
First Click: 0 seconds
Last Click: 0 seconds
#QuestionText, TimingPageSubmit#: 0 seconds
#QuestionText, TimingClickCount#: 0 clicks

FASTENER BACKGROUND
Your normal trusted supplier of specialized fasteners, Fasten-Nation Components, has experienced a
natural disaster which destroyed their primary production facility and they won’t be able to fill customer
orders for three months. Your company uses these fasteners on parts for late model vehicles and
heavy equipment. Your product line is sold at numerous auto parts stores, dealerships and heavy
equipment supply stores.The industrial fastener marketplace has had some problems in terms of
quality historically, including substandard materials, product quality inconsistencies and counterfeits.
Because of volatility of capacity demands, there is no guarantee that orders placed with US
manufacturers will actually be produced domestically. The outsourcing of manufacturing has caused a
substantial migration of demand to China, and recent trends show that the domestic sources for the
specific type of fasteners you require are diminishing.
Your supply chain management operations have been focused on lean and inventory minimization
principles to help keep operational costs down. Unfortunately, this means that you only have enough
stock on hand to continue manufacturing for two weeks. Your supervisor has asked you to select an
interim supplier for a limited time supply arrangement as a solution to the problem until your normal
supplier is able to resume operations.
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PARTS INFORMATION: The parts that Fasten-Nation supplies to you are considered “obsolete
parts” because the design is not currently manufactured by the original equipment
manufacturer. The number of suppliers still manufacturing this type of part is very small and
sourcing has been problematic for your company. The table below summarizes the history of this
part, including the previous sources, their part numbers, lot numbers, and the pricing and quantity
lows, averages and highs for your recent purchases of these fasteners.

Supplier History Information – Previous 24 Months

Current
Supplier:
Previous
Supplier
(Original
Equipment
Manufacturer
No longer in
business):

Supplier
Name
Fastennation
Components

Zenith Component
Manufacturing

Type of
Supplier

Supplier
Part Number

Supplier Lot
Numbers

Manufacturer

FNC-8257894A

1086 – 3484

Manufacturer

ZEN-82-57894

11200 - 11565

Quantity and Price Information – Previous 24 months
Average Quantity
Procured
Quantity Range
Procured

569
450 – 1200

Average Price Per
Item
Price Range Per Item

$1.37
$1.25 - $1.65

THE DECISION TO MAKE - DECIDING BETWEEN THE TWO PROPOSALS
You have sent out a request for proposal for new suppliers of the specialized fasteners, and you have
received two responses. The table below summarizes the two proposals. Hyperlinks to your request for
proposal, the two responses, as well as your demand history data are also provided to enable you to
make an informed decision.

Supplier

Agata Solutions

Adurmis Fabrication

Location

City of Industry, CA

Fresno, CA

Type of Supplier

Independent Parts
Distributor

Manufacturer

Part Number Offered ZEN-82-57894
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ZEN-82-57894

Lot Number Offered

Z35012

Technical Solution

Use excess inventory
from another source

Certification
Information

Parts are American
National Standards
Institute specification
compliant

New Lot Numbers
beginning with A to
indicate manufacturing
at Adurmis
Manufactured under
short term license from
current supplier.
Parts are American
National Standards
Institute specification
compliant
ISO 9001 Certified
Better Business
Bureau - A+ Rating

Price per fastener

$1.15

$1.40

Total Price (including
$4,817.80
shipping and taxes
Beginning 2 weeks
Delivery Timeline
after order

$6,206.00
Beginning 2- 3
weeks after order

SUPPORTING DATA FILES FOR USE IN YOUR DECISION
Request for quote

Agata proposal Adurmis fabrication proposal Demand history
data v2
Background

These page timer metrics will not be displayed to the recipient.
First Click: 0 seconds
Last Click: 0 seconds
#QuestionText, TimingPageSubmit#: 0 seconds
#QuestionText, TimingClickCount#: 0 clicks

Please check after you have reviewed the supporting files
I have reviewed the supporting data files.

Based on your review of the suppliers’ proposals, which supplier do you select?
Agata Solutions

Adurmis Manufacturing
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B7 - SCENARIO INFORMATION – HIGH COUNTERFEIT SIGNAL, LOW
WORKLOAD PRESSURE, HIGH TIME PRESSURE
INTRODUCTION
This experiment involves reading a scenario about a particular purchasing decision and then selecting
between two potential suppliers for the component.

YOUR ROLE – A PURCHASING SPECIALIST
In this role-playing scenario, you are serving as the purchasing specialist for Alpha Automotive
Accessories, a parts manufacturer that produces brakes, airbags, and powertrain accessories used by
automotive manufacturesr, repair stations, and retail automotive stores. You manage the purchase
of approximately 100 components that are used by your company.

YOUR TASK - DECIDE BETWEEN TWO SUPPLIERS FOR A COMPONENT
Your job is to evaluate the purchasing situation, review supporting information to help you understand
your industry, the suppliers and their offers and make a purchasing decision between two suppliers.
They are Adurmis Fabrication and Agata Solutions. Adurmis is a manufacturer and Agata is an
independent parts distributor. After reviewing the documentation, you will be asked a series of
questions about which supplier to select and why you did or did not select each supplier. Following the
experiment, you will be asked questions about your personal demographics, experience and
education.
These page timer metrics will not be displayed to the recipient.
First Click: 0 seconds
Last Click: 0 seconds
#QuestionText, TimingPageSubmit#: 0 seconds
#QuestionText, TimingClickCount#: 0 clicks

FASTENER BACKGROUND
Your normal trusted supplier of specialized fasteners, Fasten-Nation Components, has experienced a
natural disaster which destroyed their primary production facility and they won’t be able to fill customer
orders for three months. Your company uses these fasteners on parts for late model vehicles and
heavy equipment. Your product line is sold at numerous auto parts stores, dealerships and heavy
equipment supply stores. The industrial fastener marketplace has had some problems in terms of
quality historically, including substandard materials, product quality inconsistencies and counterfeits.
Because of volatility of capacity demands, there is no guarantee that orders placed with US
manufacturers will actually be produced domestically. The outsourcing of manufacturing has caused a
substantial migration of demand to China, and recent trends show that the domestic sources for the
specific type of fasteners you require are diminishing.
Your supply chain management operations have been focused on lean and inventory minimization
principles to help keep operational costs down. Unfortunately, this means that you only have enough
stock on hand to continue manufacturing for two weeks. Your supervisor has asked you to select an
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interim supplier for a limited time supply arrangement as a solution to the problem until your normal
supplier is able to resume operations.
PARTS INFORMATION: The parts that Fasten-Nation supplies to you are considered “obsolete
parts” because the design is not currently manufactured by the original equipment
manufacturer. The number of suppliers still manufacturing this type of part is very small and
sourcing has been problematic for your company. The table below summarizes the history of this
part, including the previous sources, their part numbers, lot numbers, and the pricing and quantity
lows, averages and highs for your recent purchases of these fasteners.

Supplier History Information – Previous 24 Months

Current
Supplier:
Previous
Supplier
(Original
Equipment
Manufacturer
No longer in
business):

Supplier
Name
Fastennation
Components

Zenith Component
Manufacturing

Type of
Supplier

Supplier
Part Number

Supplier Lot
Numbers

Manufacturer

FNC-8257894A

1086 – 3484

Manufacturer

ZEN-82-57894

11200 - 11565

Quantity and Price Information – Previous 24 months
Average Quantity
Procured
Quantity Range
Procured

569
450 - 1200

Average Price Per
Item
Price Range Per Item

$1.37
$1.25 - $1.65

THE DECISION TO MAKE - DECIDING BETWEEN THE TWO PROPOSALS
You have sent out a request for proposal for new suppliers of the specialized fasteners, and you have
received two responses. The table below summarizes the two proposals. Hyperlinks to your request for
proposal, the two responses, as well as your demand history data are also provided to enable you to
make an informed decision.

Supplier

Agata Solutions

Adurmis Fabrication

Location

City of Industry, CA

Fresno, CA

Type of Supplier

Independent Parts
Distributor

Manufacturer
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Part Number Offered ZEN-82-57894

Lot Number Offered

Z35012

Technical Solution

Use excess inventory
from another source

Certification
Information

Parts are American
National Standards
Institute specification
compliant.

ZEN-82-57894
New Lot Numbers
beginning with A to
indicate
manufacturing
at Adurmis
Manufactured under
short term license from
current supplier
Parts are American
National Standards
Institute specification
compliant.
ISO 9001 Certified
Better Business
Bureau - A+ Rating

Price per fastener

$1.15

Total Price (including
$4,817.80
shipping and taxes
Beginning 2 weeks
Delivery Timeline
after order

$1.40
$6,206.00
Beginning 2 - 3
weeks after order

SUPPORTING DATA FILES FOR USE IN YOUR DECISION
Request for quote

Agata proposal Adurmis fabrication proposal Demand history
data v2 Background

These page timer metrics will not be displayed to the recipient.
First Click: 0 seconds
Last Click: 0 seconds
#QuestionText, TimingPageSubmit#: 0 seconds
#QuestionText, TimingClickCount#: 0 clicks

Please check after you have reviewed the supporting files
I have reviewed the supporting data files.

Based on your review of the suppliers’ proposals, which supplier do you select?
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Agata Solutions

Adurmis Manufacturing

B8 - SCENARIO INFORMATION – HIGH COUNTERFEIT SIGNAL, HIGH
WORKLOAD PRESSURE, LOW TIME PRESSURE
INTRODUCTION
This experiment involves reading a scenario about a particular purchasing decision and then selecting
between two potential suppliers for the component.

YOUR ROLE – AN OVERWORKED PURCHASING SPECIALIST WITH A SUPPLY
CHAIN PROBLEM
In this role-playing scenario, you are serving as the purchasing specialist for Alpha Automotive
Accessories, a parts manufacturer that produces brakes, airbags, and powertrain accessories used by
automotive manufacturers, repair stations, and retail automotive stores. You are a very busy buyer,
managing the purchasing of over 100 components that are used by your company, which is twice the
normal amount for a buyer. Your workload is demanding and requires you to make numerous
purchasing decisions every day, and your supervisor is constantly reminding you of your to-do list and
the need to "get those orders filled for our production line".

YOUR TASK - DECIDE BETWEEN TWO SUPPLIERS FOR A COMPONENT
Your job (amongst all of the other tasks mounting on your desk between emails and phone calls from
customers and your supervisor) is to evaluate the purchasing situation, review supporting information
to help you understand your industry, the suppliers and their offers and make a purchasing decision
between two suppliers. They are Adurmis Fabrication and Agata Solutions. Adurmis is a manufacturer
and Agata is an independent parts distributor. After reviewing the documentation, you will be asked a
series of questions about which supplier to select and why you did or did not select each supplier.
Following the experiment, you will be asked questions about your personal demographics, experience
and education.
These page timer metrics will not be displayed to the recipient.
First Click: 0 seconds
Last Click: 0 seconds
#QuestionText, TimingPageSubmit#: 0 seconds
#QuestionText, TimingClickCount#: 0 clicks

FASTENER BACKGROUND
Your normal trusted supplier of specialized fasteners, Fasten-Nation Components, has experienced a
natural disaster which destroyed their primary production facility and they won’t be able to fill customer
orders for three months. Your company uses these fasteners on parts for late model vehicles and
heavy equipment. Your product line is sold at numerous auto parts stores, dealerships and heavy
equipment supply stores. The industrial fastener marketplace has had some problems in terms of
quality historically, including substandard materials, product quality inconsistencies and counterfeits.
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Because of volatility of capacity demands, there is no guarantee that orders placed with US
manufacturers will actually be produced domestically. The outsourcing of manufacturing has caused
a substantial migration of demand to China, and recent trends show that the domestic sources for the
specific type of fasteners you require are diminishing.
Your supply chain management operations have been focused on lean and inventory minimization
principles to help keep operational costs down. Unfortunately, this means that you only have enough
stock on hand to continue manufacturing for two weeks. Your supervisor has asked you to select an
interim supplier for a limited time supply arrangement as a solution to the problem until your normal
supplier is able to resume operations.

PARTS INFORMATION: The parts that Fasten-Nation supplies to you are considered “obsolete
parts” because the design is not currently manufactured by the original equipment
manufacturer. The number of suppliers still manufacturing this type of part is very small and
sourcing has been problematic for your company. The table below summarizes the history of this
part, including the previous sources, their part numbers, lot numbers, and the pricing and quantity
lows, averages and highs for your recent purchases of these fasteners.

Supplier History Information – Previous 24 Months

Current
Supplier:
Previous
Supplier
(Original
Equipment
Manufacturer
No longer in
business):

Supplier
Name
Fastennation
Components

Zenith Component
Manufacturing

Type of
Supplier

Supplier
Part Number

Supplier Lot
Numbers

Manufacturer

FNC-8257894A

1086 – 3484

Manufacturer

ZEN-82-57894

11200 - 11565

Quantity and Price Information – Previous 24 months
Average Quantity
Procured
Quantity Range
Procured

569
450 – 1200

Average Price Per
Item
Price Range Per Item

$1.37
$1.25 - $1.65

THE DECISION TO MAKE - DECIDING BETWEEN THE TWO PROPOSALS
You have sent out a request for proposal for new suppliers of the specialized fasteners, and you have
received two responses. The table below summarizes the two proposals. Hyperlinks to your request
for proposal, the two responses, as well as your demand history data are also provided to enable you
to make an informed decision. Your supervisor is reminding you to get this decision done ASAP
because he’s got other tasks for you that will need to be completed before you leave tonight.

Supplier

Agata Solutions

Adurmis Fabrication

Location

City of Industry, CA

Fresno, CA
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Type of Supplier

Independent Parts
Distributor

Manufacturer

Part Number Offered ZEN-82-57894
Lot Number Offered

Z35012

Technical Solution

Use excess inventory
from another source

Certification
Information

Parts are American
National Standards
Institute specification
compliant.

ZEN-82-57894
New Lot Numbers
beginning with A to
indicate manufacturing
at Adurmis
Manufactured under
short term license from
current supplier
Parts are American
National Standards
Institute specification
compliant.
ISO 9001 Certified
Better Business
Bureau - A+ Rating

Price per fastener

$1.15

$1.40

Total Price (including
$4,817.80
shipping and taxes
Beginning 2 weeks
Delivery Timeline
after order

$6,206.00
Beginning 2 - 3
weeks after order

SUPPORTING DATA FILES FOR USE IN YOUR DECISION
Request for quote Agata proposal Adurmis fabrication proposal
data v2 Background

Demand history

These page timer metrics will not be displayed to the recipient.
First Click: 0 seconds
Last Click: 0 seconds
#QuestionText, TimingPageSubmit#: 0 seconds
#QuestionText, TimingClickCount#: 0 clicks

Please check after you have reviewed the supporting files
I have reviewed the supporting data files.

Based on your review of the suppliers’ proposals, which supplier do you select?
Agata Solutions

Adurmis Manufacturing
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B9 - SCENARIO INFORMATION – HIGH COUNTERFEIT SIGNAL, HIGH
WORKLOAD PRESSURE, HIGH TIME PRESSURE

INTRODUCTION
This experiment involves reading a scenario about a particular purchasing decision and then selecting
between two potential suppliers for the component.

YOUR ROLE – AN OVERWORKED PURCHASING SPECIALIST WITH A SUPPLY
CHAIN PROBLEM
In this role-playing scenario, you are serving as the purchasing specialist for Alpha Automotive
Accessories, a parts manufacturer that produces brakes, airbags, and powertrain accessories used by
automotive manufacturers, repair stations, and retail automotive stores. You are a very busy buyer,
managing the purchasing of over 100 components that are used by your company, which is twice the
normal amount for a buyer. Your workload is demanding and requires you to make numerous
purchasing decisions every day, and your supervisor is constantly reminding you of your to-do list and
the need to "get those orders filled for our production line".

YOUR TASK - DECIDE BETWEEN TWO SUPPLIERS FOR A COMPONENT
Your job (amongst all of the other tasks mounting on your desk between emails and phone calls from
customers and your supervisor) is to evaluate the purchasing situation, review supporting information
to help you understand your industry, the suppliers and their offers and make a purchasing decision
between two suppliers. They are Adurmis Fabrication and Agata Solutions. Adurmis is a manufacturer
and Agata is an independent parts distributor. After reviewing the documentation, you will be asked a
series of questions about which supplier to select and why you did or did not select each supplier.
Following the experiment, you will be asked questions about your personal demographics, experience
and education.
These page timer metrics will not be displayed to the recipient.
First Click: 0 seconds
Last Click: 0 seconds
#QuestionText, TimingPageSubmit#: 0 seconds
#QuestionText, TimingClickCount#: 0 clicks

FASTENER BACKGROUND
Your normal trusted supplier of specialized fasteners, Fasten-Nation Components, has experienced a
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natural disaster which destroyed their primary production facility and they won’t be able to fill customer
orders for three months. Your company uses these fasteners on parts for late model vehicles and
heavy equipment. Your product line is sold at numerous auto parts stores, dealerships and heavy
equipment supply stores. The industrial fastener marketplace has had some problems in terms of
quality historically, including substandard materials, product quality inconsistencies and counterfeits.
Because of volatility of capacity demands, there is no guarantee that orders placed with US
manufacturers will actually be produced domestically. The outsourcing of manufacturing has caused
a substantial migration of demand to China, and recent trends show that the domestic sources for the
specific type of fasteners you require are diminishing.
Your supply chain management operations have been focused on lean and inventory minimization
principles to help keep operational costs down. Unfortunately, this means that you only have enough
stock on hand to continue manufacturing for two weeks. Your supervisor has asked you to select an
interim supplier for a limited time supply arrangement as a solution to the problem until your normal
supplier is able to resume operations.
PARTS INFORMATION: The parts that Fasten-Nation supplies to you are considered “obsolete
parts” because the design is not currently manufactured by the original equipment
manufacturer. The number of suppliers still manufacturing this type of part is very small and
sourcing has been problematic for your company. The table below summarizes the history of this
part, including the previous sources, their part numbers, lot numbers, and the pricing and quantity
lows, averages and highs for your recent purchases of these fasteners.

Supplier History Information – Previous 24 Months

Current
Supplier:
Previous
Supplier
(Original
Equipment
Manufacturer
No longer in
business):

Supplier
Name
Fastennation
Components

Zenith Component
Manufacturing

Type of
Supplier

Supplier
Part Number

Supplier Lot
Numbers

Manufacturer

FNC-8257894A

1086 – 3484

Manufacturer

ZEN-82-57894

11200 - 11565

Quantity and Price Information – Previous 24 months
Average Quantity
Procured

569

Quantity Range
Procured

450 - 1200

Average Price Per
Item
Price Range Per Item

$1.37
$1.25 - $1.65

THE DECISION TO MAKE - DECIDING BETWEEN THE TWO PROPOSALS
You have sent out a request for proposal for new suppliers of the specialized fasteners, and you have
received two responses. The table below summarizes the two proposals. Hyperlinks to your request for
proposal, the two responses, as well as your demand history data are also provided to enable you to
make an informed decision. Your supervisor is reminding you to get this decision done ASAP
because he’s got other tasks for you that will need to be completed before you leave tonight.
You also have an end-of-day team meeting, so you only have five minutes to complete this
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review and make a decision.

Supplier

Agata Solutions

Adurmis Fabrication

Location

City of Industry, CA

Fresno, CA

Type of Supplier

Independent Parts
Distributor

Manufacturer

Part Number Offered ZEN-82-57894
Lot Number Offered

Z35012

Technical Solution

Use excess inventory
from another source

Certification
Information

Parts are American
National Standards
Institute specification
compliant

ZEN-82-57894
New Lot Numbers
beginning with A to
indicate manufacturing
at Adurmis
Manufactured under
short term license from
current supplier
Parts are American
National Standards
Institute specification
compliant
ISO 9001 Certified
Better Business
Bureau - A + Rating

Price per fastener

$1.15

$1.40

Total Price (including
$4,817.80
$6,206.00
shipping and taxes
Beginning 2 weeks
Beginning 2 - 3
Delivery Timeline
after order
weeks after order
SUPPORTING DATA FILES FOR USE IN YOUR DECISION
Request for quote Agata proposal
Adurmis fabrication proposal Demand history
data v2
Background
These page timer metrics will not be displayed to the recipient.
First Click: 0 seconds
Last Click: 0 seconds
#QuestionText, TimingPageSubmit#: 0 seconds
#QuestionText, TimingClickCount#: 0 clicks
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Please check after you have reviewed the supporting files
I have reviewed the supporting data files.

Based on your review of the suppliers’ proposals, which supplier do you select?
Agata Solutions

Adurmis Manufacturing

B10 - SCENARIO INFORMATION – MEDIUM COUNTERFEIT SIGNAL, LOW
WORKLOAD PRESSURE, LOW TIME PRESSURE

INTRODUCTION
This experiment involves reading a scenario about a particular purchasing decision and then selecting
between two potential suppliers for the component.

YOUR ROLE – A PURCHASING SPECIALIST
In this role-playing scenario, you are serving as the purchasing specialist for Alpha Automotive
Accessories, a parts manufacturer that produces brakes, airbags, and powertrain accessories used by
automotive manufacturers, repair stations, and retail automotive stores. You manage the purchase
of approximately 100 components that are used by your company.

YOUR TASK - DECIDE BETWEEN TWO SUPPLIERS FOR A COMPONENT
Your job is to evaluate the purchasing situation, review supporting information to help you understand
your industry, the suppliers and their offers and make a purchasing decision between two suppliers.
They are Adurmis Fabrication and Agata Solutions. Adurmis is a manufacturer and Agata is an
independent parts distributor. After reviewing the documentation, you will be asked a series of
questions about which supplier to select and why you did or did not select each supplier. Following the
experiment, you will be asked questions about your personal demographics, experience and
education.
These page timer metrics will not be displayed to the recipient.
First Click: 0 seconds
Last Click: 0 seconds
#QuestionText, TimingPageSubmit#: 0 seconds
#QuestionText, TimingClickCount#: 0 clicks

FASTENER BACKGROUND
Your normal trusted supplier of specialized fasteners, Fasten-Nation Components, has experienced a
natural disaster which destroyed their primary production facility and they won’t be able to fill customer
orders for three months. Your company uses these fasteners on parts for late model vehicles and
heavy equipment. Your product line is sold at numerous auto parts stores, dealerships and heavy
equipment supply stores.The industrial fastener marketplace has had some problems in terms of
quality historically, including substandard materials, product quality inconsistencies and counterfeits.
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Because of volatility of capacity demands, there is no guarantee that orders placed with US
manufacturers will actually be produced domestically. The outsourcing of manufacturing has caused
a substantial migration of demand to China, and recent trends show that the domestic sources for the
specific type of fasteners you require are diminishing.
Your supply chain management operations have been focused on lean and inventory minimization
principles to help keep operational costs down. Unfortunately, this means that you only have enough
stock on hand to continue manufacturing for two weeks. Your supervisor has asked you to select an
interim supplier for a limited time supply arrangement as a solution to the problem until your normal
supplier is able to resume operations.

PARTS INFORMATION: The parts that Fasten-Nation supplies to you are considered “obsolete
parts” because the design is not currently manufactured by the original equipment
manufacturer. The number of suppliers still manufacturing this type of part is very small and
sourcing has been problematic for your company. The table below summarizes the history of this
part, including the previous sources, their part numbers, lot numbers, and the pricing and quantity
lows, averages and highs for your recent purchases of these fasteners.

Supplier History Information – Previous 24 Months

Current
Supplier:
Previous
Supplier
(Original
Equipment
Manufacturer
No longer in

Supplier
Name
Fastennation
Components

Zenith Component
Manufacturing

Type of
Supplier

Supplier
Part Number

Supplier Lot
Numbers

Manufacturer

FNC-8257894A

1086 – 3484

Manufacturer

ZEN-82-57894

11200 - 11565

Quantity and Price Information – Previous 24 months
Average Quantity
Procured
Quantity Range
Procured

569
450 - 1200

Average Price Per
Item
Price Range Per Item

$1.37
$1.25 - $1.65

THE DECISION TO MAKE - DECIDING BETWEEN THE TWO PROPOSALS
You have sent out a request for proposal for new suppliers of the specialized fasteners, and you have
received two responses. The table below summarizes the two proposals. Hyperlinks to your request for
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proposal, the two responses, as well as your demand history data are also provided to enable you to
make an informed decision.

Supplier

Agata Solutions

Adurmis Fabrication

Location

City of Industry, CA

Fresno, CA

Type of Supplier

Independent Parts
Distributor

Manufacturer

Part Number Offered ZEN-82-57894
Lot Number Offered

Z35012

Technical Solution

Use excess inventory
from another source

Certification
Information

Parts are American
National Standards
Institute specification
compliant

ZEN-82-57894
New Lot Numbers
beginning with A to
indicate manufacturing
at Adurmis
Manufactured under
short term license from
current supplier.
Parts are American
National Standards
Institute specification
compliant
ISO 9001 Certified
Better Business
Bureau - A+ Rating

Price per fastener

$1.38

$1.40

Total Price (including $6,106.40

$6,206.00

shipping and taxes
Delivery Timeline

Beginning 2 weeks
after order

Beginning 2- 3
weeks after order

SUPPORTING DATA FILES FOR USE IN YOUR DECISION
Request for quote

Agata response Adurmis fabrication proposal Demand history
data v2
Background

These page timer metrics will not be displayed to the recipient.
First Click: 0 seconds
Last Click: 0 seconds
#QuestionText, TimingPageSubmit#: 0 seconds
#QuestionText, TimingClickCount#: 0 clicks
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Please check after you have reviewed the supporting files
I have reviewed the supporting data files.

Based on your review of the suppliers’ proposals, which supplier do you select?
Agata Solutions

Adurmis Manufacturing

B11 - SCENARIO INFORMATION – MEDIUM COUNTERFEIT SIGNAL, LOW
WORKLOAD PRESSURE, HIGH TIME PRESSURE
INTRODUCTION
This experiment involves reading a scenario about a particular purchasing decision and then selecting
between two potential suppliers for the component.

YOUR ROLE – A PURCHASING SPECIALIST
In this role-playing scenario, you are serving as the purchasing specialist for Alpha Automotive
Accessories, a parts manufacturer that produces brakes, airbags, and powertrain accessories used by
automotive manufacturesr, repair stations, and retail automotive stores. You manage the purchase
of approximately 100 components that are used by your company.

YOUR TASK - DECIDE BETWEEN TWO SUPPLIERS FOR A COMPONENT
Your job is to evaluate the purchasing situation, review supporting information to help you understand
your industry, the suppliers and their offers and make a purchasing decision between two suppliers.
They are Adurmis Fabrication and Agata Solutions. Adurmis is a manufacturer and Agata is an
independent parts distributor. After reviewing the documentation, you will be asked a series of
questions about which supplier to select and why you did or did not select each supplier. Following the
experiment, you will be asked questions about your personal demographics, experience and education.
These page timer metrics will not be displayed to the recipient.
First Click: 0 seconds
Last Click: 0 seconds
#QuestionText, TimingPageSubmit#: 0 seconds
#QuestionText, TimingClickCount#: 0 clicks

FASTENER BACKGROUND
Your normal trusted supplier of specialized fasteners, Fasten-Nation Components, has experienced a
natural disaster which destroyed their primary production facility and they won’t be able to fill customer
orders for three months. Your company uses these fasteners on parts for late model vehicles and
heavy equipment. Your product line is sold at numerous auto parts stores, dealerships and heavy
equipment supply stores. The industrial fastener marketplace has had some problems in terms of
quality historically, including substandard materials, product quality inconsistencies and counterfeits.
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Because of volatility of capacity demands, there is no guarantee that orders placed with US
manufacturers will actually be produced domestically. The outsourcing of manufacturing has caused a
substantial migration of demand to China, and recent trends show that the domestic sources for the
specific type of fasteners you require are diminishing.
Your supply chain management operations have been focused on lean and inventory minimization
principles to help keep operational costs down. Unfortunately, this means that you only have enough
stock on hand to continue manufacturing for two weeks. Your supervisor has asked you to select an
interim supplier for a limited time supply arrangement as a solution to the problem until your normal
supplier is able to resume operations.
PARTS INFORMATION: The parts that Fasten-Nation supplies to you are considered “obsolete
parts” because the design is not currently manufactured by the original equipment
manufacturer. The number of suppliers still manufacturing this type of part is very small and
sourcing has been problematic for your company. The table below summarizes the history of this
part, including the previous sources, their part numbers, lot numbers, and the pricing and quantity
lows, averages and highs for your recent purchases of these fasteners.

Supplier History Information – Previous 24 Months

Current
Supplier:
Previous
Supplier
(Original
Equipment
Manufacturer
No longer in

Supplier
Name
Fastennation
Components

Zenith Component
Manufacturing

Type of
Supplier

Supplier
Part Number

Supplier Lot
Numbers

Manufacturer

FNC-8257894A

1086 – 3484

Manufacturer

ZEN-82-57894

11200 - 11565

Quantity and Price Information – Previous 24 months
Average Quantity
Procured
Quantity Range
Procured

569
450 – 1200

Average Price Per
Item
Price Range Per Item

$1.37
$1.25 - $1.65

THE DECISION TO MAKE - DECIDING BETWEEN THE TWO PROPOSALS
You have sent out a request for proposal for new suppliers of the specialized fasteners, and you have
received two responses. The table below summarizes the two proposals. Hyperlinks to your request for
proposal, the two responses, as well as your demand history data are also provided to enable you to
make an informed decision.

Supplier

Agata Solutions
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Adurmis Fabrication

Location

City of Industry, CA

Fresno, CA

Type of Supplier

Independent Parts
Distributor

Manufacturer

Part Number Offered ZEN-82-57894

Lot Number Offered

Z35012

Technical Solution

Use excess inventory
from another source

Certification
Information

Parts are American
National Standards
Institute specification
compliant.

ZEN-82-57894
New Lot Numbers
beginning with A to
indicate
manufacturing
at Adurmis
Manufactured under
short term license from
current supplier
Parts are American
National Standards
Institute specification
compliant.
ISO 9001 Certified
Better Business
Bureau - A+ Rating

Price per fastener

$1.38

$1.40

Total Price (including
$6,106.40
shipping and taxes
Beginning 2 weeks
Delivery Timeline
after order

$6,206.00
Beginning 2 - 3
weeks after order

SUPPORTING DATA FILES FOR USE IN YOUR DECISION
Request for quote

Agata response Adurmis fabrication proposal Demand history
data v2
Background

These page timer metrics will not be displayed to the recipient.
First Click: 0 seconds
Last Click: 0 seconds
#QuestionText, TimingPageSubmit#: 0 seconds
#QuestionText, TimingClickCount#: 0 clicks
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Please check after you have reviewed the supporting files
I have reviewed the supporting data files.

Based on your review of the suppliers’ proposals, which supplier do you select?
Agata Solutions

Adurmis Manufacturing

B12 - SCENARIO INFORMATION – MEDIUM COUNTERFEIT SIGNAL, HIGH
WORKLOAD PRESSURE, LOW TIME PRESSURE
INTRODUCTION
This experiment involves reading a scenario about a particular purchasing decision and then selecting
between two potential suppliers for the component.

YOUR ROLE – AN OVERWORKED PURCHASING SPECIALIST WITH A SUPPLY
CHAIN PROBLEM
In this role-playing scenario, you are serving as the purchasing specialist for Alpha Automotive
Accessories, a parts manufacturer that produces brakes, airbags, and powertrain accessories used by
automotive manufacturers, repair stations, and retail automotive stores. You are a very busy buyer,
managing the purchasing of over 100 components that are used by your company, which is twice the
normal amount for a buyer. Your workload is demanding and requires you to make numerous
purchasing decisions every day, and your supervisor is constantly reminding you of your to-do list and
the need to "get those orders filled for our production line".

YOUR TASK - DECIDE BETWEEN TWO SUPPLIERS FOR A COMPONENT
Your job (amongst all of the other tasks mounting on your desk between emails and phone calls from
customers and your supervisor) is to evaluate the purchasing situation, review supporting information
to help you understand your industry, the suppliers and their offers and make a purchasing decision
between two suppliers. They are Adurmis Fabrication and Agata Solutions. Adurmis is a manufacturer
and Agata is an independent parts distributor. After reviewing the documentation, you will be asked a
series of questions about which supplier to select and why you did or did not select each supplier.
Following the experiment, you will be asked questions about your personal demographics, experience
and education.
These page timer metrics will not be displayed to the recipient.
First Click: 0 seconds
Last Click: 0 seconds
#QuestionText, TimingPageSubmit#: 0 seconds
#QuestionText, TimingClickCount#: 0 clicks
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BACKGROUND

Your normal trusted supplier of specialized fasteners, Fasten-Nation Components, has experienced a
natural disaster which destroyed their primary production facility and they won’t be able to fill customer
orders for three months. Your company uses these fasteners on parts for late model vehicles and
heavy equipment. Your product line is sold at numerous auto parts stores, dealerships and heavy
equipment supply stores. The industrial fastener marketplace has had some problems in terms of
quality historically, including substandard materials, product quality inconsistencies and counterfeits.
Because of volatility of capacity demands, there is no guarantee that orders placed with US
manufacturers will actually be produced domestically. The outsourcing of manufacturing has caused
a substantial migration of demand to China, and recent trends show that the domestic sources for the
specific type of fasteners you require are diminishing.
Your supply chain management operations have been focused on lean and inventory minimization
principles to help keep operational costs down. Unfortunately, this means that you only have enough
stock on hand to continue manufacturing for two weeks. Your supervisor has asked you to select an
interim supplier for a limited time supply arrangement as a solution to the problem until your normal
supplier is able to resume operations.
PARTS INFORMATION: The parts that Fasten-Nation supplies to you are considered “obsolete
parts” because the design is not currently manufactured by the original equipment
manufacturer. The number of suppliers still manufacturing this type of part is very small and
sourcing has been problematic for your company. The table below summarizes the history of this
part, including the previous sources, their part numbers, lot numbers, and the pricing and quantity
lows, averages and highs for your recent purchases of these fasteners.

Supplier History Information – Previous 24 Months

Current
Supplier:
Previous
Supplier
(Original
Equipment
Manufacturer
No longer in
business):

Supplier
Name
Fastennation
Components

Zenith Component
Manufacturing

Type of
Supplier

Supplier
Part Number

Supplier Lot
Numbers

Manufacturer

FNC-8257894A

1086 – 3484

Manufacturer

ZEN-82-57894

11200 - 11565

Quantity and Price Information – Previous 24 months
Average Quantity
Procured
Quantity Range
Procured

569
450 – 1200

Average Price Per
Item
Price Range Per Item

$1.37
$1.25 - $1.65

THE DECISION TO MAKE - DECIDING BETWEEN THE TWO PROPOSALS
You have sent out a request for proposal for new suppliers of the specialized fasteners, and you have
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received two responses. The table below summarizes the two proposals. Hyperlinks to your request
for proposal, the two responses, as well as your demand history data are also provided to enable you
to make an informed decision. Your supervisor is reminding you to get this decision done ASAP
because he’s got other tasks for you that will need to be completed before you leave tonight.

Supplier

Agata Solutions

Adurmis Fabrication

Location

City of Industry, CA

Fresno, CA

Type of Supplier

Independent Parts
Distributor

Manufacturer

Part Number Offered ZEN-82-57894
Lot Number Offered

Z35012

Technical Solution

Use excess inventory
from another source

Parts are American
National Standards
Institute specification
compliant.

Certification
Information

ZEN-82-57894
New Lot Numbers
beginning with A to
indicate manufacturing
at Adurmis
Manufactured under
short term license from
current supplier
Parts are American
National Standards
Institute specification
compliant.
ISO 9001 Certified
Better Business
Bureau - A+ Rating

Price per fastener

$1.38

$1.40

Total Price (including
$6,106.40
shipping and taxes
Beginning 2 weeks
Delivery Timeline
after order

$6,206.00
Beginning 2 - 3
weeks after order

SUPPORTING DATA FILES FOR USE IN YOUR DECISION
Request for quote

Agata response Adurmis fabrication proposal Demand history
data v2
Background

These page timer metrics will not be displayed to the recipient.
First Click: 0 seconds
Last Click: 0 seconds
#QuestionText, TimingPageSubmit#: 0 seconds
#QuestionText, TimingClickCount#: 0 clicks
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Please check after you have reviewed the supporting files
I have reviewed the supporting data files.

Based on your review of the suppliers’ proposals, which supplier do you
select?
Agata Solutions

Adurmis Manufacturing
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B13 - SCENARIO INFORMATION – MEDIUM COUNTERFEIT SIGNAL, HIGH
WORKLOAD PRESSURE, HIGH TIME PRESSURE
INTRODUCTION
This experiment involves reading a scenario about a particular purchasing decision and then selecting
between two potential suppliers for the component.

YOUR ROLE – AN OVERWORKED PURCHASING SPECIALIST WITH A SUPPLY
CHAIN PROBLEM
In this role-playing scenario, you are serving as the purchasing specialist for Alpha Automotive
Accessories, a parts manufacturer that produces brakes, airbags, and powertrain accessories used by
automotive manufacturers, repair stations, and retail automotive stores. You are a very busy buyer,
managing the purchasing of over 100 components that are used by your company, which is twice the
normal amount for a buyer. Your workload is demanding and requires you to make numerous
purchasing decisions every day, and your supervisor is constantly reminding you of your to-do list and
the need to "get those orders filled for our production line".

YOUR TASK - DECIDE BETWEEN TWO SUPPLIERS FOR A COMPONENT
Your job (amongst all of the other tasks mounting on your desk between emails and phone calls from
customers and your supervisor) is to evaluate the purchasing situation, review supporting information
to help you understand your industry, the suppliers and their offers and make a purchasing decision
between two suppliers. They are Adurmis Fabrication and Agata Solutions. Adurmis is a manufacturer
and Agata is an independent parts distributor. After reviewing the documentation, you will be asked a
series of questions about which supplier to select and why you did or did not select each supplier.
Following the experiment, you will be asked questions about your personal demographics, experience
and education.
These page timer metrics will not be displayed to the recipient.
First Click: 0 seconds
Last Click: 0 seconds
#QuestionText, TimingPageSubmit#: 0 seconds
#QuestionText, TimingClickCount#: 0 clicks

FASTENER BACKGROUND
Your normal trusted supplier of specialized fasteners, Fasten-Nation Components, has experienced a
natural disaster which destroyed their primary production facility and they won’t be able to fill customer
orders for three months. Your company uses these fasteners on parts for late model vehicles and
heavy equipment. Your product line is sold at numerous auto parts stores, dealerships and heavy
equipment supply stores. The industrial fastener marketplace has had some problems in terms of
quality historically, including substandard materials, product quality inconsistencies and counterfeits.
Because of volatility of capacity demands, there is no guarantee that orders placed with US
manufacturers will actually be produced domestically. The outsourcing of manufacturing has caused
a substantial migration of demand to China, and recent trends show that the domestic sources for the
specific type of fasteners you require are diminishing.
Your supply chain management operations have been focused on lean and inventory minimization
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principles to help keep operational costs down. Unfortunately, this means that you only have enough
stock on hand to continue manufacturing for two weeks. Your supervisor has asked you to select an
interim supplier for a limited time supply arrangement as a solution to the problem until your normal
supplier is able to resume operations.
PARTS INFORMATION: The parts that Fasten-Nation supplies to you are considered “obsolete
parts” because the design is not currently manufactured by the original equipment
manufacturer. The number of suppliers still manufacturing this type of part is very small and
sourcing has been problematic for your company. The table below summarizes the history of this
part, including the previous sources, their part numbers, lot numbers, and the pricing and quantity lows,
averages and highs for your recent purchases of these fasteners.

Supplier History Information – Previous 24 Months

Current
Supplier:
Previous
Supplier
(Original
Equipment
Manufacturer
No longer in
business):

Supplier
Name
Fastennation
Components

Zenith Component
Manufacturing

Type of
Supplier

Supplier
Part Number

Supplier Lot
Numbers

Manufacturer

FNC-8257894A

1086 – 3484

Manufacturer

ZEN-82-57894

11200 - 11565

Quantity and Price Information – Previous 24 months
Average Quantity
Procured
Quantity Range
Procured

569
450 – 1200

Average Price Per
Item
Price Range Per Item

$1.37
$1.25 - $1.65

THE DECISION TO MAKE - DECIDING BETWEEN THE TWO PROPOSALS
You have sent out a request for proposal for new suppliers of the specialized fasteners, and you have
received two responses. The table below summarizes the two proposals. Hyperlinks to your request for
proposal, the two responses, as well as your demand history data are also provided to enable you to
make an informed decision. Your supervisor is reminding you to get this decision done ASAP
because he’s got other tasks for you that will need to be completed before you leave tonight.
You also have an end-of-day team meeting, so you only have five minutes to complete this
review and make a decision.

Supplier

Agata Solutions

Adurmis Fabrication

Location

City of Industry, CA

Fresno, CA

Type of Supplier

Independent Parts
Distributor

Manufacturer
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Part Number Offered ZEN-82-57894

ZEN-82-57894
New Lot Numbers

Lot Number Offered

Z35012

Technical Solution

Use excess inventory
from another source

Certification
Information

Parts are American
National Standards
Institute specification
compliant

beginning with A to
indicate manufacturing
at Adurmis
Manufactured under
short term license from
current supplier
Parts are American
National Standards
Institute specification
compliant
ISO 9001 Certified
Better Business
Bureau - A + Rating

Price per fastener

$1.38

Total Price (including
$6,106.40
shipping and taxes
Beginning 2 weeks
Delivery Timeline
after order

$1.40
$6,206.00
Beginning 2 - 3
weeks after order

SUPPORTING DATA FILES FOR USE IN YOUR DECISION
Request for quote

Agata response Adurmis fabrication proposal Demand history
data v2
Background

These page timer metrics will not be displayed to the recipient.
First Click: 0 seconds
Last Click: 0 seconds
#QuestionText, TimingPageSubmit#: 0 seconds
#QuestionText, TimingClickCount#: 0 clicks

Please check after you have reviewed the supporting files
I have reviewed the supporting data files.

Based on your review of the suppliers’ proposals, which supplier do you
select?
Agata Solutions
Adurmis Manufacturing
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B14 – POST-HOC QUESTIONNAIRE
To what extent do you prefer your selected supplier over the supplier you did
not select? Please rate your preference.
1 - No real
preference

2

3

4

5

6

7 - Greatly
Prefer

Please identify how important each of the following factors was in your
decision.
1 - Not
7 - Very
at all

2

The supplier’s price was the lowest
offered.
The supplier’s ability to meet the required
delivery date
The quality of the fasteners offered
The technical approach (make or use
excess inventory) offered by the supplier
The risk that the fasteners are counterfeit
parts
The part history information provided by
the supplier
The fact that the part was an obsolete
item

I specifically considered that one of suppliers proposals might be an offer
for counterfeit parts.
Yes
No
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Please describe your level of
agreement with each of the
following statements regarding
the supplier you DID NOT
SELECT

1Strongly
Disagree

The price offered by the supplier was
too high.
The price offered was so low that I
thought the product might be a
counterfeit.
The price offered was so low that the
quality of the product was questionable.
The delivery schedule was not
acceptable
The delivery schedule was too slow for
the requirement.
The quality of the item was inadequate
for the requirement.
The fastener has a high chance of
being a counterfeit part
The fastener might be a nonconforming part
There was insufficient information about
where the item was produced, which
was a great cause for concern in my
decision
There is likely to be quality risk
associated with selecting the lower cost
supplier
Low cost is more important than quality
in this purchasing decision
Quality is less important than schedule in
this purchasing decision.
My concerns about the prospects of
receiving counterfeit products
overweighed my beliefs about the
importance of other operational factors,
such as cost and delivery
My concerns about the costs and
consequences of counterfeit product
outweighed my feeling about lower unit
costs
I believe that it is possible to control or
manage situations that involved
counterfeit products.
I believe that it is possible to stop
opportunistic supplier behaviors, such
as supplying counterfeit products, in a
contract
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2

4Neither
agree
nor
3 disagree

5

6

7Strongly
Agree

Please answer the following questions regarding the realism of this scenario.
4Neither
Agree
nor

1Strongly

7Agree

The scenario described
in the study is realistic.
I took my role described
in the scenario
seriously.
In my work, I rarely
encounter the issues
discussed in these
scenarios.
I am highly aware of the
issues raised in this
scenario.

Please select your level of agreement or disagreement with each of the
following statements.
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4Neither
Agree
nor

1Strongly

7Agree

I felt like I had enough
time to review the
information provided for
the selection decision.
I felt rushed to make a
selection decision
Overall, I felt a sense of
time pressure when
completing the
experiment
I felt too rushed to
adequately address the
supplier selection in this
experiment
When I am confronted
with a problem, I can
usually find several
solutions.
I can solve most
problems if I invest the
necessary effort.
I am confident that I
could deal efficiently
with unexpected events.
I can always manage to
solve difficult problems
if I try hard enough
I felt like a buyer who
was overworked in this
scenario.
As I completed the
experiment, I felt there
was a large quantity of
work that needed to be
done.
As I went through the
scenario, I thought the
buyer had too much
work to do.

There was a timer displayed in this experiment.
Yes
No
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The fasteners you needed to purchase in this experiment were obsolete parts.
Yes
No

One of the suppliers in this scenario was an independent parts distributor.
Yes
No

What is your job title?

What level of training have you had regarding counterfeit parts issues?
I have no training on counterfeit parts issues
I have a little training on counterfeit parts issues
I have some training on counterfeit parts issues
I have substantial training on counterfeit parts issues
I have extensive training on counterfeit parts issues

To what degree do you think counterfeit parts are a problem for supply chains?
Counterfeit parts
Counterfeit parts
Counterfeit parts
are an extensive
Counterfeit
parts Counterfeit parts are are a considerable are a substantial
are not a problem a minor problem for problem for supply program for supply program for supply
chains
chains
chains
for supply chains
supply chains

In your own work experience, have you ever personally dealt with a counterfeit
parts situation? Check all that apply.
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I have unknowingly purchase a counterfeit product
I have knowingly purchased a counterfeit product
I know someone who has unknowingly purchased a counterfeit product
I know some someone who has knowingly purchased a counterfeit product
My company has received counterfeit products

In your work experience, have you ever dealt with a counterfeit parts
situation?
Never
problem

One time

A few times

An ongoing

In your work during the past year, how many purchasing decisions
have you made (include both individual and team decisions)?

What industry or government sector do you work in?
Which of the following best describes your current position
Top management

Middle management

Supervisor

Professional

Other

If you selected "Other" as your position level, please describe the
position.

How many years of professional work experience do you have?

How many years have you worked in supply chain management or
logistics?

How many years have you worked in purchasing?

What is the approximate annual dollar volume of purchases you are
responsible for?
< $25,000
$25,001 - $50,000
$50,001 - $75,000
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$75,001 - $100,000
> $100,000

What is the highest level of education you have completed?
High School / GED Some college Associate's Degree Bachelor's Degree
Master's Degree Post-Master's Degree Doctoral Degree

What is your gender?
Male

Female

Is English your native language?
Yes

No

Please select your level of agreement with the following statement.
Exemptions from required childhood vaccinations should only be on the
basis of medical necessity.
Strongly Disagree
Disagree
Neither Agree nor Disagree
Agree
Strongly Agree

What is your age in years?
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